Category Archives: essays

On Edelgard: Moral Complexity vs Moral Greyness

I would like to discourage applying “moral greyness” to Edelgard (by discouraging using “moral greyness” in literary analysis generally). Most of this is going to be theory about literary theory, not a discussion of Edelgard, because the facts about Edelgard are largely known and settled. I don’t think it’s productive to rehash one more time the arguments about whether act X or act Y of Edelgard’s is justified. What’s at issue is not her, it’s the theories of interpretation that are applied to her.

Morally Grey vs Morally Complex

So, let’s get to it. There is a difference between moral greyness and moral complexity. There are several models for moral greyness and moral complexity, and I can’t account for all of them.

At least for me, when a character is described as morally grey, it means that the character has mixed intents. They respond to both good and evil motivations in a meaningful fashion, beyond a hero’s ability to fail or misjudge or a villain’s ability to have good traits. E.g., a villain is not morally grey just because he likes dogs or defends his family. When he burns down an orphanage, he’s just evil: any good intentions or tendencies don’t really weigh against concrete, evil actions. What makes a character morally grey is how they “halt … between two opinions” or “serve two masters.” They willfully and knowingly do the right thing and the wrong thing. When they do the wrong thing, they are not trying to do the right thing but failing; they are doing exactly what they intend. And viceversa when they do the right thing. Moral greyness, then, tends to be impermanent in most characters.

Moral complexity, on the other hand, is what you have for difficult moral questions. A good person in a morally complex situation may not achieve good outcomes, despite good intentions. Less often considered is how an evil person, in a morally complex situation, may not be able to achieve the evil they desire. The litmus test I apply is this: a situation is morally complex if reasonable people could disagree about the right option.[1]

To better understand moral complexity, consider the law: executing the law is morally complex, no matter how wise or clever or studied you are. Most judges over criminal trials try to exercise lenience and harshness when each is appropriate. They try to recognize when a defendant is capable of or willing to reform and when they are not. Over the course of their career, they will all be lenient and harsh to some people who don’t deserve it. Or, to complicate it further, they will be lenient to someone who genuinely does deserve leniency, but that person will later abuse that leniency of their own free choice and seriously hurt someone. On top of all that, there’s a feedback loop: a judge may be tempted to be overly lenient or overly harsh if they’ve found success in leniency or harshness, or they may underuse one approach after seeing it fail. Which it should be reemphasized, both approaches fail regularly, because people are messy and deserve second chances, but it’s also not fair to victims to give people a chance to hurt people again, and there’s no perfect way to reconcile these two things without omniscience.

I believe that calling the law morally grey is inaccurate for one, but more importantly, it devalues the efforts, intents, and study of judges (a definition of moral greyness that includes this sort of thing is immediately overbroad in my eyes). The vast majority of judges in developed nations are trying to get the right results. The problem is that the right result is a matter on which reasonable people will disagree. Especially in the moment, before the consequences are known and knowledge is perfected.[2]

It’s worth mentioning here that moral complexity is not moral relativity: there are better and worse answers, and clearly wrong answers, and maybe even clearly ok answers, in morally complex questions. The complexity may be fact-specific, where it’s unclear how moral principles will apply to the specific people and circumstances involved, or it might be that the whole situation is gnarly and hard to resolve. But moral complexity presumes there are better and worse outcomes; it’s not just a wash between all the different options.

Now, just to be clear, moral greyness has its place in analysis. But it is a narrow one, limited. Moral greyness is overapplied and overused. Issues like politics, lawmaking, judicial decisions, and the like are morally complex and have resisted solutions for millennia—and will likely do so for millennia more. They are not, however, morally grey.

Edelgard Time

Edelgard is not a person of mixed intents. She intends to do what’s right. She largely rejects evil motivations like vengeance, even when they could technically coexist with her real motivations of reform and defense of the weak.

It is her lot that her choices predominantly lie in areas of moral complexity. She is a warmonger and a lawmaker: neither war nor law admit easy answers to its moral questions.[3] But the questions that law and war pose need to be answered; we cannot delay, as we can with science, until we have a “right” answer. There is an urgency to human suffering that requires us to act. There are also fundamental flaws in our ability to research and recognize right answers: it’s not clear that we could find the right answer even with an infinite delay. Most often, we simply must act, and it is only in the action itself that the answer becomes clear (if that; in these fields many questions will never be answered by mortal means).

The discourse around Edelgard’s actions is proof itself that she is in a morally complex situation, not a morally grey one. The debate is almost never whether she has good or ill intent, it’s about whether her actions were justified. And, I think the past years have made it abundantly clear, reasonable people can differ on that for pretty much everything Edelgard did. Edelgard is capable of misjudging and you may feel free to disagree with any given action of hers. What is incorrect is attaching evil intention to any misjudgment you decide she has made.

Anyways, I am content to call Edelgard a hero and to say she did nothing wrong. Not because she “objectively” did the right thing in every circumstance, but because she always sought to do the right thing and took steps to do so. And, not only did she try to do the right thing, she tried to be the kind of person who can recognize the right thing even in complex situations, by studying law, history, and philosophy.[4] She repeatedly asks the player to be a person “swayed by [her] words and deeds,” because that is where the proof is.[5] Not in framings, not in perspectives, not in outcomes, and certainly not in “Red Emperor” tropes and comparisons within Fire Emblem, but in what she has sought out to do; what she has envisioned and intended, as proven by words and deeds.

A hero isn’t someone I agree with on every issue; they’re someone I trust to fight for the truth. And that’s what Edelgard does and that’s what she’s about.

Further Theory That Isn’t Required But At The Very Least Is Something I Believe And Find Useful

Mixing is the problem: good and evil don’t mix quite like lights and darks do in painting. Moral greyness is like the worst of videogame choice design. In most “light vs dark” games that leave the choice to the character, like Star Wars: Knights of the Old Republic or Mass Effect, good actions weigh directly against bad ones. But we all know it’s ridiculous to say someone who commits genocide and then saves an orphanage is morally neutral.

Yet, this is the idea that moral greyness tends to propagate: weighing good against evil. And, while it’s true that people do both good and evil, good actions and evil actions are incommensurable, incomparable. You cannot add triangles to the number five. You cannot mix good actions and evil actions.

To illustrate, I turn to the genre noir, a genre which happens to suffer greatly from being described as morally grey. Noir protagonists tend to start out with mixed intents. Much of what’s good in the genre is that it’s willing to depict goodness in people who do bad things. So that would make them morally grey. But the point of noir is the darkness: it needs its protagonists to love the dark more and to end in the darkness. Noir is not a genre of moral relativity or ultimate greyness: if it were so, it would lose its impact and force. Noir needs the darks to be darks and its lights to be lights, because its meaning is created by contrasting the two, not by confusing them.

It is not even clear that you can “add” good to good or evil to evil. People are not permanently good or evil in any way. Good people can abandon their past, as can evil people. A good person can remain good in an evil system, even when that evil system forces them to do evil. And viceversa. The same tragic backstories can equally justify a heroic tale of overcoming and a villainous tale of succumbing. We try to create good and evil identities, but identity is an ephemeral thing. Not just for characters, but for ourselves and all humanity. We can seek to preserve good and evil intents, but we cannot reach a point where our good and evil are unchangeable.[6]

Anyways, and in conclusion, please take care, stay safe, and may your intentions be pure.


Footnotes

[1] Now, you can still do evil in a morally complex situation by choosing a harmful option that reasonable people would not choose. If you want a good reputation coming out of moral complexity, you need to choose one of the options that could be reasonably motivated by goodness. But that’s not the scenario we’re dealing with.

[2] I will note that some people use moral complexity to disguise evil intents. They will intentionally seek evil outcomes but use the complexity of the matter to claim that their intents were good and abuse the theories of well-motivated people to justify their actions and minimize the harms. But this is still morally evil, rather than morally grey. And, it must be emphasized, an evil person abusing a good person’s theory to achieve evil doesn’t mean the theory is wrong either. The theory may still be a good one, because an evil person will not execute it properly and will only imitate the appearance of the theory, rather than the substance. In short, the substance may still be quite good. Rejecting the theory because it was exploited may well cut you off from a sizable portion of truth.

That being said, I do believe that you can usually distinguish between genuine people and fakers if you are close enough to them. Not 100% of the time, since we all misjudge, but I would not say that moral complexity makes good and evil indistinguishable.

[3] Note that I use warmonger in a literal sense and not the normal pejorative one here.

[4] This is what sets Edelgard apart from the rest of the cast for me. Every character tries to do the right thing at least sometimes. However, Edelgard more than anyone else studies morality to increase how often she makes the right call. Especially in governance, it is not enough to desire the right thing: you must refine your understanding as well as your intentions. As Christ said: “Be ye therefore wise as serpents and harmless as doves.”

[5] Edelgard’s focus on words and deeds evokes these passages for me: number one and number two. Much of what I have written here, not just the one section, is motivated by these passages, too.

[6] I’d recommend reading these two criticisms of identity: one by the Argentine author Borges and another by the transcendental Ralph Waldo Emerson.

Unusual Umwelten of Fodlan: Nabateans, Crest Beasts, and Edelgard

general, light spoilers for FETH, nothing to do with Three Hopes tho

Outline

I. Intro

II. Dragons

III. Crest Beast

IV. Hegemon Husk

V. Closing Thoughts

I. Introduction and Framework: Umwelten

For a long time, I’ve wanted to write about one of my special interests[1] as it applies to Fire Emblem Three Houses: umwelten. It’ll take a moment to set up since there’s some specialized vocabulary and some background concepts necessary to understand the whole situation, but, at least to me, the groundwork is beyond fascinating.

An umwelt is a term coined by biologist Jakob von Uexküll.[2] It’s a curious little concept lying underneath much more famous theories from people like semioticians like Heidegger and Bakhtin. Strictly translated, it means “environment,” but what it really refers to is the world that an organism creates by interpreting the stimuli received by sensory organs.

It is important to understand umwelten because physically speaking, before your or my personality/mind/voluntary will can begin to act, physical factors limit what we perceive and alter how we interpret. We can only act on data if we perceive it. A bat can act on all sorts of data we cannot thanks to its sonar; a tick cannot see and cannot build its worldview on sight (but it can build an umwelt using heat signals based on a sensitivity far more delicate than ours). There could be any number of senses that humans are incapable of, with data we’ll never be able to perceive (think about all the things you physically sense, through sight and hearing and taste and touch and smell, that a plant, or a jellyfish, living beings all, have no concept of, and indeed, can never contemplate). And, of course, our senses are imperfect: vision’s fuzzy, finite, imprecise, sometimes we missee things, confuse one thing for something else, etc. And a lot of those errors we never detect (because, most of the time, they don’t matter). Just like we never realize when we are correctly filling in the gaps in our perception, because most of that happens before the data is even presented to our conscious perception.

Not only do our bodies determine what raw data we possess, but they also influence how we interpret that data. Chemical signals can dramatically alter how we interpret things, like how McDonalds never tastes better than when you’re hungry, how adrenaline allows you to perceive some things with incredible accuracy but fail to perceive other things entirely, and how trauma can increase sensitivity or awareness to negative stimuli. The sophistication of our brains allows us to do things like detect lines, perform physical predictions, and distinguish rhythms and colors when many species can’t do any of these things, even when they are perceiving the light or sound or other stimuli that contains the lines, music, and the like. (I am deeply saddened by this truth because my dog will never understand why wrapping his leash around a pole limits his movement.) To say nothing of how memory and past experience also affect your interpretive framework.

So your umwelt is the world as you construct it, based on all your sensory abilities, limitations, filters, biases, etc. Your umwelt changes whenever you interact with anything, as you add new information and forget old data. Parts of your umwelt include your innenwelt, that is, how you construct yourself within your umwelt. Because, while we do have special access to information about ourselves, we are still perceiving most parts of ourselves in some fashion. Whenever we engage in self-reflection as is necessary to create concepts like “Identity” or “Self-Image”, we do so purely by using perception on ourselves. And not just our own perception, but we necessarily rely a lot on our perception of others and how we perceive others perceive us. This brings us to the final bits of vocabulary (which I probably won’t use but it’s good to have :>). When you perceive someone else’s umwelt, that’s an umgebung (it deserves a different name because you aren’t accessing their umwelt, the umgebung is just the parts of their umwelt that you manage to perceive imperfectly). Then, a sociosphere is created by the interaction of two umwelten. A sociosphere requires communication via signs to bridge the umwelten (these signs being everything from raw sensory data to spoken language to tone to body movements, each full of their own impreciseness, imperfection, and ambiguity, for good and ill). The signing process, that is, all communications of meaning, is semiosis.

As a final example, take a moment to consider the soles of your feet, the walls around you, or the palms of your hand. Your feet are touching something, possibly fabric or grass or carpet or wood or tile. There’s a whole lot of sensory data of softness, texture, shape, temperature. When you think about walls, most of the time I just imagine them as flat, but that’s not true at all. When I see a brick wall, I know it’s made of bricks, but I don’t observe the individual bricks at all. And despite the phrase “know it like the back of your hand”, how much do you actually know or perceive of your hands? The little platelike structures that compose your skin, the creases on the joints, the veins under the surface, the pores, the precise contours and shapes of your hands?

If you choose to focus on one of these things, you’re suddenly filled with new data and your world, your umwelt, is enriched and detailed. When you’re not focusing on them, they simply do not exist at all within your umwelt, because you are not perceiving them. They exist within the welt, the physical, unperceived world, but they don’t exist in your umwelt. Attention is important to prevent us from being overwhelmed by the sheer amount of data our senses provide, like the typically useless awareness of the taste of the inside of our mouth or the sensation of clothing against skin.

Between differences in sensory organs, chemical compositions, wills, and experiences, our perceptions are fundamentally different, not just from species to species but from individual to individual. You and I can never know what it’s like to be inside someone else’s head, not really, anyway. Empathy is somewhere between reasoned guesswork and outright projection.[3] The gulf between a person and a bat is not so severe as the distance between two people, but we never really know how close or how far we are experientially, linguistically, or physically. (This doesn’t mean empathy isn’t important or valuable, but it’s limited. See [1] for places where I talk about that in detail, but a discussion of the frailty of empathy and a subsequent reconstruction of empathetic action is well beyond the scope of this article.)

With the groundwork out of the way, let’s talk about three umwelten: that of dragons, that of crest beasts, and that of the Hegemon Husk. Note that this is speculative rather than concrete because this stuff is specific enough that you’d need authorial confirmation for it to have any authority. So, more questions and possibilities are raised than conclusions reached, but they’re fun questions and possibilities and you could do a lot exploring them in fanfiction and the like. (See [4] for stories that explicitly address stuff like this; it’s awesome.)

II. The Immaculate One and other Draconic Shapeshifters/Nabateans

A single creature with a composite umwelt, because it has two separate sets of sensory devices, united by a single mind interpreting the senses, but the inability to use both sets simultaneously. We can assume that dragons in human form have a sensory suite similar to humans in most respects.

Biologically, a dragon body takes much more energy than a human one, meaning it just doesn’t make sense to use unless it’s necessary. So what is it necessary for? I doubt dragon forms are dexterous enough for construction work, so that leaves hunting and fighting. This is reflected in Rhea’s nutty combat skills, from Hoarfrost to Miracle to Defiant Strength to Ancient Dragonskin. Draconic bodies are for fighting; human forms are for communication, living, crafting, i.e., all else. Social life.

This narrow purpose means that dragon bodies are likely to focus on certain types of sensory data, like hunger (because of how much energy a dragon body needs to maintain) and aggression (the body needs the mind to be on board with fighting when it is using this form). Dragons are probably more territorial or even conquering because they would need to be so in order to survive. Of course, they’re more than intelligent enough to resist these impulses, but it might be harder for them to resist these impulses in dragon form. A dragon form is probably better able to handle the peculiar cognitive burdens of combat, like intense stench, fear, loathing (both loathing others or the dreadful sensation of being loathed).

Note, though, that the Immaculate One’s mechanics suggest social cooperation might be physically built into the dragon form: the fact that Hoarfrost and Aurora Breath don’t damage allies and Sacred Power buffs allies means that the dragon form’s abilities are modified under the assumption that allies in combat are likely to be present. But these social components specifically may reflect Rhea’s own training, rather than innate physical qualities. While the dragon form likely elevates survival instincts, which are often antisocial, these social aspects repudiate the possibility that the dragon form is purely animal. (Crossing the streams, I note also that Nowi and Tiki can benefit from pair up while transformed too.)

In summary, a dragon’s umwelt may include much more threat information than a human one, with more stimuli being perceived as threatening. Survival information will also be elevated to sustain the body’s higher energy needs. Information irrelevant to the purpose of the dragon form is less likely to be incorporated into a dragon’s worldview as long as they are in dragon form.

How much that carries over to the human form is unclear. The mere existence of a dragon form might affect the human form’s senses as well, e.g., Rhea might get hungrier faster. There are probably ways for the body to communicate to the mind the need to shapeshift, attached to the processes of aggression (it could operate somewhat like adrenaline).

Other plausible differences between human and dragon forms include:

  • better sight (the Immaculate One has a range of 5, for instance) (but perhaps they use magic as a sensory organ; the Immaculate One has white, round pupils, which wouldn’t work well at all).
  • windsense: greater awareness of wind/wind currents thanks to wings.
  • physical insensitivity: scales and scale-the scales may not have the same level of detailed touch information as skin, and the scale of draconic bodies means that they have to filter out more sensory information to not be overwhelmed.

Plausible differences between humans and dragons (regardless of form):

  • cognitive capacity: this might differ between human and dragon forms, but also between human forms and genuine humans. Perhaps dragons have better pattern recognition or something.
  • lots of instinctual interpretive filters. Dragons probably have different microbiomes, gut systems, and all that changing what they can eat, what they like to eat, etc. And from there, that changes what smells they like, what chemicals or flavors are associated with “good” and “bad”, etc. E.g., maybe fish are really good for dragons and Flayn’s fishxation is more than sentimental.
  • Stamina & other physical abilities. Crests are innate to dragons. The fact that their human forms are combat-capable (and they don’t totally rely on dragon form for combat) means that even their human forms probably require more energy than humans and that combat in human form wasn’t uncommon. Otherwise, dragons would probably be quite physically frail.
  • Age and perception of time: there’s naturally a lot of debate over how “fast” different people or species might perceive time and it’s a subject quite resistant to empirical study. But I’d say it’s pretty reasonable to say dragons, especially long-lived ones,
  • Hibernation. Dragons can hibernate, but don’t have to. That makes you wonder what triggers hibernation, how they choose to do so, etc. Perhaps a dragon can just start overeating and that tells the body they’re about to hibernate.

The last note is dragon madness present throughout Fire Emblem lore. It wasn’t clear that dragon madness applies to the dragons of Fodlan until recently, when FEH had its forging bonds event that framed Fallen Rhea’s experience squarely within the domain of dragon madness. I actually started writing this before the Forging Bonds came out and I probably found the revelation a bit more exciting (in an academic sense) than most. What I’ve written here provides a purely biological explanation for dragon madness (as opposed to an ephemeral “dragons go crazy because old” that dragon madness has often been reduced to).[5]

As stated, it seems reasonable that the dragon form increases aggression, territorialness, decreases distress in combat, etc. The shift between this state and human state requires significant neuroplasticity, that is, the capacity for a brain to modify itself to adapt to different needs and circumstances. Neuroplasticity naturally decreases in humans with age and under high stress, i.e., the exact conditions that aggravate dragon madness. So, what dragon madness may represent is the gradual loss of the ability to revert and regulate the useful and productive cognitive qualities of dragon form. So dragons lose the ability to stop thinking and feeling as if they were constantly in combat and possibly in danger. In other words, the body approaches a state where it can’t exit its emergency mode.

Emergency mode, fight or flight, adrenaline-pumping, however you frame it, is incredibly taxing on mind and body. Focus and attention don’t work normally, there is a constant search for threats which involves a very specific type of detail-oriented perception (at the exclusion of other forms of perception and thinking), the heart, muscles, and the like work overtime, certain hormones and neurological subnetworks go wild, and so on. All very taxing, very tiring, very stressful. Plus, resources are devoted to survival-focused tasks at the expense of other functions, making it harder to perform normal, low-intensity tasks. That’s why it’s only used when necessary.[6] But without relief, the damage builds up from overworking the mind and body. As damage accumulates, the body and mind become less capable, and need to exert even more energy to function normally. And the victim is typically conscious of this decay, watching their capacities decline and losing their sense of control over their lives and actions. And, unless something interrupts the decay, it not only continues but accelerates. This is bad under any circumstances, but what is important about dragon madness is how it develops even in the absence of stress or trauma. Dragons are expected to experience this, no matter what they do, and despite their (assumedly) unlimited lifespans. Now, even in dragon madness, they are still people, but their umwelt is increasingly warped: they’re going to miss information that suggests things may be nonthreatening, they’ll miss details on all kinds of tasks, and they’ll be easier to provoke. The sort of information being missed also happens to be the sort that is often most helpful in mitigating stress and maintaining healthy worldviews and relationships. And, since this process does not seem to be strongly reversible,

III. Crest Beasts

The cognitive and perceptive state of crest beasts is probably quite similar to severe dragon madness, with some aggravating factors. First off, crest beasts are an imitation of dragons, what with how crests are ultimately draconic power. Crest beasts seem to undergo the same mental alterations as dragon shapeshifters, but where the negative effects are amplified. Humans are not meant to become crest beasts (meaningful insight, that one), and the dramatic shift in perception, emotional systems, and the like means that the human system is unprepared to experience the same things dragons experience during shapeshifting. For dragons, it’s built into them; for humans, it’s a radical, forceful, unnatural reconstruction of their being.

Some things to make it worse: First, the transformation itself is painful and intense pain is quite effective at blocking our perception of most stimuli. Recall how failing to perceive neutral or beneficial stimuli is one of the primary harms of dragon madness. Adding additional factors limiting perception means those harms will manifest more severely. Second, the human mind is not going to be ready to process information as it is presented to them by a crest beast’s body. Everything will look, smell, feel, taste, sound different. Some things will be too intense, other things will be conspicuously absent. This probably isn’t as severe or stressful or disorienting as, say, a person blind from birth receiving treatment to restore their sight as an adult, but that’s the sort of distress this is. Third, the process probably just causes straight brain damage. Nothing about it seems healthy. Fourth, crest beasts don’t have any of the moderating influences of natural selection or biology to make sure anything about them works properly.

So, crest beasts experience the worst parts of being a dragon, but all at once, with no biological safeguards or ameliorating factors. Checks out why they’d completely lose their sensibility in most cases or retain very little sense in the case of the most robust, like Maurice.

IV. Hegemon Husk

We know very little about the hegemon[7] husk, but it seems to be a recreation of nabateans using human material. I would put, biologically, the husk as a sort of midway point between crest beasts and nabateans. The blood reconstruction surgery Edelgard underwent with the double crest allowed her to become a shapeshifter and retain herself while transformed, much like a nabatean and quite unlike a crest beast. She is also able to reverse the transformation. I’ll also note that Fallen Edelgard, as depicted in FEH, is still very much in control of her faculties. She’s not mad, as the fallen characters often are.

The term husk does imply something is lost in the transformation.[8] If I had to guess at it, a lot of that applies to the physical level. Like the crest beast, the husk lacks all biological function and constraints. It is a purely artificial form, so questions like natural selection, adaptation, and fitness are off the table. I would assume the entire process is incredibly strenuous, if not ruinous, for Edelgard’s body. We can imagine that, as in the crest beast, the mental shifts are severe: as a human, Edelgard’s brain on the physical level is not naturally prepared for the change and subsequent increases in aggression. But as mentioned, she bears this well.

Indeed, the husk seems to exhibit everything about crest powers/shapeshifting more intensely than even nabateans. Consider the crest of flames weapon, with a whopping 27 range, as well as the ability to act twice. 27 range, even with a low hit-rate, implies a powerful perceptive ability (probably magical rather than purely physical, especially since her black irises and red pupils wouldn’t function very well as eyes).

This extremity of power, perhaps, is the best way to interpret the term hegemon as applied to the husk (even reading it as a husk of a hegemon is inaccurate, since Edelgard did not achieve hegemony in AM. Perhaps husk of a potential hegemon). Because, in the typical, political meaning of the hegemon, Edelgard isn’t a hegemon of anything at this point in AM. She does, however, represent the peak of physical might. The husk is at least on par with a nabatean, but also possesses twin crests. One last, but unevidenced possibility, is that Edelgard is manifesting only as a husk of her real power in that form. This type of highly specific, choice-and-context of language interpretation isn’t normally my speed, but given the lack of information about the husk, it at least gives us a bit more to talk about. Whatever the case, it’s odd that the only time the word hegemon is used in FETH is to describe Edelgard in husk form and in the much more context-appropriate title for Byleth in their Edelgard paired ending.

V. Closing Thoughts

Thanks for making it through. I hope at least part of the discussion was enjoyable. I’ll note that, while I haven’t relied too much on the vocabulary developed in the introduction, I think that discussion is still useful for foundational reasons, because it motivated this entire study, and it was underlying everything I wrote here. I did this for fun and hope it was fun for yall too.

An important limitation on the whole discussion: the study of umwelten and how our bodies and experiences color, limit, and define what we experience and how we construct the world is valuable. Both to better understand ourselves and others. It is not, however, grounds for vilifying or dehumanizing people by culture, experience, personality, or physical qualities. People and cultures have flaws, but in intelligent beings, our choices weigh much more than our physical differences (and I would say this would be just as true when comparing human and nonhuman characters). This is especially true when we intentionally observe, study, and accommodate these flaws in ourselves.[8]

Quickly, I want to discuss the nonphysical implications of the term husk. The other thing lost is that this is the only time that Edelgard genuinely accepts TWSITD’s influence over her body. It’s the culmination of the blood-reconstruction and the destruction of her family. It’s a last-ditch effort, after all her friends have been slain in previous battles and Edelgard is last person who can carry her vision forward. Edelgard’s final struggle in AM is a husk of what it was: even if she were victorious, TWSITD has expanded its control over her and the people she chose to fight alongside are gone. To drive it home, note how the hegemon husk has a skill called a Wilted Flower.[9]

This note is perhaps obvious, but if I were publishing this, there’s some stuff I’d fix up (like making sure to properly couch each statement as a potential interpretation rather than a how it is interpretation, but I’m not doing that much editing for free LOL). Took being unable to sleep as a good sign to finally finish this project/I’ve been sitting on this long enough that it just feels like it’s better to finish than keep holding onto it.

And most importantly, stay safe and take care yall. World’s crazy, but there’s a lot of good people out there and a lot of good you can do.

Footnotes

[1] If umwelten are something that interests you, I’ve written about it several times before but my favorite would be this: A Description of La Vida total. Pretty much anything on my site with the tag La Vida total is concerned with understanding others’ perception (and how, although it’s ultimately impossible, it’s a sacred and essential process).

[2] I think it’s tragic that there’s so much talk of semiotics, often without hitting on this core concept at the foundation of it all. Semiotics is essential for much of the good parts of postmodernism and especially understanding why modernist, enlightenment, and romantic thought were all kinda falling apart, i.e., why postmodernism became necessary. Alongside Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems and non-Euclidean geometry messing with mathematics, an understanding of umwelten makes some amount of postmodernism essential. And knowing this stuff helps navigate a lot of current issues and debates a little better because it inoculates you against some common intellectual traps.

[3] This didn’t fit in anywhere, but for your consideration: Sonder. As much as I love tangents, I don’t want to overdo it.

[4] If you like applying science and biology to fantastic species, I’d recommend Heterogenea Linguistica, Delicious in Dungeon, and, to a lesser extent, Land of the Lustrous. Heterogenea Linguistica focuses on how language would vary based on the physical capacities of fantasy races, while Delicious in Dungeon focuses on all kinds of ecosystems, interactions, sustainability, and all that. I’ve been loving them both. And Land of the Lustrous focuses a lot on the mind-body relationship in the context of gem-body people and how differences in body affect concepts like memory. Oh, and the anime Flip Flappers actually introduced me to the concept. Due to some development issues, like the loss of their head writer halfway through the run, the second half of the show is pretty shaky. But the first half especially is very clearly playing with and trying to understand the issues of umwelten.

[5] The explanation I favored most before (and it applies to any long-lived species) is that a longer life also means more opportunities for life-shattering trauma. This, of course, was an inadequate explanation for dragon madness, because people can and do recover from life-shattering trauma and dragon madness seems inevitable (although, who knows, maybe it’s not; there are so few dragons that humans are basing their understanding of dragon madness off of a handful of individuals, individuals they have a bad tendency of starting wars and genocides with).

[6] Several human mental conditions, like PTSD (and cPTSD even more), anxiety, and paranoia are possibly, a deregulation of the same process, that is, these diseases arise when the body feels like it is in danger constantly. My experience of cPTSD squares with this description of the condition, but as someone who is more an “involuntary expert” than an actual expert on the subject, I think it’s appropriate to emphasize that I don’t know that this is the precise mechanism for these diseases. It’s a plausible explanation and one I believe, but I am unaware of how rigorously the explanation has been assessed at the scientific level.

[7] Clearing up a misconception I’ve seen in the wild about the term hegemon, that it’s pejorative or negative or some such. Hegemony is a descriptive term, not a pejorative. Hegemony is often criticized because it’s dangerous, but hegemony of some form is typical (and possibly necessary) in any given societal arrangement. A functional government is always hegemon within its territory, for instance. Modern governance limits the danger of hegemony by breaking it up between competing groups, but these groups possess the hegemony of the state between them. There may exist other powers that compete or limit a hegemon, but a hegemon is dramatically more powerful than rivals. Rhea was hegemon: the dominant power in Fodlan, a single figure who stands at the top of Fodlan’s hierarchies (albeit a power in decline by all accounts, evidenced by the incomplete loss of influence in Adrestia and the weakened ability to invoke Fodlan’s armies for the Church’s purposes). Byleth inherits that title in most routes. Edelgard can be emphasized as a hegemon in Fodlan only insofar as she represents a new hegemonic structure, i.e., a hegemon besides the head of the Church of Seiros.

[8] I feel the need to mention this because people have used semiotics and observations about biology for several noxious philosophies. Racism, for one, especially since the theory was first developed in the middle of scientific racism’s peak. Or the argument that infants don’t deserve protection because they supposedly can’t express preferences (from Peter Singer, but also an idiotic claim on the facts).

[9] If anyone recalls what I wrote about Edelgard as an empath, part of that was that she seems a lot like what is described as an orchid child, i.e., a child who blooms with support but wilts without it (as opposed to more resilient children who have less extreme outcomes). Wilted flower checks out.

A Historical Perspective on Edelgard and Political Nonviolence

Edelgard’s declaration of war is often criticized by appeals for using nonviolent methods of change. This criticism most often looks like the argument that Edelgard should’ve just talked it out with Rhea and/or Dimitri. It may also manifest as the claim that Edelgard’s cause is not urgent enough to justify violence, so only nonviolent means are permissible. Now, before we get into this, I should note that I am a prima facie pacifist for the sake of disclosure.[1]

Historical Significance of Political Nonviolence

I’m not going to say it would have been impossible for nonviolent strategies to work. Everything that follows refers to probabilities, viability, and limitations, not unconditional truths. However, the nonviolent argument is ahistorical. While the philosophy of personal nonviolence is old, the philosophy of political nonviolence is modern. Here, I refer to political nonviolence as the belief that nonviolence is an effective means to effect political change. Political nonviolence could not exist until human rights, rule of law, and (to a lesser extent) democracy had become reality. It is only because these conditions are common that we can contemplate nonviolence as a political option. As George Orwell observed:

It is difficult to see how Gandhi’s methods could be applied in a country where opponents of the regime disappear in the middle of the night and are never heard of again. Without a free press and the right of assembly, it is impossible not merely to appeal to outside opinion, but to bring a mass movement into being, or even to make your intentions known to your adversary.[2]

Freedom of speech, press, and assembly are prerequisite to the formation of a nonviolent movement. Rule of law is necessary so that violent opponents of nonviolent protesters cannot act with impunity – paramilitary groups, members of the government, and lone actors must all be held responsible or expected to be held responsible for attacks on nonviolent protesters. Democracy aids nonviolence since nonviolence relies on popular support, but is neither essential nor sufficient (after all, Socrates was democratically executed). Before these conditions existed, nonviolence was a philosophy of individual conduct – it was not considered a method to effect political change. Striking, protesting, and the like are not effective against someone who is willing to kill innocents in the name of preserving their power. (Just as Peasant Revolts were wildly unsuccessful, a Peasant Picket Line is a laughable concept.) It just is not possible to develop a serious philosophy of political nonviolence in the medieval political environment.

On the subject of monarchy, violence is nearly the only form of regime change. Since the monarch controls policy, policy change can only come by changing the monarch’s beliefs (usually only possible as an adviser) or by changing the monarch (assassination, coup, invasion, kidnapping, etc). For an outsider to change the monarch’s beliefs, the outsider must do more than convince the monarch. The outsider must overcome the (probably hostile) influence of the monarchy’s staff. The staff may be advisers, guards, bureaucrats, or messengers. Whatever their station, officials are unlikely to aid anti-establishment causes and are likely to resort to censorship or false reporting. Monarchs are powerful forces for the establishment, but are generally less effective vehicles of reform.

As a corollary, even if the monarch is sympathetic to an anti-establishment message, the monarch must change the moods of all their enforcers. That is an enormous challenge logistically, legally, and politically, even for a monarch. Monarchy is not prone to dramatic ideological change unless the people themselves are readied to make the same change.[3] The renaissances and ideological revolutions of the medieval era were organic. A monarch, or an aspiring agitator, could not have willed them into existence.

Nonviolence in Fodlan’s Political Environment

Now, let’s look at Edelgard’s options for peaceful change. First off, diplomacy with Rhea is a nonoption. Rhea is dogmatic, totalitarian, and does not recognize freedom of discourse. Rhea is the only single figure that could bring about change across Fodlan, but she is not in a position where she is willing to listen to a political opposition. Centuries of hegemony warp the mind and it is no wonder that she has a hard time taking any vision but hers seriously, for all other ideologues die without damaging her position. The other lords aren’t particularly promising either. Dimitri is highly unstable, even pre-timeskip, prone to blinding emotion during disagreements, and pro-establishment (though not radically so). His refusal to recognize that it is impossible for Edelgard to be behind the tragedy of Duscur is demonstrative. As for Claude, there is no particular advantage to diplomacy. Edelgard considers Rhea her adversary and Dimitri considers Edelgard her enemy. Claude being on Edelgard’s side would not move us closer to a Golden Route. Further, his own desire to conquer Fodlan, coupled with his manipulative and secretive nature make him a poor partner for Edelgard. In short, the personalities of Edelgard’s counterparts leave me with little trust in the diplomatic process.

It is also reasonable to suppose that Edelgard would be a nonparty to the political scene without a war. Edelgard’s rise to power was likely contingent on starting a war. Her main benefactors are House Hevring and House Bergliez, both of which benefit from a war. House Hevring’s main source of revenue is mining and its main duty is administration. Thus, their best method for accruing power is land, the primary form of wealth prior to industrialization. More land -> more mines/exploitable resources and more land -> more need for Hevring’s administrative role. Wartime also increases demand for mining (stone and ore for armor, weapons, and fortifications) and heightens their influence over domestic policy as competitors shift focus to external affairs. As for House Bergliez, they command the army. They have more power during wartime. They stand to benefit from the boost to attention and prestige. Even if they aren’t warhawks in particular, they are unlikely to oppose war on ideological grounds. We do not know Count Bergliez or Count Hevring to be idealistic in any sense (Count Hevring participated in the Insurrection of the Seven, after all). Since they do not care for Edelgard’s vision, the war remains as the biggest factor distinguishing her and PM Aegir. For his part, PM Aegir has shown no hawkish inclinations over the course of his rule. Therefore, if Hevring and Bergliez want a war, Edelgard is their only option.

Without the title of Emperor, Edelgard would have little political influence, especially in foreign affairs. Even with the title, nonviolence is especially impotent on the international scale: “Applied to foreign politics, pacifism either stops being pacifist or becomes appeasement.”[2] As a puppet or figurehead, Edelgard would have no leverage and no means beyond her own charisma. Rhea and Dimitri, her primary adversaries, are violently unstable – “the assumption, which served Gandhi so well in dealing with individuals, that all human beings are more or less approachable and will respond to a generous gesture, needs to be seriously questioned. It is not necessarily true, for example, when you are dealing with lunatics.”[2] Even without the violence, they are still dogmatic and closed off to Edelgard’s influence. This all combines to make diplomacy unviable.

Summary

Political nonviolence would be an anachronism in FETH.[4] Even in theory, it is out of place. Considering the particulars of Fodlan, the case for nonviolence gets even worse. The promise of a war was probably necessary for Edelgard to retake power in the Empire.

I’ve written this because <3 Edelgard, but also because it really is important to understand the history, limits, and nature of our ideals. This is a bit personal, but I’ve been troubled by the rise of ideologues throughout modern society and how they call dogma “idealism” or “faith to their principles.” And I think it’s something to watch out for/keep in mind.

[1] Prima facie pacifism “presumes that war is wrong but allows for exceptions [and] places the burden of proof upon the proponent of war: it is up to the proponent of war to prove, in a given circumstance, that war is in fact morally necessary” (Standord Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Pacifism).

[2] Reflections on Gandhi, George Orwell, 1949

[3] The Adrestian people seem readier to accept ideological change than the others. For one part, Adrestia seems to suffer from more extreme examples of the abuses that exist throughout Fodlan. For another, the Adrestian people have no common ideology that shores up these abuses. By contrast, Faerghus seems the least ready for change. Even though Faerghus’ culture is full of severe abuse, the Faerghus culture shores up these abuses. A normal participant of Faerghus culture (esp. the knightly ideal) is discouraged from criticizing the aristocracy, the religious ideologues, and the dogmatic cultural norms. Faerghus culture is self-preserving and shifts attention from itself: every character from Faerghus (excluding Felix and Jeralt to some degree) criticizes those around them or themselves for their suffering, not the systems, laws, and beliefs that cause suffering. This being the case, Faerghus may well resent many of Edelgard’s reforms in Crimson Flower, but reform is more likely to come by conquest than from within. Funnily enough, there is a real-life novel that would be perfect for the people of Faerghus, especially literary folk like Ingrid and Ashe: Don Quixote, or my preferred title, El Ingenioso Hidalgo Don Quijote de la Mancha (The Ingenious Gentleman Don Quixote of La Mancha). Don Quixote was written specifically as a criticism of the chivalric ideal and as a parody of chivalric novels, the same ideal that plagues Faerghus. Miguel de Cervantes’ genius would probably strike a chord with many Faerghus readers.

[4] Another anachronistic idea that I see a lot is new players’ preference for the Leicester Alliance. They see Adrestia and Faerghus and, based on the fact that monarchy is bad, decide that the Alliance is preferable. Some may even mistake the Leicester Alliance as being close-ish to democracy, which, as moderns, we are supposed to prefer in all circumstances. However, the Alliance is an aristocratic oligarchy, which is one of the worst forms of government. In fact, Plato’s Republic goes out and calls it the absolute worst form of government, out of all forms it considers. It inherits almost all the foibles of monarchy and the weaknesses of democracy: indecision, corruption, excessive concentration of power, an elite class formed by blood, etc.

[Originally written 04 May 2021 for r/Edelgard]

Con amor, el noir: Una teoría de empatía literaria

El noir es un género emocional. Por tanta preocupación que los personajes noir tienen con la lógica, tanto ellos como los lectores reconocen el espacio que existe más allá de la lógica—el mismo espacio que sirve para darle al noir su identidad, aparte de la novela policiaca y la novela detectivesca (véase Copjec 178-183). Dentro del hueco dejado por la lógica, surge una disposición emocional en particular: la empatía. Es de la empatía que el noir saca la mayoría de su valor literaria. La empatía es una de las motivaciones principales de la filosofía noir, igual que un factor esencial de sus resultados. La empatía también asegura que el género no degenere en su propia vileza. El rol clave de la empatía se debe al ambiente de emoción negativa que crea el noir, el cual ambiente ha recibido recientemente el nombre de noir affect. Sin la empatía, el afecto noir quedaría tóxico y no recibiría lectura fuera del contexto nihilista.

Este estudio discutirá los temas mencionados de esta manera: se establecerá la base del afecto noir, la empatía será identificada como elemento sine qua non de este afecto. Como el afecto es un fenómeno con elementos fuertes de subjetividad, el punto de referencia afectiva tendrá que ser el del autor, en este caso, en relación con la novela Montevideo noir, por Hugo Burel. Habrá referencias ocasionales a las experiencias afectivas de otros autores que las han descrito e interacción con otros textos, cuando es relevante. Sugiero que un estudio fuertemente empático puede hacerse con cualquier texto noir, sin sugerir que todos los autores desearían o anticiparían tal lectura. El noir tiene su componente empático en sí, donde la empatía esté ausente, el texto carecerá del afecto noir.

1. El afecto noir

Empezamos con el afecto noir. Existe mucho desacuerdo en cuanto a la definición, la ontología, la causalidad, la posición, etc., del afecto dentro de las disciplinas diversas que se han valido del concepto. Aquellas discusiones quedan fuera de este estudio: nos conformamos con considerar el afecto noir. Para los propósitos del afecto general, adopto la definición de Carroll y Russell: “genuine subjective feelings and moods (as when someone says, ‘I’m feeling sad’), rather than thoughts about specific objects or events (as when someone calmly says, ‘The crusades were a sad chapter in human history’). Affect can be assessed at any given moment, rather than only in times of great emotion” (3-4). El afecto noir, entonces, es formado por los sentimientos que corresponden al noir, tanto los sentimientos efémeros y reactivos de una lectura como el humor que el lector asociará con el libro después de haberlo terminado.

Breu y Hatmaker han propuesto que la presencia del afecto noir sea la definición total del noir. No proveen una definición exacta, pero quizá con la razón de que el noir tiene cierta hostilidad con las definiciones libres de ambigüedad. Proveen las palabras siguientes para bosquejar el concepto:

In trying to define noir, we encounter the same forms of negativity that characterize the work of the form itself. Noir itself foregrounds fractiousness, divisiveness, conflict, and dissension. Moreover, it is preoccupied with belatedness, retrospection, fatality, inadequacy, and intransigence. It also marks the elusiveness of subjects to definition and even to self-knowledge. (3)

De este bosquejo, se nota que el afecto noir está vinculado en todo a la filosofía noir. Si la filosofía noir se trata del nihilismo, la incertidumbre, la posmodernidad y la fatalidad, el afecto noir es la crisis existencial que estos asuntos filosóficos suelen traer consigo. En general, el afecto es dividido entre el afecto positivo y el afecto negativo. El afecto positivo corresponde a conceptos como el amor, la felicidad y la seguridad, mientras que el afecto negativo se relaciona con sentimientos como el enojo, la tristeza y el temor. En base de estas filosofías, el afecto noir es de la clase negativa: “an understanding of noir as characterized by negative affect is the central premise” (Breu y Hatmaker 3).

En el caso de Montevideo noir, yo describiría el afecto de la primera porción de la novela como una ansiedad nauseabunda. El protagonista, Gabriel Keller, se ha fascinado con la estética del asesinato perfecto a través de la lectura de una novela noir llamada Asesino a sueldo, esta novela protagonizada por un Murray Sullivan. A la vez, Keller sufre de la soledad y la pérdida de su familia (su esposa perdida a la muerte y su hijo a la mudanza remota) y descubre un amor tentativo para una vecina, Beatriz, y un odio convencido hacia su novio, Javier Brentano.

La ansiedad mencionada tiene varios elementos. Primero, hay el miedo que Keller imite la trama de Asesino a sueldo. A este miedo, se suma un miedo específico: Murray Sullivan mató a la mujer a quien él había tratado de salvar. Mientras se deshace la división entre la realidad (ficticia) de Keller y la trama de Asesino a sueldo (una ficción dentro de una ficción), se produjo en mí una preocupación intensa de que Keller mate a Beatriz. La severidad de este peligro es atestiguada por las palabras que Keller se asevera débilmente cuando comprende las razones que Murray Sullivan teñía cuando mató a la mujer: “Finalmente se dijo que era solo una novela y que la realidad suele ser muy diferente” (41). Este segundo miedo se distingue del primero por afectos. Que Keller mate a Brentano, por ejemplo, es grave, pero es menos grave gracias al afecto negativo del caso: Keller puede inculcar en el lector parte del odio que Keller siente. El lector no tiene que depender totalmente de Keller para este afecto negativo, cuando aprende que Brentano es un adicto del azar, es abusivo en su relación con Beatriz y tiene otra novia aparte (aunque solamente la adicción es revelada antes de que Keller mata a Brentano). Por otra parte, el riesgo de que muera Beatriz produce un afecto nauseabundo porque Beatriz produce afecto positivo, ya que es retratada como abnegada, optimista e inocente. En ambos casos, hay un afecto fuertemente negativo asociado con la posibilidad de que Keller mate (una posibilidad que se realiza), pero este afecto es agravado por el afecto positivo hacia Beatriz y aliviado por el afecto negativo hacia Brentano.

Además de estos afectos principales, hay varios afectos auxiliares dentro de la primera porción de Montevideo noir. Por ejemplo, mientras crece el entendimiento de la vileza de Brentano, crece el miedo de que Brentano siga causando daño a Beatriz y a su familia sin sufrir repercusiones, ya que la sociedad no promete ningún castigo para él. Hay también el afecto de la disforia, demostrado cuando Keller se despide de su jefe anterior: “Keller lo miró y de pronto le pareció estar ante un desconocido, alguien que no podía comprenderlo ni saber siquiera remotamente cómo se sentía” (48). La angustia mental y emocional suele producir este sentimiento de aislamiento entre conocidos y, aunque Keller no describe ninguna enfermedad mental específica ni expresa necesariamente una experiencia duradera del trauma, Keller invoca los afectos del trauma en los lectores que conocen trauma por sí mismos a través de este lenguaje.

El afecto noir existe de una manera más limitada después del asesinato de Brentano. Con la muerte de Brentano realizada, la ansiedad y la ambigüedad se han acabado en gran parte. La segunda parte de la novela retrata las acciones de Keller mientras él procura encubrir el crimen y mata a otro en el proceso, es decir, más de lo mismo. La filosofía ha cumplido su propósito y la trama se confirma en lugar de proponer nuevas amenazas existenciales. La trama se enfoca más en hechos y menos en posibilidades.

El afecto noir sufre esta reducción de severidad en gran parte porque hay menos miedo mortal. El peligro que Keller presenta hacia Beatriz se disminuye lentamente. El peligro no es recalcado y pasa de la memoria. Las amenazas que Keller enfrenta no producen un afecto fuertemente malo. Es un caso del reproche que normalmente corresponde al asesinato. Si Keller es capturado y castigado por la ley, es triste, pero es una tristeza cotidiana y fácil de soportar porque se entiende por qué el matador es castigado. La convergencia de la realidad de Keller y de Asesino a sueldo para de una manera asintótica, o sea, son historias paralelas, no historias convergentes.

En base de las diferencias entre el afecto en las dos partes de la novela, el afecto noir no puede ser solamente el afecto negativo, sustenido a lo largo de un texto. A la segunda parte de la novela no le falta de afecto negativo: Keller sigue con odio y hay mucho temor de ser descubierto, arrestado o chantajeado (en fin, Keller sufre un chantaje que le obliga a cometer más asesinatos). Sin embargo, este afecto negativo no produce un afecto fuertemente noir. La fortaleza del afecto noir que rodea Beatriz en la primera parte de la novela viene del afecto positivo que se asocia con ella.

Regresando a la perspectiva de Breu y Hatmaker, un afecto puramente negativo no puede producir “divisiveness,” “retrospection” o “inadequacy” (3) a solas. ¿Quién podrá luchar divisively sin ideología o pasión positivas? ¿Para qué considerará uno el pasado de una manera retrospectiva si no había una posibilidad de un pasado y un presente mejor? ¿Quién se creerá inadecuado si no es adecuado para nada? Copjec también observa la necesidad de un afecto positivo (que ella llama desire) para crear el afecto noir y el gap dentro del cual el noir existe: “Desire is not an impurity that threatens the ‘objectivity’ of the detective but the quasi-transcendental principle that guarantees it. … Desire does not impose a bias but supposes a gap: the detective reads the evidence by positing an empty beyond” (178-179). Copjec invoca el deseo como el medio para contemplar el espacio noir porque la lógica no basta fuera del mundo conocido: la lógica y la filosofía noir tiene que ceder el paso al afecto noir.

Gracias a afectos como el deseo, el afecto noir es tanto un afecto positivo como un afecto negativo. Consistente con la complejidad del noir, hasta el deseo puede convertirse en un afecto negativo: el lector del noir sabrá bien que el deseo puede volverse cáustico. Para entender el afecto noir, hay que “consider the possibility that in many cases one and one does not equal two, at least when it comes to comparing positive and negative affective states. Instead, … most of the time, positive and negative feeling states are independent of one another: a person can be both happy and sad, or even unhappy and not sad” (Potter et al. 75-76). El afecto noir es un conjunto complejo de afectos negativos, positivos e irresueltos que coinciden sin cancelarse.

El afecto noir es el afecto que surge al navegar el espacio noir entre la positividad, la negatividad y la ambigüedad. Sin importar dónde uno se coloca en tal esfuerzo, la diversidad de influencias afectivas del noir garantiza que parte de la jornada pase por espacios desconocidos, el gap de Copjec. En breve, el noir es un encuentro afectivo con el Otro (afectivo porque el encuentro es una experiencia afectiva que solamente es posible gracias también al afecto). Debido al afecto negativo que permea el noir, Copjec concluye que el Otro (“the existence of other people”) es lo más horrible que hay (195). Keller tiene miedo de muchas personas, por cierto, pero, aunque existe tanto desacuerdo, aislamiento y confusión entre él y su sociedad, todavía Keller desea llegar hasta el Otro representado en su hijo lejano y Beatriz. En base de las observancias anteriores en cuanto al rol del afecto positivo, sugiero que el afecto noir no termina con el miedo del Otro, porque la empatía noir representa una búsqueda para algo mejor: hacer las paces con el Otro.

Todo el afecto noir culmina en la necesidad de la empatía en el noir. La empatía es la herramienta precisa para vivir dentro del espacio noir de una manera ventajosa, capaz de procesar los afectos positivos y negativos.

2. Sine qua non: la empatía

La fascinación con el afecto negativo en el noir ha hecho que la empatía pase desapercibida. Este resultado sorprende poco, ya que la oscuridad del noir sobrepasa la que se halla en la literatura general, hasta el punto de que el género recibió su nombre basado en la falta de luz. Sin embargo, es natural que el género se base en la empatía. La empatía, desde el principio, ha sido un fenómeno noir, una contradicción: una expresión de amor y bondad que invita el dolor y la miseria ajenos.

Describo la empatía como una disposición emocional ya que la empatía no es una emoción en sí, sino un conducto por el cual los sentimientos y las disposiciones de otras personas pueden ser transmitidas a otras personas, las personas que ejercen la empatía. Ya que la empatía transmite el afecto en diversas formas, la empatía puede describirse como una atmosfera afectiva: los afectos que uno absorbe del ambiente.

El noir crea una atmosfera empática desde el principio: suele escoger antihéroes y villanos como protagonistas. El protagonismo es una estructura empática, diseñado para ayudar a que el lector comparta los sentimientos del personaje principal, con el fin de que se regocijen y lloren juntamente. En otros géneros, el regocijo y el llanto no son fijados a personas que se regocijan del asesinato o que lloran por la posibilidad de que uno haya matado emocionalmente y no imparcialmente, como hace Keller. La autora Claudia Piñeira explica el proceso empático para personajes de una moralidad tan inadecuada:

¿Quién no puesto en el lugar de unos de los personajes haría el mismo que ellos? Esa cosa de ver a alguien hacer algo que primero decir que no, jamás haría eso y después, si reflexionás, puedes llegar a pensar, bueno, habría que ver yo no estoy en ese lugar. A lo mejor si estuviera en ese lugar podría hacerlo creo que tiene que ver con la empatía, con lograr tener con estos personajes, algunos que se van del límite, puede haber crímenes, puede haber un cuento de terror, distintas circunstancias de las cuales de verdad uno sabe que no estaría allí.”

Este proceso empático es esencial para entender preguntas importantes como por qué existe la violencia y por qué hay personas que están dispuestas a causarle daño al Otro. Hay que considerar el afecto negativo que otras personas experimentan para reconciliarse con ellas. Estos afectos se vuelven todavía más negativos con el entendimiento que cada uno de nosotros somos el Otro de otro. Esta empatía es también importante en el desarrollo de la empatía dirigida de uno a uno mismo: somos todos capaces de volvernos un monstruo en la vista de otras personas y en nuestra propia vista. Si odiamos los monstruos ajenos, más odiaremos la monstruosidad dentro de nosotros.

Keller mismo ejerce la empatía en base de este modelo. Siente una empatía demasiado directa con Murray Sullivan, el protagonista de Asesino a sueldo. Antes de decirse que “era solo una novela y que la realidad suele ser muy diferente,” siente que Murray Sullivan “había actuado como un monstruo. Y sin embargo… [él], como lector no podía condenarlo por completo. El autor había sido capaz de meter una duda en su moralidad” (41).

Otro ejemplo del proceso se halla en Ornstein, un rabino y académico legal, quien pasó en medio de las posiciones de Keller y Piñeira, con deseos de empatía y fuertes desafíos a su capacidad de ejercerla. De joven, el noir le inculcó la filosofía de empatía hacia los desamparados. Las palabras de Bogart en Knock on Any Door le impactaron: “Until we do away with the type of neighborhood that produced this boy, ten will spring up to take his place, a hundred, a thousand. Until we wipe out the slums and rebuild them, knock on any door and you may find Nick Romano” (citado en Ornstein 7). Después, Ornstein

learned what victims of crimes come to understand the hard way: A crime is a brazen, traumatizing act of cruelty and an abuse of power, no matter who commits it or the circumstances of that person’s life that led that person to become a criminal. It took me time and maturity to recognize that justice against criminals for their crimes must constantly be balanced against mercy for the sometimes terrible circumstances that contributed to their actions. (8)

El afecto noir no es aditiva. Lo malo es malo y lo bueno es bueno, sin que el bueno impida lo malo y viceversa. La empatía noir, por lo tanto, no puede negligir ni lo bueno ni lo malo para lograr la empatía que Piñeira y yo tanto deseamos. Una cantidad de oscuridad y una cantidad igual de luz no son cero en suma porque son cantidades independientes. El malo debe ser reconocido, pero también la humanidad de la gente que comete maldades merece reconocimiento. Tratar de añadir y comparar lo bueno y lo malo, como si fuesen números compatibles, sería disminuirlos. Si la suma del bien y el mal en un texto favoreciera a lo bueno, tendría que faltarle respeto a la humanidad de los que han obrado mal y, por lo tanto, lo bueno y la empatía se hallarían frustrados. Por otra parte, el favorecer a lo malo sería burlarse de las víctimas—inaceptable para la misma filosofía noir, que reconoce a los victimarios como víctimas, lo cual es la base de la empatía dirigida a las personas dentro del mal. Para expresar fielmente la empatía, hay que tomar el bien y el mal aparte, de modo simultaneo e igual, sin mezclarlos.

Con este modelo de empatía en mente y con deseos de evitar la empatía disfuncional de Keller, la empatía cumple varias funciones para el noir y protege el género de la degeneración en dogmas y vilezas. Sin embargo, los ejemplos anteriores demuestran que la empatía dentro del noir crea riesgos. Lo que describe Piñeira es importante para entender al Otro pacíficamente, pero lo que ocurre en Keller es el caso menos ideal para tal cosa, ya que Keller llega a matar a parte del Otro en base de su empatía para otra parte. El afecto noir, como debe esperarse, siempre conlleva riesgos. La realidad no suele ser muy diferente de lo que ocurre con Keller: la empatía parcial se halla en la violencia tribal y el terrorismo (Hartevelt Kobrin 108; Putilin 359-361). La empatía es el vencimiento del afecto positivo y la reconciliación con el Otro, mientras que la vida de Keller representa una fe demasiada en el afecto negativo y una empatía parcial. La tarea del afecto noir necesita ser una empatía universal, o tiene riesgo de destruirse y convertirse en odio del Otro y de uno mismo (tal como el afecto noir ha sido entendido por tanto tiempo por autores como Copjec y Conard).

Esta tarea es difícil. El afecto negativo dentro del afecto noir puede dañar al lector de varias maneras, no solamente convertirlo al tribalismo o a la violencia. Por ejemplo, el afecto negativo puede causar el enfoque excesivo en uno mismo y, consigo, ansiedad social, ansiedad general y depresión (Mor y Winquist 638). El retrato de la criminalidad crea un riesgo de la angustia moral (del inglés moral distress), o sea, angustia relacionada con no cumplir con la conciencia de uno al ver la victimización de uno mismo o de otra persona. Los textos noir pueden recordarle al lector de diversos problemas sociales en los cuales el lector no puede actuar conforme a su conciencia. La angustia moral será más intensa entre más cercano está el lector a las dificultades invocadas en el noir y puede causar una pérdida de moralidad y trastornos físicos y mentales (Devos Barlem y Souza Ramos 612). Además, aunque apenas necesita ser mencionado, si el noir solo causara dolor en el lector sin algún producto positivo (y más que un poco de afecto positivo dentro de la mezcla), ¿quién lo leería?

Recalco que el afecto negativo es una parte esencial del afecto noir y, sin ello, la empatía podría ser extendida hacia el Otro. Entonces, con consideración a estos riesgos y con esfuerzos para no dificultarle la vida al lector sin buenas razones, el afecto noir puede tomar dentro de sí los afectos negativos y positivos. Un afecto altamente negativo, temperado inteligentemente con afectos positivos y contextualizado dentro de una empatía universal puede profundizar los sentimientos del lector y alcanzar un modo de empatía más avanzada. Este estado avanzado se define por poder llegar al Otro después de tomar en cuenta todo el afecto negativo dentro del noir, con todo el miedo del Otro, la inseguridad del ambiente y la inhabilidad de confiar en el bien humano. Que yo pueda desear el bien de Keller y de Brentano, aunque el uno mata al otro y ambos necesitan mejorar su pensamiento moral, es la finalidad de la empatía noir. Deseo el bien, no de ellos (ya que no existen), pero de todas las personas reales que han sufrido, se han confundido y se han perdido como ellos, igual que deseo que las personas como Beatriz puedan librarse de novios abusadores y acosadores. Que la empatía se extienda a Brentano y Keller, no solamente a la inocente Beatriz, importa mucho: la ayuda dirigida a los victimarios ayuda a que las Beatrices del mundo no tengan más novios abusadores y acosadores. Además, esta empatía respeta la inocencia que Brentano y Keller antes tenían y la que quizá no tuvieran culpa en perder.

De esta manera, ni la moralidad ni la empatía dentro del noir apoyan un relativismo verdadero (no es la muerte de Dios, sino una revisión). El impedimento al relativismo se debe a que, tras reconocer las causas de las acciones, no deja de calificarlas como buenas, malas o ambiguas. Si fuese relativista, el noir no sería el género negro, sino el gris. “In many cases one and one does not equal two, at least when it comes to comparing positive and negative affective states” (Potter et al. 75), pero el gris es la resulta de precisamente esto: sumar falazmente el bien y el mal, lo positivo y lo negativo. El noir es negro y blanco. Extiende la empatía sin dejar de reconocer la injusticia de los hechos. Las víctimas merecen este reconocimiento, mientras que los victimarios merecen la empatía.

Un noir sin empatía, un noir verdaderamente gris, que no reprocha la victimización y tiene simpatía para la víctima, perdería su sentido rápidamente y se quedaría como melodrama: “scenes of violence within [melodrama] take on an even darker cast than the shadowy corners and wailing sirens that make us shudder with pleasure and fear in noir. Melodrama may be noir’s bad seed” (Rabinowitz 265). Un noir que se concediese al schadenfreude podría ser melodrama, podría ser horror, pero no sería noir. Los afectos negativos tienen que quedarse negativos: la filosofía noir surge del dolor ajeno y propio, la lástima por la vileza del humano y el conocimiento que las personas pueden comportarse mejor. Es clave que el noir no deje de retratar la crueldad tal como es: cruel, vil, asqueroso. El afecto negativo, asociado con tales eventos, es necesario para interpretar los eventos correctamente y las acciones resultantes, es decir, las tramas noir. Si un texto noir llega a negligir el sufrimiento de las víctimas y negarles empatía, no importa cualquier empatía extendida hacia los victimarios, o sea, sería una hipocresía total. Igualmente, el noir es más rico mientras retrata fielmente la bondad en la humanidad y en la naturaleza. El afecto noir se beneficia del contraste, no solamente de la contradicción.

3. Conclusión

La reconciliación del afecto negativo y positivo dentro del afecto noir, si se puede llamar una reconciliación, es sencillamente el retrato simultáneo. La empatía solamente puede existir si ambos elementos son respetados. Si fuese de otra manera, repito la declaración: no sería un género negro, sino un género gris. La oscuridad existe, pero no se puede entender sin la luz.

Esta simultaneidad es lo que hace que el noir sea un género de tanto significado. El noir se basa en la declaración radical que toda la humanidad, hasta el bellaco, el miserable y el desamparado, debe ser respetada. Mucha literatura declara algo parecido, pero el noir es uno de aquellos lugares excepcionales donde la creencia se pone en práctica. La mayoría de la literatura no alcanza esta fidelidad positiva a la causa humana. Será porque la tarea es difícil y, como se ha propuesto, requiere una contemplación directa y más completa de lo malo, o sea, la mayoría de la literatura no acepta el costo del afecto negativo que se cobra para llegar a la empatía poderosa y positiva que posee el noir. Siempre es difícil hacer que las personas contemplen lo negativo, pero la empatía es una manera de hacerlo y salir con ventajas.

En resumen, el noir es un microcosmos donde se hace una meditación difícil y verdadera: la contemplación simultánea de la hermosura profunda, silvestre, eterna y vital del universo, con la tragedia, la destrucción, el caos, la futilidad y la muerte. Aquí, el bien no borra el mal, ni puede el mal borrar el bien. Sin poder añadir la luz y la oscuridad, el puente que queda para unirlas es la empatía.

Obras citadas

Arias Mariana y Claudia Piñeira. “Entrevista a Claudia Piñeiro – Conversaciones.” YouTube, subido por LA NACION, 7 nov 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8uCcw0LytZs.

Breu, Christopher y Elizabeth Hatmaker, editores. Noir Affect. Fordham UP, 2020.

Breu, Christopher y Elizabeth Hatmaker. “Introduction: Dark Passages.” Breu y Hatmaker, pp. 1-27.

Burel, Hugo. Montevideo noir. Alfaguara, 2016.

Carroll, James y James Russell. “On the Bipolarity of Positive and Negative Affect.” Psychological Bulletin, vol. 125, no. 1, 1999, pp. 3-30.

Conard, Mark. “Nietzsche and the Meaning and Definition of Noir.” The Philosophy of Film Noir, UP of Kentucky, 2005, pp. 7-22.

Copjec, Joan. “The Phenomenal/Nonphenomenal: Private Space in Film Noir.” Shades of Noir: A Reader, Verso, 1993, pp. 167-197.

Devos Barlem, Edison y Flávia Souza Ramos. “Constructing a theoretical model of moral distress.” Nursing Ethics, vol. 22, no. 5, 2015, pp. 608-615.

Hartevelt Kobrin, Nancy. “Nobody Born a Terrorist, but Early Childhood Matters: Explaining the Jihadis’ Lack of Empathy.” Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 10, no. 5, 2016, pp. 108-111.

Mor, Nilly y Jennifer Winquist. “Self-Focused Attention and Negative Affect: A Meta-Analysis.” Psychological Bulletin, vol. 128, no. 4, 2002, pp. 638-662.

Ornstein, Dan. “Balancing Justice and Mercy.” Cain v. Abel: A Jewish Courtroom Drama, U of Nebraska P, 2020, pp. 7-12.

Potter, Phillip, et al. “The Independence of Affects is Context-Dependent: An Integrative Model of the Relationship Between Positive and Negative Affect.” Annual Review of Gerontology & Geriatrics, vol. 17, no. 1, 1997, pp. 75-103.

Putilin, Dimitri. “Tribalism and Universalism: Reflections and Scientific Evidence.” The Oneness Hypothesis, editado por Philip Ivanhoe, et al., Colombia UP, 2018, pp. 351-370.

Rabinowitz, Paula. “Afterword: Melodrama, Noir’s Kid Sister, or Crying in Trump’s America.” Breu y Hatmaker, pp. 261-273.

La locura sana y la violencia enfermiza: Don Quijote como hombre más violento que loco

El nombre Quijote es sinónimo de la locura y lo ha sido por mucho tiempo y en varios idiomas. A pesar de esto, deseo sugerir que esta perspectiva hace hincapié en la cosa equivocada. La locura de Quijote no está en sus ideas o moralidad, sino en la violencia que mutuamente se efectúa entre él y su comunidad. En sí, la palabra locura es poco apta para lo que ocurre con él. Quijote, y los que lo rodean, no son locos, sino violentos. Quijote es la víctima de un proceso de radicalización violenta, mientras la enfermedad mental ha sido el chivo expiatorio por sus disparates. Gracias a la dominancia de la ideología en la mente moderna, combinada con el ajuste de cuentas sobre el maltrato y la falsa representación de las personas con enfermedades mentales, la reforma de la imagen del Quijote tiene un valor cultural aumentado. Para esta discusión, se estudiarán primero los problemas con la asociación entre las hazañas de Quijote y sus errores de percepción, o sea, su enfermedad mental. Este componente tiene como propósito principal desvincular el legado de Quijote con la enfermedad mental. Después, se desarrollará la tesis alternativa que asociará la identidad de Quijote con la ideología violenta, la cual es, en este caso, la misma ideología caballeresca.

1. La tesis de la insania

Para demostrar unos problemas en la alegación que Don Quijote es quién es por su locura, podemos tomar el mismísimo ejemplo de las molinas del viento. Famosamente, Quijote percibe las molinas como si fuesen un grupo de aproximadamente treinta gigantes con múltiples brazos de unos diez kilómetros. La abundancia de brazos es sugerida por el desafío levantado por el caballero: “Pues aunque mováis más brazos que los del gigante Briareo, me lo habéis de pagar” (76). Quijote, como ya se conoce, decide que tal grupo ha de ser combatido, ya que “es gran servicio de Dios quitar tan mala simiente de sobre la faz de la tierra” (75).

La interpretación típica de esta escena hace hincapié en el desacuerdo alarmante entre gigantes y molinas de viento. Aunque, por cierto, esto es un problema llamativo, hay un problema de pensamiento más sutil en este episodio. ¿Por qué merecerían la muerte los gigantes por el mero hecho de existir?

No hay nada intrínseca en la idea misma del gigante que justificaría esta reacción. La clasificación de los gigantes como mala simiente va más allá de la definición de un ser con apariencia humana y una altura desmedida. A menos que el tamaño mismo sea tomado como una señal de la virtud, tendría que haber otro indicio para justificar el ataque de Don Quijote. El relato es escaso, tal de que, si existen otras justificaciones, tendrán que ser extratextuales.

El prejuicio que Quijote expresa hacia estos gigantes se vuelve aún menos si se considera el retrato de otros gigantes dentro del texto. Malambruno, en el episodio de la condesa Trifaldi, por ejemplo, es capaz de razonar y, “aunque es encantador, es cristiano y hace sus encantamentos con mucha sagacidad y con mucho tiento, sin meterse con nadie,” además de haber servido una familia real con distinción (856). Si Malambruno, como miembro de la especia de los gigantes, es capaz de fidelidad religiosa, servicio gubernamental y la sabiduría para obrar con encantamientos y magia, la especie obviamente es capaz de una vida altamente moral y filosófica, igual que cualquier humano. Como miembros de la misma especie (a menos que exista una taxonomía desconocida de gigantes), los gigantes molina han de ser capaces de la misma nobleza e inteligencia de Malambruno y Don Quijote mismo.

Por cierto, la descripción de Malambruno viene del artificio de los duques y no de la mente de Quijote. El otro gigante principal en la historia, el que atemoriza a la princesa Micomicona y su nación, tampoco es de la invención de Quijote. Esto limita la aplicación de sus casos al caso de las molinas, aunque no deja de establecer que la idea de gigantes pacíficos, cristianos o inteligentes es compatible con el entendimiento que tiene Quijote del mundo.

Para resolver esta ambigüedad, pensemos en las diferentes maneras por las cuales una molina de viento puede volverse un gigante. Por ejemplo, quizá los gigantes tuviesen un parecer espantoso, o el grupo, el parecer de unos invasores, y, gracias a la valentía de Quijote, él poseía la capacidad de enfrentarse a ellos para defender el país. Los artistas han interpretado a los gigantes de varias maneras, generalmente con varios brazos, rostros enojados y a veces con espadas (las espadas sirven también como una transformación de las aspas de las molinas) (véase “The Giants (Don Quijote)” para varios ejemplos). La manera consistente de retratar a los gigantes con disposiciones violentas será garantizada porque Quijote mismo los describe como violentos.

La dificultad que surge en la narración de Quijote es que la percepción errónea de gigantes, en sí, no tiene mucha razón de proporcionarles un aspecto violento. Es posible que sí, Quijote los percibe de esta manera independiente de todos los demás factores como la ideología. Aunque existe esta posibilidad, no existe razón para pensar que la tergiversación de la vista sea ponderada para preferir imágenes violentas. Es decir, la tergiversación debe ser un proceso más o menos neutro y aleatorio. Entonces, si los gigantes violentos tienen un parecer violento solamente en consecuencia de la percepción y no de otra cosa, este resultado tendría que corresponder puramente al azar. Si llamamos el proceso de tergiversación T, con la entrada de la imagen original y la salida de las imágenes potenciales que podría ver Quijote, entonces T(molina de viento) = {cualquier gigante} + {otros objetos aparte de gigantes}. Tomemos por sentado que la percepción nos mostrará gigantes y no otra cosa para descartar el conjunto de objetos aparte de gigantes, como torres, castillos, montañas y espíritus. Aunque limitemos así T(molina de viento) a {cualquier gigante}, el conjunto de cualquier gigante incluye gigantes violentos, gigantes pacíficos, gigantes neutros, gigantes que le causan un dialogo para cambiar su perspectiva sobre los gigantes. La figura 1 ilustra la poca diferencia entre un gigante que agita los brazos y un gigante que labra la tierra con azadas, desde el punto de vista de T. Los estímulos visuales, como el contorno de una imagen y la relación de los componentes, permiten muchas interpretaciones tergiversadoras. En breves palabras, el resultado no es único. La apariencia violenta no deja de ser posible, pero es lejos de inevitable o garantizada.

Figura 1.

Por consiguiente, el error de percepción asociado con la enfermedad mental (bajo el nombre tradicional de locura) difícilmente justifica a solas el episodio con las molinas del viento. Además, la atribución de la violencia de Don Quijote a la enfermedad mental se basa en un prejuicio no científico que falazmente sugiere las personas que sufren la enfermedad mental son más violentas que las personas sin tales enfermedades. Hasta las enfermedades mentales más asociadas con la violencia, como la esquizofrenia y el trastorno bipolar, no producen una taza de violencia mucho más alta que la taza de violencia en la población general. Aproximadamente 4% de toda la violencia societal parece ser el resultado de la enfermedad mental (Fazel et al.; Harvard Mental Health Letter). La enfermedad mental que sí se asocia con violencia elevada es el trastorno del uso de substancias, el cual no se halla presente en ninguna manera en Don Quijote. La violencia que ocurre en las personas con enfermedad mental es parecida a la que ocurre en cualquier persona: “[it] stems from multiple overlapping factors interacting in complex ways. These include family history, personal stressors (such as divorce or bereavement), and socioeconomic factors (such as poverty and homelessness)” (Harvard Mental Health Letter).

Ya que los elementos que generalmente instan la violencia están ausentes en Don Quijote, quien lleva una vida ociosa y cómoda, la tesis de locura, o en palabras más adecuadas, la tesis de enfermedad mental, es menos confiable o estable que generalmente se considera. Por cierto, Don Quijote sufre de alguna tergiversación desconocida de su percepción, pero no son los errores de percepción lo que le inculcó un deseo de matar gigantes y salir en tres aventuras para vencer y luchar.

En la sociedad actual, la enfermedad mental ha llegado a ser un chivo expiatorio para explicar todo tipo de violencia masiva: “Media accounts of mass shootings by disturbed individuals galvanize public attention and reinforce popular belief that mental illness often results in violence. Epidemiologic studies show that the large majority of people with serious mental illnesses are never violent” (Fazel et al.). El autor de este ensayo conoce personalmente los prejuicios asociados con la violencia masiva: de joven, cada vez que hubo un tiroteo masivo, como yo era callado, los compañeros de la escuela me dirigían el cliché vil: siempre son los callados. Esta persecución de personas con enfermedad mental no es justificada, especialmente con el conocimiento de que la persona que es más amenazada por la enfermedad mental es el mismo que sufre: la enfermedad mental sí se asocia con el suicidio (Frazer et al.).

Hay una necesidad urgente para cambiar la perspectiva alrededor de la violencia societal y la enfermedad mental, tanto para apoyar y proteger a los que sufren de la enfermedad mental como para combatir la violencia societal y ayudar a que las personas no lleguen a expresar impulsos violentos. La enfermedad mental no puede seguir siendo un chivo expiatorio por la violencia.

2. La tesis ideológica

El modelo alternativo que propongo para la locura quijotesca es la de la ideología. Don Quijote es víctima de la radicalización. Igual que en los casos del terrorismo, no es culpa de la enfermedad mental, sino de la fe basada en una ideología violenta. Quijote comete violencia masiva y dirigida repetidamente a lo largo de la historia. Una brevísima selección incluye los episodios siguientes: las molinas del viento, la lucha con el vizcaíno y su caravana, el robo del barbero, la lucha con los galeotes y los leones (estos episodios son mucho más frecuentes en la primera novela, conforme al humor distinto de la segunda novela). Por suerte, la tergiversación de perspectiva y la ausencia de enemigos auténticos u oficiales (como lo fueron los moros) aseguran que, en la mayoría de los casos, los ataques de Quijote son sin víctimas, pero no cambia la naturaleza del hecho. Que él no sea homicida resulta del cuidado de los con quienes se encuentra, no por virtud de él.

La pregunta fundamental de esta sección es por qué Don Quijote está tan predispuesto a usar la violencia en sus encuentros. Tal como Cervantes podría haber señalado, es culpa de la ideología caballeresca. Esta ideología es homicida en sí. Quijote mismo dijo: “¿y dónde has visto tú o leído jamás que caballero andante haya sido puesto ante la justicia, por más homicidios que hubiese cometido?” (91). El caballero tiene muchísima confianza en la capacidad y la justicia de cometer violencia libremente. Mientras Quijote vive bajo esta ideología, busca aventuras, donde la aventura requiere violencia. Por consiguiente, Quijote eleva la probabilidad de violencia en todo encuentro en que se halla. Él busca la violencia y, por lo tanto, necesita que los extranjeros sean violentos para justificar su violencia.

La ideología caballeresca tiene por lo menos dos axiomas. Primero, el caballero ejerce su oficio a través de la violencia. Segundo, la violencia caballeresca es justificada. Las circunstancias y el carácter de los demás tienen que conformar con esta verdad. Estos dos axiomas, por ejemplo, permiten que la violencia entre dos caballeros, por tan inútil y frívolo que sea, sea normalizada.

De regreso a los gigantes de las molinas, dentro de la ideología, caben muchas justificaciones para matar a cualquier gigante. La justificación más fácil será el racismo, el cual se halla fuertemente en la filosofía medieval y en los libros de caballería (aunque el racismo de la época de Cervantes es menos sistematizado como en la actualidad, o sea, la filosofía alrededor del concepto era menos formal, relacionada, cohesiva y desarrollada. De este modo, muchos elementos de la obra de Cervantes critica instantes del racismo sin llegar a una condenación sistemática del racismo). La ideología también se vale de conexiones superficiales con la religión, por lo que, dentro de la caballería, los pecados de Goliat bastarán para la condenación de la especie. Otra posibilidad es que los gigantes presentan en sí un riesgo a la seguridad popular, debido a su capacidad intrínseca militar, pero esto no es muy distinto al caso racista. Es difícil, en fin, que la tergiversación visual justifique la violencia quijotesca, pero la ideología provee muchas maneras fáciles para hacer lo mismo. Se dijo anteriormente que la tergiversación no tiene una probabilidad muy alta de crear una imagen de gigantes violentos sin algo que añada un sesgo al proceso. La ideología es precisamente aquel sesgo.

Hay espacio para decir que existen méritos parciales de la ideología del Quijote; validez que sería mayor si no fuese por la violencia. Por ejemplo, la historia está llena de personas que, de veras, tienen necesidad de ayuda extrajudicial para ayudarles donde las estructuras oficiales les han fallado. Esto incluye a Andrés, Dorotea, Cardenio, Lucinda, Doña Rodríguez, su hija, Ricote, Ana Félix y Roque Guinart. La mayoría es ayudada por la buena suerte o la intervención divina, mientras que Roque Guinart se hace la ayuda extrajudicial que necesita. En sí, de todos los personajes, Guinart es el que quizá más vive el credo caballeresco, pero se vuelve ladrón por organizarse con otros (el modelo del caballero andante a solas es reemplazado por la sistematización formal en un grupo de rebeldes, ya que el sistema les permite combatir con enemigos organizados a pesar de los avances de tecnología que tanto amenazan al caballero anacrónico). El punto decisivo se halla precisamente en que Quijote es demasiado violento y no lo usa medidamente. Así que, por tanta necesidad que la España de Cervantes tenía para un sabio armado viajero y fuera de la ley, la violencia acaba creando tantos problemas como resuelve (con referencia a la tortura de Andrés, la libertad de los galeotes y la autoflagelación de Sancho).

Que la ideología caballeresca sea condenada por el libro de Cervantes y que sea demasiado violenta no son conclusiones tan sorprendentes en sí. Más bien, este estudio sugiere que la violencia ideológica es el problema esencial de la novela, no la locura. Debemos clasificar a Don Quijote como radicalizado, en lugar de disparatado. De hecho, un estudio de la literatura caballeresca sugiere que la radicalización violenta no es tan accidental: el género es un género de modelos, enseñanzas, hechos e ideales que imitar, tanto dentro de las crónicas como las ficciones caballerescas. Bellis y Leitch documentan este fenómeno:

Chivalric literature was practical, not just in that it instructed knights in their métier … but in that it reflected to medieval society the image of its proper order. It was both inspirational and corrective, as Hoccleve’s advice to the Lollard Sir John Oldcastle made clear: ‘Clymbe no more in holy writ so hie!’ but ‘Rede the storie of Lancelot de lake,/ Or Vegece of the aart of Chiualrie,/ The seege of Troie or Thebes’. … Chivalric literature reinforced patterns of conduct and the proper structure of society: restraint and obeisance, exercising and recognising authority, muscularity moral and literal, when to stand and when to bend. (242)

A esto, se añade la declaración del cronista medieval Froissart: “In order that the honourable enterprises, noble adventures and deeds of arms which took place during the wars waged by France and England should be fittingly related and preserved for posterity, so that brave men should be inspired thereby to follow such examples, I wish to place on record these matters of great renown” (citado en 243). Esta literatura tiene elementos de enseñanza loable—“chivalry signified knights, fighting, and the ideas that encouraged them to be more than trained thugs”—pero no podemos escapar del hecho de que la literatura caballeresca fue diseñada para un mundo violento y que aumenta la violencia en personas como Quijote (251-252).

Figura 2.

Quijote no fue el último radicalizado por la literatura caballeresca, ya que la estética de los cruzados y los caballeros ha sido adoptada por extremistas derechistas. Esta adoptación llega hasta el odio del islam, un eco nefasto y aterrador de las campañas españolas contra los moros. Koch documenta, por ejemplo, un meme de una página (ya removida) de Facebook de la Liga de Defensa Española que combina dentro de contextos modernos la imagen caballeresca con la ecuación prejuiciado entre el islam y el terrorismo (17) (véase fig. 2). Koch resume la relación entre lo caballeresco y el derecho extremo en la modernidad:

For the extreme right wing (either the CJM or neo-Nazis and fascists) circles, Christianity is under a religious and demographic threat, posed by Muslims in general and by Jihadis in particular. … Right wing individuals, groups, movements, parties and organizations in Europe and North America use the same militant-religious symbols and rhetoric, … to provide an appropriate response to what they see as a threat posed by Muslims. Furthermore, it is being used not only as a motivational source … but also for recruitment, mobilization and propaganda. (20)

Entre la apropiación de la caballerosidad, el prejuicio anti-islam y el prejuicio anti-enfermidad mental, la distinción entre un Quijote disparatado y un Quijote radicalizado llega a tener más que un significado literario y filosófico.

3. Conclusión

Ya que Quijote es radicalizado y no disparatado, su declaración “Yo sé quién soy” resulta más verídico (58). Él puede formar su propia identidad, su quién soy, independiente de los esfuerzos de su familia y sus amigos de desradicalizarlo. La identidad de un radicalizado es consciente y, aunque puede ser irracional, no es sin su lógica. Reconocer la identidad de Quijote, tal como él la construyó, nos ayudará a entender mejor su vida y el deseo de Alonso Quijano de ser llamado “El Bueno.” El pensamiento cuidadoso en cuanto a la radicalización, el esfuerzo por la desradicalización y la liberación de la enfermedad mental de las asociaciones falsas con la violencia son proyectos urgentes en la sociedad moderna.

El ejemplo de Don Quijote radicalizado (y el Alonso Quijano desradicalizado) sirve para aviso. El mundo moderno está inundado por las ideologías—quizá la razón porque muchos académicos se ven en Quijote no es la locura, sino la abundancia de ideología que Quijote comparte con la modernidad. Toda ideología con rasgos o elementos violentos, igual que la caballeresca, merece mucha desconfianza. Aunque no participemos de una ideología violenta, el aviso queda para que tengamos más cuidado al poner fe en cualquier ideología, ya que esta nos puede consumir, hasta que salgamos en tres aventuras y muramos arrepentidos. Es decir, evitemos ser un nuevo Quijote. Alonso Quijano, el Bueno, dejó un ejemplo mejor.

Obras citadas

Bellis, Joann y Megan Leitch. “Chivalric Literature.” A Companion to Chivalry, editado por Robert Jones y Peter Coss, Boydell & Brewer, 2019, pp. 241-262.

Cervantes, Miguel de. Don Quijote de la Mancha. 2ª ed. Conmemorativa del IV Centenario Cervantes, editado por RAE, Penguin, 2015.

Fazel, Seena, et al. “Mental illness and reduction of gun violence and suicide: bringing epidemiologic research to policy.” Annals of Epidemiology, vol. 25, no. 5, 2015, pp. 366-376. PubMed Central,doi: 10.1016/j.annepidem.2014.03.004. Accedido 20 abril 2021.

Harvard Mental Health Letter. “Mental illness and violence.” Harvard Health Publishing, enero 2011, https://www.health.harvard.edu/newsletter_article/mental-illness-and-violence. Accedido 20 abril 2021.

Koch, Ariel. “The New Crusaders: Contemporary Extreme Right Symbolism and Rhetoric.” Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 11, no. 5, 2017, pp. 13-24.

“The Giants (Don Quijote).” Villains Wiki, https://villains.fandom.com/wiki/The_Giants_(Don_Quixote)#Gallery. Accedido 20 abril 2021.

Moral Distress: A Systemic Issue in L2 Teaching

Introduction

Moral distress exists at epidemic levels, but most of its sufferers and potential doctors do not have the vocabulary to describe it. As long as moral distress remains unchecked, it self-perpetuates and spreads throughout schools and societies. This essay seeks to follow a handful of earlier researchers in introducing the teaching world to moral distress. Developing a thorough awareness of moral distress is urgent: “The adoption of a theoretical model of moral distress allows the visualisation of everyday situations, often perceived as ordinary, but frequently hiding traps, devices and strategies of subjectivation” (Devos Barlem & Souza Ramos, 2014, p. 6). After defining terms, this essay details moral distress’ parasitic relationship with the L2 classroom. That will be followed by an examination of its causes, methods of propagation, and finally a review of strengths and weaknesses in moral distress research within pedagogy.

Definitions

Three definitions are central to this discussion: that of moral distress itself, its causational partner, morally injurious experiences (MIEs), and networks (particularly, social networks).

Moral distress is a form of distress that corresponds to damage to one’s sense of what is right. Persons suffering moral distress typically feel decreased ability to trust, to advocate or self-advocate, and, naturally, intense stress. Severe cases can cause a breakdown of a person’s moral framework. Moral distress damages the affective state itself. Moral distress has also been found to potentially produce other severe mental ills such as PTSD and burnout (Currier et al., 2015).

MIEs can intuitively be defined as any event that produces moral distress. The term itself suggests how moral distress arises; a person experiences something that injures their sense of morality. These experiences are qualitatively diverse. The injury can come from failing to live up to one’s own expectations, that is, underperforming morally. The injury can also come from viewing others underperform, or cause harm. In short, MIEs are any sort of event that “challenge[s] one’s deeply held moral beliefs and values as well as possibly threatening death or injury” or otherwise “violate[s] deeply held moral values/beliefs” (Currier et al., 2015). Another scenario is a clash of moral systems, where a person may feel their own sense of right threatened or their commitment to doing good weakened. Most literature refers to moral distress rather than MIEs, however, the concepts are intimately related. In particular, distinguishing MIEs as the causational component and moral distress as the resultant component makes for clearer discussion.

Vachová (2019) alone identifies over 65 types of MIE typically encountered by teachers. A familiar handful of these teacher-specific MIEs include: “Required participation in school events cut down the time available for preparation for my teaching” (509). “I know that some colleagues set a bad example by their behaviour towards their pupils” (510). “I have to work with pupils with special educational needs even though it is not within my professional competencies” or “I do not have enough information for the elaboration of an individual educational plan” (511). “When I inform OSPOD (the [Czech] agency for the social-legal protection of children), I have concerns as to whether I will not cause more harm to the pupil” (511).

Beyond commonly recognizable MIEs where the typical person’s sense of morality is threatened, it is important to understand that some MIEs will be more intimate in definition and character. The fact that most people would not be affected by a given event does not mean an MIE and the moral distress resultant will not be any less real for the victim. What constitutes an MIE will vary from one person to the next.

The term network, as it is used here, is an abstract structure composed of connected objects. The connections may represent any manner of real or abstract connections and the objects may be any sort of real or abstract object. When studying social networks within schools, typical objects are students, teachers, administrators, and even entire schools. Connections may be teacher-student interaction, friendships, bonds of trust, mentorships, supervisor-supervisee relationships, and so on.

Social networks are a class of networks whose connections are social in nature. This type of network is valuable for studying moral distress because MIEs typically happen within preexisting social networks and affect the network structure itself. It is noted here that the common usage of the term social network to refer to sites like Facebook and Twitter is correct, but overly narrow, as many social networks exist outside the Internet. Many social networks exist simultaneously within schools. For instance, Cole and Weinbaum (2010) worked with networks built of connections between staff who went to each other for help; networks made of connections between staff formed by nonprofessional discussions, like relaxation or discussion of personal issues; and networks based on connections formed when a staff member recurred to another for help in implementing a given school reform program.

The L2 Context

Moral difficulty is found in many fields and, while it is pertinent to all branches of teaching, it is especially proximate to L2 classrooms. It must be emphasized that L2 teachers face not only all the typical MIEs encountered by all teachers, but their own MIEs particular to L2 teaching. Some MIEs are dramatically more common in L2 classrooms, as will be discussed in continuation. As if these were not enough, L2 teachers are still at-risk for all the MIEs that arise outside schools: the racism, discrimination, violence, and the like that exist within all societies. Moral distress, as it causes a breakdown of trust and confidence, will raise the affective filter between teacher and student. A student suffering moral distress tied to L2 culture cannot be expected to want to continue in language learning, just as a teacher under moral distress is far less able to meet their student’s needs.

Culture can be a flashpoint for MIEs. L2 classrooms are cultural contact points for both their teachers and students. Many L2 programs bridge majority-minority communities and involve all the moral challenges involved in bringing disparate (and sometimes hostile) communities together. Students, teachers, administrators, and parents may view the L2 or L2 culture as inferior, undesirable, or problematic. MIEs tied to cultural contact include bullying, classism, racism, and religious discrimination. This bridging runs both directions, as language majority students learn minority languages and language minority students learn majority languages. Substantive cultural exploration necessarily exposes moral differences between students, teachers, and the target culture. Teachers and students alike may be unprepared to handle those differences responsibly.

Consider the contextual variety of a concept like target culture. When a target culture is ostensibly faraway, learning its language becomes a problem of empathy, globalism, and international involvement. Closer to home, it is often the case that the target culture is the host culture, which implies a dangerous power dynamic that students and teachers must navigate. For instance, members of host cultures do not need to choose between their family’s cultural identity and an identity based on the host culture; for them, those cultures are the same. On the other hand, language and cultural minority students may be punished by their families for assimilating, while they may also be punished by peers for not assimilating. Those dueling pressures could well manifest as the student attempts to learn the L2.

Because so many L2 classrooms include individuals with immigrant, refugee, or other minority backgrounds, these individuals are more likely to suffer MIEs outside the classroom. Many refugees with profound, unresolved trauma. Students and teachers may have friends or family deported. They may be in danger of deportation themselves. Beyond deportation, there is a myriad of dangers and distractions found in navigating immigration law: document issues, court hearings, interviews. Even when a student belongs to a majority at home, they may discover that, in the target culture, they would belong to a minority suffering discrimination.

This contextual complexity creates moral complexity, increasing the risk of MIEs. MIEs suffered by teachers can affect students and vice versa. The fact that L2 students and teachers are at heightened risk for MIEs increases the risk their peers face, too. Thus, while all teachers are at risk for moral distress, moral distress is a particularly urgent issue in L2 teaching. Many of the same things that make L2 learning and teaching so valuable are the same things that create MIE risk. MIEs must be managed without sacrificing the cultural integrity of L2 classrooms.

A Model of Moral Distress

Current and previous conceptions of moral distress have repeatedly proven inadequate. (Devos Barlem & Souza Ramos, 2014; Bradbury-Jones et al., 2020). This inadequacy stems from several sources. One source is the variety of MIEs; as more MIEs are considered, the concept of moral distress is complicated and vice versa. Another is that moral distress is a young concept; it was first developed by the nursing field in the 1980s. Moral distress has been considered within pedagogy for only about a decade. In general, the movement has been towards a broader concept.

The concept began with this definition of an MIE: “one knows the right thing to do, but institutional constraints make it nearly impossible to pursue the right course of action” (Jameton, 1984, as cited in Bradbury-Jones et al., 2020). Constraints, institutional or otherwise, are what allows an MIE to produce moral distress.

Moral distress exhibits a cyclical, self-perpetuating structure in the individual, as described by Devos Barlem and Souza Ramos (2014). See Figure I on the next page. An individual experiences something that causes them moral sensitivity, uncertainty, or discomfort. The subject typically will attempt to resolve the source of their moral issue, through processes like deliberation and advocacy (possibly self-advocacy, possibly advocacy on another’s behalf). Devos Barlem and Souza Ramos suggest that moral distress begins when these resolving processes are obstructed.

The concept of obstruction should be interpreted broadly. Some subjects may take no action to resolve their initial feelings of moral distress, especially if it is their own actions that are morally troubling. A person may simply violate their own conscience and make a habit of doing so. The obstruction here, is the self. A similar case is when the moral distress is attached to a past, irreversible action, in which case it is time itself that causes the obstruction. Shapira-Lishchinsky (2011) found several teachers whose moral distress stemmed from their own past misbehavior (in this case, moral distress begins to overlap with concepts like guilt and shame). Furthermore, the initial conditions—moral sensitivity, uncertainty, and discomfort—can constitute obstruction in themselves. If they manifest severely enough, they may produce decision paralysis. Abstractions, like ignorance, uncertainty, or self-doubt can also provide obstructions, preventing the subject from even attempting action. It should also not be assumed that the initial MIE is composed of a single problem—the obstruction may be that too many morally distressing events are happening at once to handle.

The obstruction tends to compound the initial feelings of moral distress. The experience of having someone or something prevent the subject from doing what they feel is right tends to be morally injurious itself. Thus, what may have been thought to be a simple, single MIE may in fact be a multi-faceted process of morally injurious experience.

Figure 1. Conceptual model of moral distress (Devos Barlem & Souza Ramos, 2014, p. 5)

After nonresolution occurs, the subject begins to suffer feelings of powerlessness. Feelings of powerlessness reduce the subject’s resistance and mortify their interest. All three of these factors mutually reinforce each other, forming what Devos Barlem and Souza Ramos refer to as the “Chain of Moral Distress” (2014, p. 5). The reduced resistance to MIE increases moral sensitivity, uncertainty, and discomfort (that is, it aggravates the original condition of moral distress). Reduced resistance also may cause the subject to fail in preventing additional MIEs. The mortification of personal interests produces ethical, political, and advocational inexpressivity. Ethical, political, and advocational expressivity are all tools for preventing and correcting MIEs, heightening the risk of new MIEs again. The chain collectively produces moral distress, with distinct physical, psychical, and behavioral symptoms.

By way of note, there is a strong tendency to associate moral distress with institutional obstruction. Devos Barlem and Souza Ramos frame moral distress as occurring because of institutional power games. This certainly captures many moral distress situations. Institutions are effective at suppressing moral expression. Employees, dependents, and the like are unlikely to raise moral objections to people who control their pay, employment, or other necessities. The subordinate status of the nurse in the nurse-doctor and nurse-hospital relationship likely explains why moral distress was first identified within the nursing field. Teachers and students often find themselves in potentially subordinate positions: adjunct-tenure professor, teacher-administrator, teacher-school, student-teacher, student-parent, student-student, student-school, and sometimes teacher-parent. Additionally, social norms often demand moral suppression. A moral critique directed at a coworker may be viewed as poisoning the workplace environment by introducing conflict. It may damage all of a person’s workplace relationships, not just the relationship with the person creating the MIE. It is hard to question someone’s moral activity, even in an agreeable fashion, if that person is unlikely to be receptive. The source of the MIE may be a bully who already punishes the victim arbitrarily and without consequence. These social issues are worse in workplaces with low turnover, like schools, where the social repercussions of speaking up can last years. It is often the case that institutions punish people for doing the right thing.

The institutional view does not, however, address moral distress that stems from events like when genuinely incompatible interests need to be accommodated or when it’s not a game of power but there is simply insufficient power available to all involved actors to achieve an unambiguously good moral result. Moral distress from failing to prevent violence or death, for instance, cannot be resolved in the sense that violence and death cannot be undone.

Moral distress, as described in the prior model, reinforces itself at several levels. It occurs within the process itself, as obstruction becomes an MIE itself and the Chain of Moral Distress makes the subject more vulnerable to new MIEs. However, one of moral distress’ most effective methods of self-preservation is on the level of the social network. Three phenomena cause moral distress to spread across a network: the cascading effects of the original MIE on the social network, the implicit reach of an MIE, and the damage moral distress causes to the connections that compose social networks.

Typically, MIEs have victims. Moral distress is a distinct phenomenon from victimhood, but often forms part of the experience of victimhood (Currier et al., 2015). Moral distress can affect everyone from the victim themself to remote witnesses, people who only hear of the morally problematic event. Moral distress starts with being troubled about a moral issue. The subject need not be directly affected by it in any way. This makes managing MIEs difficult, as the waves of harm tend to be diverse and possibly far-reaching. Moral distress causes harm even beyond what victimhood predicts (Currier et al., 2015).

The second effect is how MIEs can spread across healthy connections. Many important connections are implicit: if person A is connected to person B and person B is connected to person C, even though person A is not connected to person C, their shared bonds with person B can allow them to influence each other. Classic examples of these implicit connections are love triangles or the person in a trio who is stuck between two friends-turned-enemies. Implicit connections can be especially potent because they can force connections between people who do not want to be connected. If person A is victimized, person B is likely to be distressed. Assuming the victimization goes unresolved, persons A and B will likely develop moral distress. Even though person C is not connected to person A, they are likely to share person B’s distress. If the MIE is foul enough, merely learning about it may cause person C, and anyone else who hears it, to become morally distressed. Moral distress does not need a positive, trust-filled, or friendly connection to spread. A nasty enough idea hurts anyone who hears it, even if they are not connected to the actual sufferer.

The third social effect is that those suffering moral distress will have their social relationships decay. Mortification of interests cuts the subject off from healing hobbies and interest-based relationships. Many MIEs involve betrayal, on the individual or institutional level. People suffering moral distress will often lose faith in those who caused the MIE and those who failed to resolve it. Loss of trust destroys social connections. Loss of connections isolates the individual, increasing stress and cutting them off from any support systems that may still be operational. The more a person sought help and failed to receive it, the more pronounced this effect will be.

When individuals reach this point, this makes it incredibly difficult for the institution to correct its own problems. This is especially true if the institution is at fault. The success of school reforms depends massively on connections of trust (Moolenaar & Sleegers, 2010). Furthermore, schools where the average connections per individual was lower (referred to as low density) were less successful at implementing reform. Moral distress damages and deletes connections. Trust tends to be lower in surviving social connections and connection loss, besides isolating the individual, lowers network density. In other words, not only are they cut off from everyone else, everyone else is cut off from them. The isolated teacher will not be an effective advocate for reform, even if they are receptive to the reform, because they cannot transfer their positive feelings towards reform to others. There may be a temptation to artificially bring schools together in such circumstances by forcing staff to interact. This is unlikely to be successful. These networks need to be natural; artificial social connections established to encourage reform were ineffective at propagating change (Cole & Weinbaum, 2010). Whatever attitudes spread over natural social networks, pro-reform or anti-reform, would prevail over attitude spread across artificial social networks. Trust, friendship, and mutual support are essential for helping those facing MIEs. A school with a weak social network, whatever the cause, suffers a heightened risk of moral distress because it cannot provide that support. Once that moral distress takes root, it will self-perpetuate unless serious action is taken.

Discussion

A great deal of research on moral distress remains to be done. The field is young. However, some strong conclusions exist. First, preventing is better than curing. Due to the self-perpetuating nature of MIEs and moral distress, it is harder to cure than prevent. The unfortunate companion to this observation is that, on some level, moral distress is inevitable. If there were a school that managed to perfect its internal moral systems, it would exist within broader social institutions that would continue to produce moral distress. Teachers and students cannot always rely on police, child-protection agencies, parents, and governments to do the right thing. As teachers are increasingly placed on the frontline of childcare and as school resources remain critically insufficient, moral distress among teachers will rise. It is good for teachers to do good and to do the best they can, but these social changes are exposing more and more teachers to profoundly troubling MIEs. The situation is only worse in third-world countries; Currier et al., in both the 2014 and 2015 studies, examined El Salvador, where teachers’ students were being murdered and kidnapped by gangs at global-record heights.

Both prevention and curation are more effective at the institutional level. As institutional mismanagement produces moral distress, the absence of moral distress implies proper institutional management. Institutions designed with robust and supportive moral systems are powerful tools against moral distress, both in terms of prevention and treatment. Some such structures already exist. For instance, Löfstrom et al. (2018) found that the strong antiplagiarism institutions in universities shielded professors from moral distress caused by their students’ plagiarism. Of special mention is how, in effective programs, professors were given the option to take on as much of the issue as they felt comfortable with and offload the rest to another professor. The freedom to handle the situation on one’s own combined with the assurance that they do not have to do any more than they are comfortable handling (even if that amount is zero) is an effective balance between individual agency and mutual support. Institutional solutions should avoid dictating precise solutions or stripping individuals of their ability to choose what to do, because that is precisely how institutions cause MIEs. Guidelines, default recommendations, and the like allow the institution to set standards while preserving the balance so long as they do not become tyrannical. The balance is delicate; if individuals are too independent, they will cause their peers moral distress, but if they are too limited, they will be unable to do what is right themselves. Many institutions have programs like this for specific MIEs. In light of rapidly changing social and educational contexts, it remains to implement similar systems, when appropriate, for other MIEs.

The development of such programs remains an open question and will likely come with great contextual variety. A systematic approach to solution development could begin by studying known examples of MIEs, such as in Váchova (2019), Thornberg (2010), and Shapira-Lishchinsky (2011). Identifying the original sources of moral distress and obstructions can guide solutions. Which MIEs are better handled at the systemic level and which at the individual level is a question as well. Developing robust curative systems, like better moral distress diagnostic tools, as Váchova’s work attempts, and is another necessary element.

Prior research on combating moral distress has naturally emphasized the role of the sufferer within moral distress (see Currier et al., 2014; Devos Barlem & Souza Ramos, 2014). Once moral distress arises, the sufferer needs attention and should be treated. Possibly on account of its origins in the medical industry, moral distress is often framed as a condition to be treated, with the problem ending once the condition passes. Some remaining problems on this front include effective treatment, but especially diagnosis. Underdiagnosis is likely both because awareness of moral distress is low and because it is associated with better known conditions, like PTSD, burnout, and direct victimization. This research is essential for the curative function. However, this orientation towards the morally distressed is incomplete.

As discussed, institutions are often at the core of MIEs, whether as the obstruction or the source. Within the teaching profession, there are an abundance of power structures in which teachers are not able to morally advocate. The problems that existed guaranteeing MIEs inside and outside schools are also preventing teachers from fixing them. Teachers often lack negotiation power vis-à-vis administration, parents, peers, and even students, with little resources to address the broad swathe of social issues that appear within the schooling context. In the face of poverty, crime, discrimination, and the whole spectrum of childhood and teenage suffering, teachers are often powerless to address the actual problems they and their students face. This fact must be repeated. The issue will remain urgent without serious commitment to resourcing schools and other social institutions.

Hand-in-hand, moral distress among students must be studied further. The current research almost exclusively focuses on teachers. Nonetheless, Thornberg (2010), without using the vocabulary of moral distress, found an incredible rate of MIEs among students, all the way down to preschoolers. Significant institutional and social norms were already producing significant obstacles to students attempting to act according to their conscience.

Finally, moral distress within the L2 context is little understood. It is, so to speak, an elephant in the room. It goes without saying that classes centered around minority language speakers, cultural integration, globalized populations and the like are going to encounter MIEs. The moral component of culture shock, even if it disappears from students over time, is experienced by every new cohort. Cultural exploration is almost guaranteed inefficacy if it cannot address moral distress in its students, just as its efficacy will be greatly enhanced if moral distress is anticipated and addressed. It is worth asking whether prior MIEs are a significant reason why so much cultural activity in the L2 classroom is insubstantial. L2 classrooms can help immigrants and refugees find their place in new societies, just as they can help natives find their place in the global community. The chief obstruction here is, perhaps, the absence of moral thinking. Discussing foods, dances, and dresses is all well and good, but they are but a skeleton without the moral lifeblood of culture.

Conclusion

Moral thinking has the power to transform schools and society. As Thornberg (2010) concludes:

Moral development and education in … schools have to be far more proactive than merely making advances in moral reasoning and talking about hypothetical dilemmas indecontextualized classroom settings. Prosocial morality has to be practiced so that it can thereby become a significant part of students’ sense-making and actions in everyday real life. (p. 605)

L2 classrooms must be capable of meeting the moral challenges it invokes: those found by the host culture, those faced by the target culture, and those of the students themselves.

A world without moral distress is not a reasonable objective. It is fine for students to have morally difficult experiences. That is a part of moral growth and cultural discovery. The problem is that moral difficulty becomes moral injury. They find themselves alone, unsupported. What should have been one of a million moments in the slow growth of the human soul, a wound opens and is left to fester. The healing process, on the contrary, is the act of teaching itself: supporting a confused soul with the knowledge and resources they need to solve the problem themselves.

References

Bradbury-Jones, C., Ives, J., & Morley G. (2020). What is ‘moral distress’ in nursing? A feminist empirical bioethics study. Nursing Ethics, 27(5), 1297-1314. https://doi.org/10.1177/0969733019874492.

Cole, R. P., & Weinbaum, E. H. (2010). Changes in attitude: peer influence in high school reform. In Daly, A. J. (Ed.), Social network theory and educational change (pp. 77-95). Harvard Education Press.

Currier, J., Foy D., Herrera, S., Holland, J., & Rojas-Floras, L. (2015). Morally injurious experiences and meaning in Salvadorian teachers exposed to violence. Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice, and Policy, 7(1), 24-33. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0034092.

Currier, J., Herrera, S., Rojas-Flores, L., & Roland, A. (2014). Event centrality and posttraumatic outcomes in the context of pervasive violence: a study of teachers in El Salvador. Anxiety, Stress, & Coping, 27(3), 335-346. https://doi.org/10.1080/10615806.2013.835402.

Devos Barlem, E. L., & Souza Ramos, F. R. (2014). Constructing a theoretical model of moral distress. Nursing Ethics, 22(5), 608-615. https://doi.org/10.1177/0969733014551595.

Löfstrom, E., Nevgi, A., & Vehvilaäinen, S. (2018).  Dealing with plagiarism in the academic community: emotional engagement and moral distress. Higher Education, 75(1), 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-017-0112-6.

Moolenaar, N. M., & Sleegers, P. J. (2010). Social networks, trust, and innovation: The role of relationships in supporting an innovative climate in Dutch schools. In Daly, A. J. (Ed.), Social network theory and educational change (pp. 97-114). Harvard Education Press.

Shapira-Lishchinsky, O.  (2010).  Teachers’ critical incidents: Ethical dilemmas in teaching practice.  Teaching and Teacher Education, 27(3), 648-656. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tate.2010.11.003.

Thornberg, R. (2010).  A student in distress: Moral frames and bystander behavior in school.  The Elementary School Journal, 110(4), 585-608. https://doi.org/10.1086/651197.

Váchová, M. (2019).  Development of a tool for determining moral distress among teachers in basic schools.  Pedagogika, 69(4), 503-515. https://doi.org/10.14712/23362189.2019.1524.

A Description of La Vida total

This essay is an attempt to describe a certain framework of empathy and intellectual controversy. At the center of this attempt is a short piece of prose by Gabriela Mistral: “Poemas de la madre más triste.” La Vida total, the name for this proposed framework, is a story of grief, of infinity, of joy, sight and blindness. After covering the theoretical groundwork for la Vida total, we will move to Mistral’s work and how it generates a beautiful vision for literature, in terms of praxis and implications.

1. COMPONENTS

The concept of la Vida total is not so much a novel concept as it is an extension of previous theories. Two concepts must be defined before la Vida total can be properly described: umwelt and polyphony. The first is understood according to the theory of umwelt by Jakob von Uexküll and the second by the theories of Bakhtin. We begin by discussing these terms and the relevant parts of their respective theories.

An umwelt (plural: umwelten) is “an organism’s unique sensory world” (Britannica). More complexly, Herman Weber defined it as “the totality of conditions contained in an entire complex of surroundings which permit a certain organism, by virtue of its specific organization, to survive” (qtd. in Winthrop-Young 238). Uexküll principally contrasted umwelten on the level of species: how the perceived world of a jellyfish is distinct from a human’s, a worm’s, a moss’, or a salamander’s. Many species lack sensory tools humans possess, like eyes, ears, and noses, but certain species possess senses humans do not, like some aquatic species ability to sense electric charge. The umwelt can only be constructed from sensory information; what exists outside of the senses cannot exist within the umwelt.

Species is only the first of many ways by which umwelten become differentiated. In the human case, all sorts of subjective experience alter a person’s umwelt: nation, culture, family, religion, profession, education, class, illness, genetics. As a person with PTSD perceives the world differently on account of prior sensations of trauma, their entire world, their umwelt, is changed according to the changes in perception. However, umwelten are not a deterministic model: “Nobody is the product of their milieu—each is the master of his Umwelt” (Uexküll qtd. in Winthrop-Young 216). An umwelt does not determine the choices of its singular inhabitant; an umwelt changes the choices its inhabitant can make. Not the least of these are the decisions a person makes in integrating subjective information into a coherent worldview, the decisions that go into the creation of umwelten.

We now turn to polyphony: the manyness of voices. The concept is first relevant in its typical literary sense: the authorial inclusion of many voices within a novel, including voices conflicting with the author’s, on a more or less equal footing. Polyphony, in terms of umwelten, is allowing multiple umwelten to become visible to the reader.

For the purposes of this essay, the concept of polyphony will be stretched a bit far (that polyphony, as used here, does not conform to its usual meaning is acknowledged). La Vida total is not only concerned with the confluence of voices within a novel (intratextual), but across works (intertextual). On reading an author’s oeuvre, there is polyphony. The many moods, selves, and beliefs the author inhabited across their working period produce different voices, voices which typically will not sum to a complete concept of the author. Borges reflected later in life: “I suppose my best work is over. … And yet I do not feel I have written myself out. … I no longer regard happiness as unattainable; once, long ago, I did” (“Autobiographical Essay” 260). Borges’ most studied stories often seem to communicate that belief in an unattainable happiness, yet, that belief represented a Borges that existed for a certain period of time and later ceased to be. A polyphonic perspective listens to both Borges.

One more process of polyphonizing is required. La Vida total requires polyphony to act across every text and every authorship. Everything that any human ever has, could, or will write is here viewed as a single, infinite text: The Human Text. The Human Text contains endless, unknown and unknowable voices. Each voice inhabits a unique umwelt, an umwelt which it will never share with anyone else. Nonetheless, this multitude of voices can form a single text. La Vida total is concerned with reading that text. Umwelten is la vida, polyphony is the total, which combined produce la Vida total.

2. LA VIDA TOTAL

What then, is la Vida total? La Vida total is to expand one’s umwelt to include as many umwelten as possible and live accordingly. It is an attempt to live and understand as many lives as possible within the constraints of a single life.

La Vida total is in large part a literary task; it is obsessed with the Human Text. It goes without saying that reading the full Human Text is impossible, unless the reader possesses at minimum an infinite amount of time. Many of its parts are irreversibly lost, just as many of its parts will never be written. Many authors’ texts exist in pure potentiality, prevented from ever exiting the mind: how many texts are unwritten solely because the author was illiterate and impoverished, without the resources of text creation! Although those texts cannot be read, they exist and, therefore, enter the Human Text. It is written by everyone, constantly. It contains everyone’s stories, every dead man’s untold tales. Olmec farmers, Sumerian accountants, Jainist mathematicians, Norte Chico architects, Kentucky gas station clerks, Taiwanese schoolchildren—all their contributions are coequal components.

La Vida total is, instead, the incomplete reading of the Human Text. It is a finite contemplation of an infinite literary object. Many things are hidden in the infinities of the Human Text. The Human Text is a timeless, spaceless, unchanging text composed of the deeply spatial and temporal umwelten. It encompasses humanity’s past and future, but also alternative histories that exist purely as potentials. The worlds of fiction, too, figure in the Human Text. Fiction’s polyphonic characters may correspond to real human attributes combined in an entirely possible fashion within a fictional body, unreal only in the sense that no human has yet been born with that specific expression or combination of attributes. If not, they correspond to flaws in the author’s beliefs about humanity (flaws which must be accounted for in the total concept of humanity). It seems reasonable to call whatever worldview or beliefs that result from comprehending the Human Text capital-t Truth, so la Vida total is also a search for Truth.

La Vida total is a constant accumulation of incoherent, apparently contradictory data and narratives, filtered eternally through the reader’s own sensory devices. So, this is the final key aspect: harmony. Just as the reading of the Human Text will always be incomplete, so will the interpretation and reconciliation of all that has been read. On some level, every umwelt belongs to the same world, produced by the same laws dictated by the character of this universe and its human subjects. This common genesis guarantees all these disparate umwelten, subjectivities, and expressions can be reconciled in polyphony.

Impossibility and paradox are recurring themes in la Vida total. After all, the very definition of an umwelt precludes understanding even one umwelt outside of one’s own. With respect to reading, interpretation, harmonization, and, finally, application of all that has been learned, each is an infinite task alone and an infinite task combined. There should be no pretense that living la Vida total is terminable. Instead, it is the belief that it is better to go as far as one can down this path of reading, learning, and growing, despite the fact that the end will never come.

3. AN URTEXT FOR LA VIDA TOTAL: “POEMAS DE LA MADRE MÁS TRISTE”

“Poemas de la madre más triste,” by Gabriela Mistral, is an essential expression of this framework. It is a pair of prose poems followed by a brief explanatory note. The phrase itself, “la Vida total,” is taken from the explanatory note: “tales prosas humanas tal vez sean lo único en que se canta la Vida total” (528). Gabriela Mistral “[escribió] los poemas … con intención casi religiosa” after witnessing a pregnant woman be brutally insulted by a man passing by the woman’s ranch. The first poem, “Arrojada,” deals with a pregnant woman being cast out of her home and abandoned by her family and lover (527). The second, “¿Para qué viniste?”, is the woman’s soliloquy directed at her child, in which she laments how the child would be unloved by all but her and yet, the child came to be in order to comfort her.

The act of cosuffering that prompted her to write these poems was, from the beginning, an expression of la Vida total. She states her purpose as beautifying motherhood, a state she never possessed, being childless her whole life. Yet, her poetry is that of a mother; she lives another life vicariously through her poetry. “Poemas de la madre más triste” is about the umwelten of single mothers in their full complexity: “The distress of abandonment and loneliness, the difficulties of motherhood, and the unexpected sorrow of desire are assuaged but not erased by the unconditioned love between mother and child. Gabriela acknowledges the great power of love but does not shrink from the despair and isolation that sometimes accompany maternity” (Zubizarreta 299). La Vida total, as exemplified in these poems, wrestles with the opposing forces and perspectives that occur, not just outside the individual, but within. Oppositions are allowed to coexist, not in peace per se, but without the demand that either side cease to be.

This is hardly unique to “Poemas de las madres más tristes” en Mistral’s work. As Alegria observes, her work is composed of “personal confessions, human documents instead of literary exercises” (25). He describes her poetry as “a voice too strong for the little songs that it wishes to sing. The movement is always there, a powerful, vast, rhythmic upsurge that encompasses people, landscapes, passions, hopes, bitterness, faith.” Mistral dives deep into her own life and lays it bare in her production of poetry: the “intensity of emotion which adds such force to so many of Gabriela Mistral’s poems, giving them the appearance of being wrung from the very depths of the poetess’ soul” (Preston qtd. in Zubizarreta 309). Mistral understood how la Vida total is a deep dive, not just into the souls of others, but into the umwelt of oneself.

In accordance with the polyphonic spirit, the phrase “la Vida total” is not exclusive to Mistral. José Martí too invoked it: “en la vida total han de ajustarse con gozo los elementos que en la porción actual de vida que atravesamos parecen desunidos y hostiles” (qtd. in Housková 25). Housková elaborates on Martí’s connection to la Vida total: “En la concepción de José Martí, … la armonía y la belleza surge por unión de lo contradictorio. Abarca angustia, tensión, espanto del mundo … En otro polo de la armonía tiene dimensión cósmica y dimensión íntima, unida con la ternura y la nostalgia por la infancia” (26). Mistral and Martí elaborate a vision of compassion and tenderness that makes the intellectual and emotional complexity of la Vida total survivable.

4. PRAXIS

Because almost every step of the process is infinite or otherwise impossible, la Vida total must use methods of approximation. The work of authors such as Gabriela Mistral is essential to la Vida total—la Vida total would be impossible without them. Authors perform the work of approximation simply by adding to the body of writing, but more sophisticatedly through techniques like polyphony and soul-exploration, the study of their own senses, perspectives, and emotions: the world as they can perceive it. Each additional entry provides another finite piece to incorporate into the infinite text, thus bringing the finite collection of readable texts closer to the infinite.

Beyond authorship, the matter of interpretation requires significant discussion of its own. Unlike infinite or infinity-approximating texts like Borges’ Book of Sand or “Library of Babel,” the Human Text is fully interpretable. For most of its pages, when one begins to read, they will, within a certain degree of error, understand the text. Although the Human Text spans all times and languages, it also includes all translations necessary for readers in any language to partake. A translation increases the error range of interpretation but typically will not make the error level intolerable.

Error is the key concern when approximating infinity with finitude. Oftentimes, it is impossible to know how severe the error has become. However, there is a mathematical guarantee to ensure the finite reader’s perspective approaches the infinite Vida total over time. If the reader’s perspective always trends towards expansion (so long as the knowledge gain exceeds the error growth) and there is no limit on the knowledge gain, then the perspective will approach infinite comprehension with all guarantee (this is a literary application of the monotone convergence theorem, the proper discussion of which is beyond the scope of this essay. See Bakker). In short, the two conditions are that the reader acquires more truth than error and that the reader is willing to take on all truth eventually. It could also be thought of constantly growing one’s umwelt, never letting anything remain outside it—an ever-growing bubble of perception. Given an infinite amount of time, such a perspective will become infinite. That is to say, it will comprehend la Vida total.

The first condition, ensuring knowledge gain overall exceeds knowledge loss or error, is difficult. From a finite perspective, locked within our own umwelten, it is impossible to truly know. Thomas Bernhard’s observations on truth from the author’s perspective can be inverted for the reader’s sake:

Truth, it seems to me, is known only to the person who is affected by it; and if he chooses to communicate it to others, he automatically becomes a liar. Whatever is communicated can only be falsehood and falsification; hence it is only falsehoods and falsifications that are communicated … What matters is whether we want to lie or to tell and write the truth, even though it never can be the truth and never is the truth. (qtd. in Thornton 210)

The reader cannot even be sure the author intends to write the truth. However, Bernhard’s argument provides a decanter for separating texts valuable to the seeker of la Vida total from those that are not. Texts that seek to tell the truth, and especially those that acknowledge their inability to capture the truth, are elevated. Texts that are unconcerned with truth are deemphasized. Texts that exploit, dehumanize, or devalue their subjects are condemned. As la Vida total is concerned with umwelten, such texts can only be studied to comprehend the darkened umwelt of the author, because exploitation, dehumanization, and devaluation of others cuts the reader off from the subjects’ umwelten, preventing polyphony and contemplation of la Vida total. By the same token, texts that emphasize kindness, sensitivity, and mutual understanding often (but not necessarily) serve la Vida total better than texts that do not. One more thing must be said respecting texts lacking value for la Vida total. Even though some voices must be rejected in their literal or umwelten-less interpretation and even if certain actions must be condemned unilaterally, part of la Vida total is still acknowledging the umwelten that produced these voices and actions. It is often required of the reader to reject the belief or action expressed, but understand why that belief or action came to be.

The second condition, avoiding limits on knowledge, is not so troublesome. It can largely be achieved by enjoying all good texts. La Vida total is not a framework concerned with canonicity or short-term cohesion. La Vida total requires macro and micronarratives, modernism, postmodernism, paradox, multiculturalism, literary revival, and the enfranchisement of diverse perspectives. The old canons cannot produce la Vida total, in their centering within specific historical-cultural moments. New canons can do no better; simply establishing a canon of integrated, diverse authors and cultures will quickly fall behind the growth of literature (to say nothing of how any canon will necessarily exclude works regardless of source that may benefit the particular reader in their umwelt more than the canonical texts).

The reader should not cut themselves off from the broad domains of human experience: religion, science, literature. Each offers human testimony. This is also true of media and moods. La Vida total cannot be found solely through serious philosophy or contemplation. Silly, preposterous, and casual works all form an essential and beautiful part of the Human Text (as a somewhat embarrassing but useful demonstration of this principle, this essay’s author cried to the Swedish pop song Caramelldansen because of its sublime demonstration of this point).

Silly media is not the end of the unconventional in la Vida total. Sometimes, knowingly preposterous interpretation can be profoundly valuable. Borges highlighted this in “Kafka y sus precursores.” The essay aptly begins with one of Zeno’s paradoxes of motion, which, like la Vida total, are resolved by infinite methods. Highlighting a number of Kafkaesque texts that predate Kafka, Borges observes:

si no me equivoco, las heterogéneas piezas que he enumerado se parecen a Kafka; si no me equivoco, no todas se parecen entre sí. Este último hecho es el más significativo. En cada uno de esos textos está la idiosincrasia de Kafka, … pero si Kafka no hubiera escrito, no la percibiríamos. El hecho es que cada escritor crea a sus precursores. Su labor modifica nuestra concepción del pasado, como ha de modificar el futuro. (395)

It is preposterous to read a text predating Kafka as being Kafkaesque and yet doing so can produce incredible textual and philosophical insight. Similarly, there are many occasions in which using a knowingly mismatched interpretative frame can be a valuable exercise (so long as the reader readily acknowledges that they are not interpreting the author, or even the text, but their own modification of the text).

In addition to the variety of texts, the reader should understand that a large part of la Vida total is acknowledging the validity of “enemy” or opposing beliefs and umwelten. Every reader is insufficient on their own, just as is every author. There is a certain requirement of humility; if the reader mistakenly adopts an erroneous belief during their search for la Vida total, that erroneous belief will limit their growth and keep them from la Vida total until it is corrected. This happens constantly and inevitably. Every human needs to go through that correction process.

In addition to these chiefly literary methods for pursuing la Vida total, there exist a glorious abundance of other practices that expand one’s umwelt. Of these, we highlight the neologism sonder, coined by the Dictionary of Obscure Sorrows:

the realization that each random passerby is living a life as vivid and complex as your own—populated with their own ambitions, friends, routines, worries and inherited craziness—an epic story that continues invisibly around you like an anthill sprawling deep underground, with elaborate passageways to thousands of other lives that you’ll never know existed, in which you might appear only once, as an extra sipping coffee in the background, as a blur of traffic passing on the highway, as a lighted window at dusk.

La Vida total is about exploration, discovery, and the beauty of diversity. Thus, its practice is accessible to people of many philosophies, religion, disciplines, and walks of life. The practitioner cannot do it all, like so many other parts of la Vida total. Diversifying the methods and disciplines employed for the expansion of umwelten should prove fruitful.

5. CONCLUSION

Unsurprisingly, the discussion of la Vida total cannot be completed. Like any stopping point in an infinite process, what is included and what is excluded is a matter of practicality. However, some final comments should be valuable.

La Vida total is an aesthetic of beauty, built from human difference and conflict. Interest in la Vida total is often attached to suffering. Gabriela Mistral employed la Vida total against the dehumanization of mothers in “Poemas de la madre más triste.” Her work elsewhere represents a struggle with powerful, internal pain or troubling outside forces; Wretmark identifies each of “Poema del Hijo,” “Meciendo,” “El niño solo,” “Poemas de las madres tristes,” and “Poemas de las madres más tristes” as possible expressions of her struggle with childlessness (35-36). José Martí died a martyr in order not to die of illness in Cuba’s war for independence, a war that ultimately subjugated Cuba to other foreign powers and set the foundation for the Castro dictatorship. This essay’s author has turned to la Vida total in response to the study of the true nature of genocide and the despair that comes from being unable to save or support anyone involved: the mad from their madness, the victim from their captor.

An objective model of reality cannot be correct unless it fully explains every subjective reality, every umwelten. Enough umwelten are pierced through with profound bitterness, pain, and suffering. The innocent, carefree child is part of it. So is the child soldier. La Vida total subjects its devotee to contemplation of pure pain and evil, which must be reconciled with the purest love and joy. It is an attempt to deal with the world as it is and, seeing truly, understand what to make of life.

Works Cited

Alegria, Fernando. “In the True Language of a Woman.” Review of Selected Poems of Gabriela Mistral, edited by Doris Dana. Saturday Review, 17 July 1971, pp. 25-26. The Unz Review, www.unz.com/print/SaturdayRev-1971jul17-00025/. Accessed 17 Dec. 2020.

Bakker, Lennard. “§2.4: The Monotone Convergence Theorem and a First Look at Infinite Series.” BYU Mathematics Dept., math.byu.edu/~bakker/M341/Lectures/Lec09.pdf. Accessed 17 Dec. 2020.

Borges, Jorge Luis. “An Autobiographical Essay.” The Aleph and other stories, 1933-1969, E.P. Dutton, 1970, pp. 203-259.

Borges, Jorge Luis. “Kafka y sus precursores.” Borges esencial, Real Academia Española, 2017, pp. 393-395. Accessed 16 Dec. 2020.

Housková, Anna. “Defensa de la poesía: Martí y paz.” Inti, no. 83/84, 2016, pp. 19-31. www.jstor.org/stable/26309970.

Mistral, Gabriela. “Poemas de la madre más triste.” Gabriela Mistral: En verso y prosa, Antología, Real Academia Española, 2010, pp. 527-528.

“Sonder.” The Dictionary of Obscure Sorrows, 2012, www.dictionaryofobscuresorrows.com/post/23536922667/sonder. Accessed 17 Dec. 2020.

Thornton, Megan. “A Postwar Perversion of ‘Testimonio’ in Horacio Castellanos Moya’s ‘El asco.’” Hispania, vol. 97, no. 2, June 2014, pp. 207-219. www.jstor.org/stable/24368766. Accessed 1 Dec. 2020.

Umwelt.” Britannica, www.britannica.com/topic/Umwelt. Accessed 17 Dec. 2020.

Winthrop-Young, Geoffrey. Afterword. A foray into the worlds of animals and humans, by Jakob von Uexküll, U of Minnesota P, 2010, pp. 209-243.

Wretmark, Astrid. “Coping with Childlessness and Perinatal Loss: Reflections of a Swedish Hospital Chaplain.” Reproductive Health Matters, vol. 7, no. 13, May 1999, pp. 30-38. www.jstor.org/stable/3775700. Accessed 16 Dec. 2020.

Zubizarreta, John. “Gabriela Mistral: The Great Singer of Mercy and Motherhood.” Christianity and Literature, vol. 42, no. 2, 1993, pp. 295-311. www.jstor.org/stable/44312170. Accessed 16 Dec. 2020.

Human Rights Advocacy in “Insensatez”: Viewing, Foulness, and Powerlessness

Most writers will take up death as their subject at some point, but few ever write about murder. Yes, murder is a common plot device, but the sensation of murdering and being murdered, of a society that revolves around murder, of living under the real, experienced, undying threat of being destroyed by another human being, complex, living, breathing, hating, and perhaps loving also, that is a rare subject. This heady, sensory, personal concept of murder is the subject of Horacio Castellanos Moya’s Insensatez. It is a novel about what it means to view trauma permeate society, using the full foulness of language to evoke and elaborate the concept. As that is the subject of the novel, so is it the focus of this essay: by examining how Castellanos Moya handles the viewing of trauma via grotesque language, a theory for navigating issues faced by human rights advocates such as powerlessness, vicarious pain, and fear results.

1. KEY ELEMENTS OF THE NOVEL

Insensatez is concerned with two moments of history: the protracted genocide against the indigenous peoples of Guatemala by their government in the latter half of the 20th Century and the writing of Nunca Más, a report detailing in extensive detail that genocide, prepared by the Catholic Church and published on April 24, 1998. In time, the story belongs to the latter period, that is, the final moments before the publication of Nunca Más, plus a few days after. In space, the story takes place almost exclusively within Guatemala City, with a brief foray into the Guatemalan forest and, at the very end, an unnamed European country.

The European is the second unnamed country in the novel; the first is Guatemala itself. Just as it never names Nunca Más (the unnamed protagonist mentions only that he recommended a different name for the report, taken from indigenous testimony: “todos sabemos quienes son los asesinos”), the country at the center of the book is an open secret (153). The historical ties are oblique. The connection stems from events like the casual appearance of the names of a few Guatemalan politicians, mention of the Salvadoran border, and, naturally, the close correspondence of the events of the novel and Guatemala’s historical narrative.

The protagonist is an unnamed journalist, a recent exile and editor. He stands out as being peculiarly unpleasant, an unpleasantness magnified by his position as narrator. For instance, his exile began when he made the statement, which, at his insistence, was entirely nonracist, that “El Salvador era el primer país latinoamericano que contaba con un presidente africano. … yo no me había referido al hecho, por lo demás verificable, de que el presidente pareciera un negrito africano, que el color de la piel nada importa, sino a su actitud dictatorial y a su negativa a escuchar opiniones de quien no opinara como él” (49). Among his many vices and flaws are found growing paranoia, hyperarousal, compulsive behaviors, and, most predominantly, an aggressive and obsessive sexuality.

This protagonist is tasked with performing final edits to Nunca Más, reviewing the 1100-sheet document before publication. He is an odd choice, as a foreigner and an avid atheist with a hatred for the Catholic Church. As the work begins, the protagonist interacts poorly with the endless depictions of human cruelty in the document, facing increasing distress, paranoia, violent visions, and inability to focus or work. Partially due to literary interest, partially as a coping technique, he finds that much of the indigenous testimony in the report has a poetic quality to it, a quality he describes as Vallejano. He copies these poetic lines in a notebook and uses the lines to harangue disinterested conversation partners and interpret the events of his own life. Refer to the Appendix contains every such line given by the narrator and, for simplicity’s sake, they will be referred to as poems within this essay. Along the way, he attempts to seduce a couple of women, develops a bit of a social life in Guatemala, and picks up an STD along the way, before ultimately abandoning the country a few days before completing his work in a paranoid frenzy. Here, it is worth noting that his paranoia is not altogether irrational; the perpetrators named in Nunca Más were still very much in power.

Of the other dramatis personae, the most central is Erick, or rather, Archbishop Juan José Gerardi Conedera, whom the character Erick represents. The connection between the character and the man depicted is strongest in their final moments: “le destruyeron la cabeza con un ladrillo” (155). The only significant difference between their deaths is that Erick died the night of the human rights report’s presentation, while the Archbishop died two days later, April 26, 1998 (“Assassination of Bishop Gerardi”). Erick is presented as a friend of the protagonist, who hired him for the editorial job. The last figure of note is Toto, a Guatemalan farmer and self-proclaimed poet who primarily serves as the protagonist’s conversation partner and guide to the local literary and bar environments— significant, because Castellanos Moya identifies himself as the type of writer and journalist for whom the adage “Dime en qué bar vives parte de tus días y te diré quién eres” is true (“Cartografías”).

2. LOOKING AT TRAUMA

At the center of Insensatez, and a recurring theme within Castellano Moya’s thought is the experience of looking at trauma. This extends beyond the witnessing of traumatic events as a victim or bystander. The primary mode of looking in the novel is vicarious trauma, the trauma that comes from learning about others’ traumatic history. This mode of looking is also the primary mode of most historical fiction, which is not read in the way Bernal Díaz read Historia general de las Indias, instead using a voyeuristic mode. Adjacent to the voyeuristic mode, superficial viewing is the sort of seeing and never perceiving that comes when someone sees another in suffering without processing it in any meaningful way.

The protagonist is locked into the vicarious mode. By the nature of his work, he must constantly read, review, revise, reread, and, in inevitable consequence, comprehend and actualize the awful testimonies he reads. In absence of context, there is a perverse aspect to intruding on someone’s suffering, given how most people will only confess their suffering to someone in whom they have an intimate trust. Furthermore, as he adapts the poems taken from indigenous testimony to his own life, he acknowledges that his situation is fundamentally different from theirs and that his use of their words is appropriation. Here, the vicarious mode is at risk of degenerating into a voyeuristic mode. Indeed, the very act of interpreting these testimonies of such profoundly awful histories as poetry is appropriating them from their justice-seeking context for the contextless, antiseptic study of poetic aesthetics. What prevents the degeneration into voyeurism is intent and context: intent to benefit victims or potential victims, context of acting according to that intent. The protagonist lacks altruistic intent, but the context of his work is guided by the good intent of others. At the very least, even if the Church’s intent in creating Nunca Más was merely “tocarle los huevos al tigre militar,” as the protagonist expresses, the report’s victim advocacy helps to keep him from falling into mere, grotesque voyeurism (17).

He encounters one person in the first mode, that is, a victim. She, a woman working within the Human Rights Office of the Archbishop of Guatemala, had been kidnapped as a 16-year-old student protester and subjected to diverse tortures which in much less graphic detail than the novel, include gangrape and an encounter with another prisoner who, still living, had such a decayed body that maggots were bursting from the flesh. What complicates his encounter with her is that he is privy to her history not because they have any relationship (they never speak), but because he read her testimony in the report. As he notes her beauty, his reaction stands out even stronger against his typical behavior. Contrary to his typical sexual proclivity, what he wants is to have nothing to do with her, to never see her again. As a person in the vicarious mode, exposure to a genuine victim causes the vicarious pain to flare and, in the protagonist’s case, to reach intolerable levels.

Toto is the key example of the superficial mode, at least within his conversations with the protagonist. He is dismissive of the protagonist’s attempts to discuss his work, making Toto a nonoption to relieve the emotional burden under which the protagonist operates. When the protagonist quotes poems 2 through 6, in attempt to make Toto the poet acknowledge the poetic character of the testimonies, Toto responds mockingly with Quevedo’s “Sólo ya el no querer es lo que quiero,” without taking any interest in the protagonist’s selected poems (33). Notably, unlike the indigenous poems, this poetic line, the only conventional poem in the entire novel, is placed between Spanish comillas, not italicized. The superficial mode inoculates the viewer against empathetic pain from viewing trauma and, in many cases, that is probably why this mode arises: to prevent pain.

That it hurts to view others in pain is so essentially human that Rousseau identified it (using the name pity) as still extant even in his concept of the original condition of man and the source of all social virtues. This is truest for witnesses and direct witnesses. Their pain can be so intense that they may refuse to recall or testify of their own trauma, a pain described in the 27th poem: “Para mí recordar, siento yo que estoy viviendo otra vez” (149). To review trauma with memory is to resurrect it. The mind cannot understand a traumatic scene without reconstructing it (whether with specificity or abstraction). To understand trauma, trauma must be relived.

Insensatez represents the dangerous ability of this empathic pain to reach far past the event itself. Any viewer, no matter how distant, exposes themself to this pain if they do not operate under the superficial mode. Insensatez’s protagonist is a hapless victim of this pain, while a figure like Erick is not so helpless. They are not, however, the only ones involved in this question: throughout the novel, the spread of vicarious pain reaches the reader. If it did not, Insensatez would be senseless in title and substance. There are certain moments that must hurt the reader, like the graphic description of infants’ brains flying in the air or the story of a mute man whose torturers demanded a confession and, enraged by his silence, went on to brutalize him and his village (a conundrum of silence that could not even be solved by sign language, as, the report noted, his hands were bound).

This pain is essential because, as Rousseau argued, it spurs humans to preserve not just themselves, but each other, to oppose all cruelty, not just their own suffering. The problem, however, is that this pain can become so intense that it drives many viewers to abandon the vicarious, empathetic mode for the superficial mode. Once in the superficial mode, the impulse of opposition disappears. The superficial mode cannot inspire sacrifice on someone else’s behalf.

The difficulty of viewing trauma is an ancient defense mechanism of cruelty and tyranny, even as it has impulsed the overthrow of cruelty and tyranny. In a democratic era, tyranny needs to be able to endure modern challenges like a free press and international pressures. Mild and moderate cruelty are the easiest to stir public condemnation against. The pain is manageable for the masses. However, the depths of cruelty cannot be described within the bounds of taboo and politeness. Thus, the tyrant has a strategy in making their actions so grotesque that the mere act of reporting what has happened violates social norms, brings crippling emotional pain to the tyrant’s opponents. A human rights advocate with traumatic emotional disorders is less effective than a human rights advocate without them. Genocide is one form of cruelty that has survived modernity quite well, and it owes some of that survival to the fact that anyone who comprehends what is occurring will be deeply disturbed and, in a very real sense, wounded themself. Insensatez, in order to tackle Guatemala’s genocide of its peoples,breaks social norms throughout, especially in its graphic descriptions of torture by rape, violence against infants, and in its description of how readers exposed to such evil themselves reconstruct not only the victim’s perspective, but the perspective of the murderer as well.

3. FOUL MICRONARRATIVE

The question thus becomes, for the concerned author, inspiring enough pain for action but not enough to cause people to flee. Castellanos Moya identifies these two objects: exile/flight/escape and fear/anxiety/pain as permanent concerns of his. His description of the second is especially telling: “The second concern is paranoia, that is to say fear. Not on the individual level but as a collective feeling, as a way of surviving. Fear as a way of life” (Castro Luna). The pain involved in studying history and human rights is not a problem to be fixed, but a quality to be managed in historical and political writing.

Insensatez manages this in an iconoclastic fashion: drenching the entire narrative in nastiness. As has been mentioned, the protagonist himself is the brightest example of the foulness. As a fictional character, most traits of the protagonist are chosen rather than arbitrary. The choice of an atheistic, willfully immoral, predatorial, opportunistic, contemptuous, unreliable narrator to describe the work of the Human Rights Office of the Archbishop of Guatemala in the Recovery of Historical Memory (REMHI) project shows no intention to praise the efforts that produced Nunca Más. The protagonist and Erick are antitheses. Choosing to make such a character protagonist over Erick, the fictionalized archbishop, or other, more palatable members of REMHI is more than a move from macro to micronarrative. If the faults of the protagonist went unrecognized, it would signal an invective, polemic perspective on the part of the novel. The novel respects the work of REMHI but mocks it to do so. Thus, the choice of protagonist is a transition, not only from macronarratives, but a transition from conventional micronarrative as well. In particular, Insensatez is built of willfully foul micronarrative. (Foul micronarrative could be largely be substituted in Spanish with realismo sucio, which some authors like Manzoni have already identified with Castellanos Moya and Insensatez, but the English use of the phrase dirty realism already has its own conflicting associations.)

The use of foul micronarrative has several advantages. First, in terms of moral discussion, the protagonist represents a minimally tolerable standard of care. That is, if the protagonist feels morally obligated to do something, as a person with no moral capital, he sets a standard that everyone should follow, no matter how mediocre, detached, or troubled they are. The protagonist is deeply affected by the descriptions of violence and trauma. The argument, if it were presented as such, is that if this person can take these things seriously, then so can the reader.

Second, foul narrative sets up a pattern for the violation of social norms. Insensatez, as a novel, was going to violate social norms anyway by depicting graphic violence. The graphic depiction of sex, STDs, objectification, and masturbation normalize the breaking of norms. This technique, not without drawbacks, at least allows the reader to confront the taboo subjects of genocide and torture on their own terms, whereas the reader typically has to process the breaking of taboo at the same time as they are meant to contemplate the content itself beyond the taboo.

Third, foul narrative discourages binary thinking. Nunca Más included not only indigenous testimony, but also the testimony of soldiers and officers who killed and witnessed killing. The psychological damage they suffer is a nontrivial part of the conflict and represents political exploitation of soldiers. If soldiers suffer trauma, they become more amenable to acts of violence. Furthermore, damage to soldiers also represents damage to Guatemala, because they are citizens, too. Besse colorfully describes the damage in terms of psychoanalytic fragmentation:

Ese deseo y ese goce del sufrimiento impuesto al otro, esa destrucción de la persona tenderían, según los psicoanalistas, a regular una fragmentación interior infligiéndola al otro; por lo demás, las pulsiones de muerte buscan la disociación, el retorno a la nada. …

No sorprende, por lo tanto, que el texto de Horacio Castellanos Moya, que describe una verdadera carnicería, haga hincapié en el desmembramiento. Cuántas veces leemos verbos como «despedazar», «descuartizar», «destazar», «cortar», «tasajear», «desgarrar», «reventar», «machacar», con gran refuerzo de cuchillazos y machetazos, en una espiral de crueldad que raya en la demencia. El texto no sólo pone de relieve la acción sino su resultado: las personas tratadas como cuerpos sin alma resultan nada más que pedazos de carne, sanguinolentos, despojados de su humanidad y reducidos a objetos repugnantes. Esa orgía sangrienta de cuerpos mutilados, castrados o violados, y esa violación de los derechos humanos que deshumaniza tanto a la víctima como a aquel victimario que degenera hasta lo “infra-humano”, revela una locura total, entre violencia y delirio, sin que ya se sepa cuál de los dos es la causa o el efecto del otro.

Soldiers treat their victims as “cuerpos sin alma,” but to their superiors, the authors of genocide, the soldiers themselves tend also to be “pedazos de carne.” There is a strong inclination to vilify these soldiers and, without any exception, the commission of genocide deserves no apologetics. However, it must be understood that the scars they suffer hurt Guatemala as well and both sides of the conflict must be healed in order for the conflict to end in truth. As observed by poem 28, “eran personas como nosotros a las que teníamos miedo” (150). The study of genocide does not lead to the conclusion that every participant is monstrous. Most people who commit monstrosities do so because of their humanity, not in spite of it. This is insensatez at its finest.

Fourth, Insensatez is not only a depiction of trauma, but also a performance. The protagonist displays an array of symptoms associated with traumatic disorders: paranoia, panic attacks, hyperarousal, and compulsive behaviors. Sharing the space of his mind throughout the novel he narrates allows readers unfamiliar with the processes of trauma to experience, in part, the protagonist’s particular brand of traumatic experience. Since the actual experience of trauma and traumatic is diverse, this performance should not be understood as a generalized representation of trauma. Nevertheless, the protagonist serves as an excellent demonstration of a variety of symptoms a traumatized person may suffer.

Fifth, the protagonist’s fragmented mind shadows these fragmenting processes that are occurring throughout Guatemala and his home country of El Salvador. That is, the performance applies as a metaphor for the person and the nation. The narrator is perverse, divisive, and predatorial in semblance of the perversions, divisions, and predations that must exist in the sort of society that can produce genocide.

Sixth, there is no issue of lionization with foul narrative. If one chooses to respect the creators of Nunca Más, it is on one’s own terms. As far as the narrator is concerned, everyone is held in contempt. This significantly reduces the risks of the author being interpreted as sanctimonious or dogmatic.

Seventh, the novel has consistent narrative heaviness and tone. There is no surprising turn towards the dark, no out-of-place frivolity or humor. Like the issue with taboo, a consistent tone allows the reader to focus on important content rather than the presentation.

Now, this has been a discussion of advantages. There are also significant disadvantages to foul narrative that must be acknowledged:

First, the sensation of sharing perspective with the protagonist is often unpleasant. It is difficult to sympathize with him. For the reader more concerned with the description of human rights issues, he is a distraction and an obstacle. His personal exploits may feel increasingly like deviations from the plot.

Second, his unreliability makes it difficult to provide useful commentary or contextualization to the events within the novel or the tragedies depicted in Nunca Más. For the foul narrative to be successful, it needs to undermine its own credibility. In the case of Insensatez, this is achieved through the protagonist’s paranoia and flawed moral qualities. The protagonist argues for this himself: “yo no estoy completo de la mente, me dije, … porque solo de esa manera podía explicarse el hecho de que un ateo vicioso como yo estuviese iniciando un trabajo para la pérfida Iglesia católica,” as well as his willingness to read the madness of others (16). That this issue is peculiar to the choice of protagonist is emphasized midway through the novel during his discussions with the altogether sane psychiatrist who originally wrote much of the report the protagonist was editing. The protagonist characterizes the Church’s actions as selfish, resents Erick, and near the end of the novel, comes to believe in his delusions that Erick is conspiring with an enemy general. The reader understands that the protagonist’s value judgements hold little value and must make those judgments themself. This unreliability, however, applies to everything about the narrator. While the foul narrative decreases the negative impact of reading such narratives in its own ways, the narrator has an exceedingly narrowed capacity to provide wisdom, interpretation, and the like, all of which can help the reader mentally and emotionally process the difficult information. The narrator, as a helper, is useless.

Third, the reader is put at higher risk for vicarious distress. It is natural to ask, if I were to read Nunca Más, would I be damaged by it in a similar fashion to the damage it caused the narrator? The narrative offers only a limited perspective on the actual contents of the report, and those perspectives are already distressing.

Fourth, foul narrative significantly limits the novel’s potential audience. At least three audiences are excluded by this sort of novel. The first is, naturally, the group which Gabriela Mistral once described as (referring, in that case, specifically to female critics) “esas mujeres que para ser castas necesitan cerrar los ojos sobre la realidad cruel pero fatal” (528). It is unclear if this group can be reached by any serious literature about human cruelty, but if any can, it is certainly not the foul narrative. Second, there are those who, while more than willing to study genocide and human suffering, are uninterested or unwilling to follow the protagonist through his sexual escapades or coexist with his cynical perspective. This group is separate from the first because they are willing to engage with serious literature, but a willingness to engage with serious topics is not the same as a willingness to participate in a discussion regardless of presentation or context. The last group is people who, due to certain sensitivities, may react poorly to the foul parts of the narrative. Mental and emotional illness, being a victim of abuse or predation or the like, all could make reading Insensatez more difficult than it already is. People in this category are likely to be sensitive to the graphic descriptions of cruelty. It is one thing to work through one’s sensitivity to understand another’s suffering, a different thing entirely to be wounded in one’s sensitive heart or mind by nonessential, narrative elements. None of these groups should be excluded from the discussion of violations of human rights. The second group would quite plausibly include a character like Erick, while many victims themselves are liable to fall into the third category. Victims of human rights abuses already face traumatic insensitivity from interviewers, political enemies, and the like when they attempt to speak up.

Fifth, this sensitivity issue not only tends to exclude victims from the discussion, but also makes foul narrative unsatisfying to victims. As expressed by Nadia Murad, a Yazidi victim of genocide and human rights activist, regarding questions she had been asked, such as “When you think about the man who raped you, what do you want to happen to him?” or “Did you try to resist? Could you tell him no?”, “[t]hese kinds of questions are not the ones to ask. The things I want to be asked are ‘What must be done so Yazidis can have their rights?’ ‘What must be done so a woman will not be a victim of war?’ These are the kinds of things that I want to be asked more often” (“On Her Shoulders”). Foul narrative, and especially Insensatez by dint of its unreliable narrator, has little to no power to advocate solutions or change. The reader must turn to other sources to learn about action.

Sixth, the foulness of the narrative and the foulness of the history can mix in deeply unpleasant ways. The rampant sexuality of the narrator, for instance, is hard to forget as he describes the gangrape of his coworker in graphic detail. His tendency to imagine sexual encounters in graphic detail with other women, while not the case here, still adds a perverse color to the scene. It is hard to detach his description of damage to the tortured genitalia from his general obsession with genitalia.

Seventh, there is a heightened risk of misinterpretation by immature or inexperienced readers. In an ideal world, this type of text only lands in the hands of people who are sympathetic to genocide victims, opposed to racism, and can recognize the designed immorality of the protagonist. However, this type of literature would not even need to exist in an ideal world. All texts suffer the risk of misinterpretation, but graphic depictions and the lack of clear commentary make the risk more severe in the case of this text.

4. HISTORICAL FICTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Above all, this paper emphasizes the impossible question: how do you prepare a reader to think about the fact that there are people smashing babies’ brains against the floor? To, by the act of reading, relive it not just from the victim’s side, but also to revive the perpetrator? When the protagonist acknowledges “una sensación de levedad … como si mi transformación en el teniente que reventaba la cabeza de los bebés recién nacidos contra los horcones fuera la catarsis que me liberaba del dolor acumulado en las mil cien cuartillas,” and his visions appear not only as he reads but as he rests and does anything besides review and revise the report, it is hard to feel confidence in any good solution for discussing trauma (138-139). To remain in the vicarious mode of viewing trauma is dangerous, but to adopt the superficial view is to leave others permanently in that state as well. “Herido sí es duro quedar, pero muerto es tranquilo”–poem 25 (141). Castellanos Moya’s acknowledgements text at the end of the book, though it uses words that could be found in any acknowledgements section, takes on a special color: “Pude terminar este texto gracias al apoyo desinteresado de [the names of the thanked parties follow]” (156). Being able to finish a text such as this, remaining in the vicarious mode, viewing and reviewing, is terribly similar to the maddening task of the protagonist and, perhaps, requires “apoyo desinteresado” to finish the process whole.

Historical fiction often deals with traumatic events; unresolved trauma is one of the principle reasons why a past event still needs to be discussed. When human rights are at the center of a historical event, the line between historical fiction and political fiction blurs. For his part, Castellanos Moya has consistently denied letting his work be classified as political: “en Centroamérica, solo tenemos la política, o matar al prójimo, que es una continuación de la política; entonces no creo que escriba una literatura política en esencia porque una literatura de este tipo retrata los pleitos por el poder” (Castellanos Moya and Rodríguez Freire 65). For him, his fiction, and by extensión the genre he works in, is an alternative: historical fiction defined by micronarrative. His characters are not politicians, “se pueden encontrar afectados por la política y a veces determinados por ella, pero su problemática no pasa por tomar el poder, ni por convertirse en políticos.” The practice of history, as opposed to politics, is defined by this restraint: not taking power.

Historical fiction and political fiction are often differentiated simply by time, but the question of power is a more robust distinction. As Homi Bhabha argues, “Migrants and refugees spend much of their time caught in the anticipatory anxiety of waiting: waiting to leave, waiting to be caught by the police, waiting to have their testimony questioned, waiting for the legal documentation to come through, waiting for acceptance, waiting to make a new life … Waiting … The politics of waiting is not a passive condition” (qtd. in Karugia et al. 9). Crises of the past drift into the present. Efraín Ríos Montt, who presided over much of the Guatemalan genocide, died in 2018, never brought to justice. He had been convicted in 2013, but his sentence was overturned. In the case of the assassination of Archbishop Juan José Gerardi Conedera, three military officials were convicted in 2001, but one has walked free since 2012 and the other has enjoyed the freedom to leave prison at his leisure for much of his time in prison (“Assassination of Bishop Gerardi”). The mere fact that a text be about the past does nothing to separate it from present affairs, just as a text about the present can be very much historical.

Now, if what defines historical fiction is its disassociation from power, rather than time, what can it do for the victim of genocide? Historical fiction’s power is not political—its power is found in perspective. It all goes back to viewing. Political power can subject people to trauma, but it cannot force them to move beyond the superficial mode. To make a person view trauma, with a willingness to endure the pain that entails, is the domain of historical fiction.

Castellanos Moya’s own approach to traumatic history is heavily influenced by Thomas Bernhard, best evidenced by his novel El asco, on account of its less known subtitle Thomas Bernhard en San Salvador. Thornton, referencing Matthias Konzett, argues that Bernhard “[strove] for ‘an aesthetics of witnessing,’ through irony, victimization, and violence, that reflects the ills of society amidst the normalization and rehabilitation processes in post-World War II Austria” and that Castellanos Moya did the same in Central America (216). Witnessing is viewing, viewing by any means necessary, no matter how distant or foreign the subject. As the primary vessel of that access is memory, the movement towards an aesthetic of witnessing is elsewhere called “una cultura de memoria” or “una clima de época” (Salto 138).

Insensatez’s protagonist is just that, a witness and purveyor of memories: his own, those of killers, those of the dead, those of survivors. He witnesses the crimes described in Nunca Más, the creation of that report, the character of its creator, his assassination, and the protagonist’s own vicarious victimization by the military and Church (who pushed him into the experience of vicarious viewing). In no meaningful sense is he an actor—the report would be published without his editing if it were necessary. He, like the victims themselves, like the reader who learns of genocide forty-plus years after it occurred, is powerless. Thus, together, this group can exclaim together, with wildly different spirits, intentions, and meanings the words of poem 21: ¡pero yo siempre me siento muy cansado de que no puedo hacer nada! (113).

This powerlessness is the origin of Castellanos Moya’s historical fiction. The pain of vicarious viewing disappears in the body of the powerful, because the powerful can eliminate the cruelty themselves. The space of this fiction exists precisely because the powerful do not act and thereby preserve the pain of the victim, the author, and the reader alike. It is necessarily anti-power, anti-status quo. This opposition is factionless, as the differences between guerrillas and governments fade away when change does not come, with the helpless victimized time and again (Vanegas V. 329). This fiction is a resentment of political power, which his character Vega expresses powerfully in El asco:

“Los políticos apestan en todas partes, Moya, pero en este país los políticos apestan particularmente, te puedo asegurar que nunca había visto políticos tan apestosos como los de acá, quizás sea por los cien mil cadáveres que carga cada uno de ellos, quizás la sangre de esos cien mil cadáveres es la que los hace apestar de esa manera tan particular, quizás el sufrimiento de esos cien mil muertos les impregnó esa manera particular de apestar.” (26)

The purpose of Castellanos Moya’s fiction is to apestar. It seeks to spread awareness of genocide, of cruelty, of violence in Central America and elsewhere in antipolitical tones.

This powerlessness is felt inside the genre itself. It stands in contrast to traditional history, as well as much of traditional historical fiction (especially testimonio, as described by Thornton). Thomas Bernhard said:

“Truth, it seems to me, is known only to the person who is affected by it; and if he chooses to communicate it to others, he automatically becomes a liar. Whatever is communicated can only be falsehood and falsification; hence it is only falsehoods and falsifications that are communicated … What matters is whether we want to lie or to tell and write the truth, even though it never can be the truth and never is the truth” (qtd. in Thornton 210).

Historical study typically intends to tell the truth, while historical fiction does not necessarily. Testimonio, as a genre, was certainly concerned with that truth, yet Castellanos Moya’s work is a move away from testimonio. William Castro identifies Castellano Moya’s El arma en el hombre, a testimonio-style novel from the perspective of the obviously fictional character Robocop emblematic of the problems with testimonio, that the central perspective of testimonio is necessarily a construction, a fiction. “The traditional subject of testimonio is both an absence and the very center of the novel” (133). Testimonio, historical study, and much of conventional historical fiction is hampered because it operates on the premise that it is true, but that premise is vacuous. Historical fiction, in the style of Bernhard and Castellanos Moya, serves the truth, not by intending to tell the truth as truth, but by acknowledging that he is using lies to create, not the truth, but an approximation thereof.

This is not an optimistic powerlessness; “lo que prevalece al final es la impunidad y el desamparo de las víctimas. Aunque se le atribuye cierta importancia a la memoria escrita, queda claro que esta verdad grabada en papel no lleva ni a la justicia ni a la persecución de los culpables” (Haas 180). Testimonio, the study of history, and historical fiction are powerless together and alike. When Efraín Ríos Montt’s conviction for genocide was overturned, Castellanos Moya wrote about how Guatemala had allowed a former president to be extradited at the same time for money laundering to calm international pressure against letting Ríos Montt go free, a murderer for a thief, a soldier for a civilian. Castellanos Moya was neither surprised nor efficacious, with no pretense that he could influence the event in any way (“Guatemala”).

Reflecting on how imminent death affects a writer, he concluded: “La eficacia del lenguaje responde, más que a una estrategia narrativa, a una condición vital en la que aquello que sobra, que estorba, es eliminado de forma tajante en la mente del escritor” (“Death at Their Heels”). Quite opposite to senselessness, he does rescue some (apolitical) power for language. This power does not stem from narrative skill (indeed, few, if any, of the indigenous witnesses whose poetry he describes in Insensatez could have been trained writers or orators), but from truth, a power conferred by the real conditions which the communicator experiences. This power is unlikely to ever change politics, but, at the very least, “golpea al lector con tanta fuerza que lo subyuga, lo hipnotiza, quizá porque en las frases se concentra la desesperación del hombre tocado por la muerte.” As Castellanos writes of fear, pain, torture, exile, and powerlessness as ways of life, indeed, the way of life of so many Central Americans and hopeless people throughout human time and space, this language that subjugates and hypnotizes is the closest thing to power he seeks.

5. CONCLUSION

There is no power to tell the truth, to effect change, to make people see, to prepare people to see, to make people safe when they see. This is the endless challenge of the human rights advocate: the fact there is no power to save. If the power to save were there, the fragility of human rights and the condition of war could almost disappear. To draw someone else into the conflict is fundamentally cruel, full of falsehood and little-understood processes, to expose them to a futile struggle. To advocate for the victim, the innocent must lose their innocence of heart and become a participant. This process, though it cannot bring anyone to truth or justice, can be described as senseless. Yet, what Elie Wiesel said rings as true of Castellanos Moya’s work as his own:

There is much to be done, there is much that can be done. One person … one person of integrity, can make a difference, a difference of life and death. As long as one dissident is in prison, our freedom will not be true. As long as one child is hungry, our lives will be filled with anguish and shame. What all these victims need above all is to know that they are not alone; that we are not forgetting them, that when their voices are stifled we shall lend them ours, that while their freedom depends on ours, the quality of our freedom depends on theirs.

No matter how senseless his actions may be, Castellanos Moya still wrote Insensatez, still spoke up when Efraín Ríos Montt was pardoned, still advocates for Central American migrants, and will keep on writing pain, fear, exile, and death.

For the vicarious viewer, an alteration of Bernhard’s phrase serves: what matters is whether we want to see the truth, even though it never can be the truth and never is the truth. This is what saves the protagonist, in all his perversion, from becoming a voyeur into others’ pain. It also saves him from falling into the superficial mode. Still faithful to his training as a journalist, he wants to see the truth. In this senseless search to see something that cannot be seen, the lines blur between the victimized, witnessing, and the vicarious pains. The senselessness of violence must be mirrored in its opponents, in their senseless, futile quest for truth and a society ruled by powerlessness. If a reader can be persuaded to stick around long enough to become senseless, the question encountered earlier, of causing just enough pain to inspire action but not so much that the reader flees, is resolved. The reader will now endure the pain. Thus, the first objective of historical fiction is well and truly realized.

Finally, the second, hidden purpose of historical fiction can come to the fore. As expressed by Gabriela Mistral, “si la misión del arte es embellecerlo todo, es una inmensa misericordia, ¿por qué no hemos purificado, a los ojos de los impuros, esto? (528). She spoke of beautifying the condition of single mothers, abandoned by their lovers and families, all but their child. The spirit with which she fought for motherhood, aesthetic even in its pain, is true of the human: why have we not purified, in the eyes of the impure, the human, no matter what evils or pain they suffer under? Castellanos Moya, for all the foulness of his stories, is deeply concerned with the beauty of literature. Thus, he observes “pareciera ser común lo que debemos pasar algunos escritores de escribir en condiciones poco propicias, algunas veces evitando ser reprimidos por las ideas que profesamos, pero también sin hacer de la literatura un panfleto, sino que rescatando siempre la belleza de las formas literarias” (qtd. in Menjívar). In this fashion and under this light, the act of holding up indigenous poetry found in antigenocide testimony, rather than academic appropriation, is an act of sublime respect and appreciation. Nunca más, in its title, expressed a senseless, absurd, powerless, yet sublimely all-important, beautiful wish: that never again should the hideous, foul face of genocide appear.

Appendix: Index of Testimonial Quotes

The following are lines taken from indigenous testimony used throughout Insensatez. The page number given is the first appearance of the line, as several lines appear repeatedly (for instance, line 1 appears five times in Chapter One and is the focal point of that chapter). Each original was italicized, but they are written here without italics for ease of reading.

1. Yo no estoy completo de la mente (13).

2. Se queda triste su ropa (30).

3. Las casas estaban tristes porque ya no había personas dentro (31).

4. Quemaron nuestras casas, comieron nuestros animales, mataron nuestros niños, las mujeres, los hombres, ¡ay!, ¡ay!… ¿Quién va a reponer todas las casas? (31).

5. Tres días llorando, llorando que le quería yo ver. Ahí me senté abajo de la tierra para decir ahí está la crucita, ahí está él, ahí está nuestro polvito y lo vamos a ir a respetar, a dejar una su vela, pero cuando vamos a poner la vela no hay donde la vela poner (32).

6. Porque para mí el dolor es no enterrarlo yo (32).

7. A puro palo y cuchillo mataron a esos doce hombres de los que se habla allí. Agarraron a Diego Nap López y agarraron un cuchillo que cada patrullero tenía que tomar dándole un filazo o cortándole un poquito (38).

8. Lo que pienso es que pienso yo (43).

9. Tanto en sufrimiento que hemos sufrido tanto con ellos (43).

10. Mis hijos dicen: mamá, mi pobre papá dónde habrá quedado, tal vez pasa el sol sobre sus huesos, tal vez pasa la lluvia y el aire, ¿dónde estará? Como que fuera un animal mi pobre papá. Esto es el dolor (47-48).

11. Los cerdos lo están comiendo, están repasando sus huesos (48).

12. Quiero ver al menos los huesos (48).

13. Cuando los cadáveres se quemaron, todos dieron un aplauso y empezaron a comer (48).

14. Allá en el Izote estaban los sesos tirados, como a puro leño se los sacaron (63).

15. Hasta a veces no sé cómo me nace el rencor y contra quién desquitarme a veces (68-69).

16. Entonces se asustó y enloqueció de una vez (82).

17. Ése es mi hermano, ya está loco de tanto miedo que ha recibido; su mujer murió del susto también (82).

18. No son decires sino que yo lo vi cómo fue el asesinato de él (82).

19. Porque yo no quiero que maten la gente delante de mí (82).

20. Si yo me muero, no sé quién me va a enterrar (104).

21. ¡pero yo siempre me siento muy cansado de que no puedo hacer nada! (113).

22. Que siempre los sueños allí están todavía (122).

23. Hay momentos en que tengo ese miedo y hasta me pongo a gritar (129).

24. Al principio quise haber sido una culebra venenosa, pero ahora lo que pido es el arrepentimiento de ellos (135-136).

25. Herido sí es duro quedar, pero muerto es tranquilo (141).

26. Que se borre el nombre de los muertos para que queden libres y ya no tengamos problemas (144).

27. Para mí recordar, siento yo que estoy viviendo otra vez (149).

28. Eran personas como nosotros a las que teníamos miedo (150).

29. Mientras más matara, se iba más para arriba (152).

30. Todos sabemos quiénes son los asesinos (153).

31. Después vivimos el tiempo de la zozobra (154).

Works Cited

“Assassination of Bishop Gerardi.” Guatemala Human Rights Commission, www.ghrc-usa.org/our-work/important-cases/assassination-of-bishop-gerardi/. Accessed 9 Dec. 2020.

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Castellanos Moya, Horacio. “Cartografías.” Sampsonia Way, 27 Sept. 2012, www.sampsoniaway.org/horacio-castellanos-moya-spanish/2012/09/27/cartografias/. Accessed 9 Dec. 2020.

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—. Insensatez. 2004. Tusquets Editores, 2017.

Castellanos Moya, Horacio, and Rodríguez Freire, Raúl. “Horacio Castellanos Moya.” Hispamérica, vol. 40, no. 118, Apr. 2011, pp. 57-70. www.jstor.org/stable/23070005. Accessed 1 Dec. 2020.

Castro, William. “The Novel After Terrorism: On Rethinking The ‘Testimonio’, Solidarity, and Democracy in Horacio Castellanos Moya’s ‘El arma en el hombre.’” Revista Hispánica Moderna, vol. 63, no. 2, Dec 2010, pp. 121-135. www.jstor.org/stable/40927298. Accessed 1 Dec. 2020.

Castro Luna, Claudia. “A conversation with Horacio Castellanos Moya.” Proximity Magazine, 6 Sept. 2018, true.proximitymagazine.org/2018/09/06/a-conversation-with-horacio-castellanos-moya/. Accessed 1 Dec. 2020.

Haas, Nadine. “El papel del lenguaje y la escritura para las víctimas. El enfrentamiento con el pasado conflictivo en Guatemala.” Iberoamericana, vol. 10, no. 37, March 2010, pp. 176-180. www.jstor.org/stable/41677038. Accessed 1 Dec. 2020.

Karugia, John Njenga, et al. “’Even the dead have human rights’: A conversation with Homi K. Bhabha.” Journal of Postcolonial Writing, vol. 54, no. 5, 2018, pp. 702-716. DOI: 10.1080/17449855.2018.1446682. Accessed 1 Dec. 2020.

Manzoni, Celina. “Violencia escrituraria, marginalidad y nuevas estéticas.” Hipertexto, vol. 14, 2011, pp. 57-70. www.utrgv.edu/hipertexto/_files/documents/articles/hipertexto-14/celina-manzoni.pdf. Accessed 1 Dec. 2020.

Menjívar, Elmer. “Horacio Castellanos Moya se suma a Rubem Fonseca y Ricardo Piglia al recibir premio Iberoamericano.” El Faro, 22 May 2004, elfaro.net/es/201405/el_agora/15421/Horacio-Castellanos-Moya-se-suma-a-Rubem-Fonseca-y-Ricardo-Piglia-al-recibir-premio-Iberoamericano.htm. Accessed 1 Dec. 2020.

Mistral, Gabriela. “Poemas de la madre más triste.” Gabriela Mistral: En verso y prosa, Antología, Real Academia Española, 2010, p. 528.

“On Her Shoulders – Official Trailer – Oscilloscope Laboratories HD.” YouTube, uploaded by oscopelabs, 5 Oct. 2018, www.youtube.com/watch?v=9RRE1DWK8cU.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse Upon the Origin and the Foundation of the Inequality Among Mankind. E-book, Project Gutenberg, 2004.

Salto, Graciela. “Memoria, tradición y lenguaje en los ensayos de Horacio Castellanos Moya.” CELEHIS–Revista del Centro de Letras Hispanoamericanas, vol. 25, no. 31, 2016, pp. 137-149. www.academia.edu/38134669/Memoria_tradici%C3%B3n_y_lenguaje_en_los_ensayos_de_Horacio_Castellanos_Moya. Accessed 1 Dec. 2020.

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Wiesel, Elie. “Elie Wiesel – Acceptance Speech.” The Norwegian Nobel Institute, 10 Dec. 1986, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1986/wiesel/26054-elie-wiesel-acceptance-speech-1986/.

Confounding Variables: Rhea + Edelgard

Author’s Note: This post began as a series of comments a while back. Seeing as the Rhea-Edelgard comparison has proven a central issue of discussion for the past weeks, I figured it was worth cleaning up this comment and making a full post out of it.

Rhea is an awful tyrant by the year 1180, but there are some important considerations to make regarding that. When I wrote about empathy and orchid children with regard to Edelgard, there is a very real possibility that the same once applied to Rhea. This post is an application of many of those same principles. I believe Rhea is very much the sort of person that Edelgard would have become had her circumstances been different. They begin in similar circumstances, of course, both being sole survivors of massacres, producing survivor’s guilt, PTSD, and all that. However, there are some significant differences that complicate our comparisons between the two. These differences may well suffice to explain the difference between Rhea and El’s outcomes:

  • Rhea struggles with race conflict that is almost nonexistent for El. El’s captors belong to the same ethnicity, political class, nation, race, everything, as her. Even when Edelgard deals with people of other ethnicities and class, she has no special experience to put them at odds (I’d like to think she would handle these issues well even if she did, but that’s a big IF). Despite all this, at her young age, she is already wary of ‘children of the goddess,’ though I don’t believe her wariness could be classified as bigotry. By contrast, race issues are at the fore for Rhea’s suffering. She was the victim of a racial massacre. She has felt it necessary to completely hide her racial identity (and, along with it, her true self) for centuries at least (I assume Wilhelm knew, but his story is too sparse to know why their relationship was special and if such a thing happened again. Jeralt knew Rhea was more than human, but I don’t know how deep that knowledge goes). The differences between a dragon’s umwelt and a human’s are significant (I intend to work on this idea in a later post). And she has little experience that would moderate those racial tensions. To make it even worse, Rhea also faces the threat of racial extinction. Not only is her race attacked, those attacks have been so successful to drive them to the brink of annihilation. This, I anticipate, evokes a special, existential fear. And, as messed up as the attempts to reincarnate Sothis are, they represent possibly the only option for Rhea to prevent her people’s total extinction.
  • More speculative, since the timeline is so uncertain for this portion of Fodlan history, but Rhea may have been very immature, even more than Edelgard, when the Red Canyon happened. She is a direct child of Sothis and her experience of grief is from an infantile perspective. Based on the slower maturation of dragons, Sothis’ sleep and subsequent death may have deprived Rhea of motherly affection very early in her development. If this is the case, she is not only left without a mother, which is bad enough in general, she is left without a mother to emotionally and physically nurture her, teach her virtue, and so on. Rhea partially absorbed Sothis’ vision of coexistence with humans, but her understanding is about as sophisticated as it would be if she only had access to that vision as a child. The big question here is when Rhea lost Sothis in substance. For the time after the 1st war with the Agarthans, Sothis was devoting a lot of energy to healing the scars of war, so even in peacetime Rhea wouldn’t have gotten to see as much of her mother as a child needs. If Rhea was born before the war, Sothis’ duties may well have kept them largely separated. Her experience of grief makes it feel like she’s trapped as a child. She doesn’t mourn her mother like an adult would. There’s too much dependency. Even teens have enough independence that their grief is unlikely to manifest this way. But that is something about trauma: it preserves the original emotional world as it was when the trauma occurred. Even though she can be mature, cunning, intelligent, and all that, when it comes to her mother, she still feels like a child (feel as in experience feeling, not feel as in how she appears to us). [Note 1]
  • Rhea did not have someone do for her what Byleth did for Edelgard. If she ever did, they died long before she did. Wilhelm is the only human on record who we can reasonably believe had an emotionally intimate relationship with her, and that’s not even certain. [Note 2] And, given the difference of lifespans, Rhea has far less incentive to connect to humans. And, well, there aren’t many dragons running around to fill that role, and those we know already have a relationship with Rhea that preempts such.
  • Rhea is socially awkward and relies on decorum to communicate in a normal-seeming manner (to hide her isolation, present a fixed and plausible persona to others, and bridge the racial divide). She has little ability to communicate her emotional needs, because her need for security necessitates cutting herself off from others (Edelgard exhibits this same behavior, but the dangers of exposing herself lack the racial and historical risk that Rhea faces). Very like Edelgard, Rhea does not feel she can show weakness, ever. However, she has no outlet for this. Consider the following advice request she puts in: “I am more than capable of protecting myself from ruffians, but those around me tend to worry, and so I am often denied the pleasure of a private stroll.” She is dissatisfied with any response besides “You’re too important, so I’m afraid it can’t be helped.” She yearns to connect with people, to relax, and the like, as all leaders do, and as El does, but she has a deeply internalized sense of obligation and decorum (decorum also being almost a nonissue for El).
  • The most important is longevity: Edelgard is human, Rhea is a dragon. All these issues don’t play out over months, years, or decades: we’re dealing with centuries. Any negative tendency in Rhea’s character, any deficiency in her environment, has had centuries to work themselves on her and cement themselves in her psyche. It is well known that it is easier for things to fall apart than to put them back together. We humans can kinda keep things together sometimes for 100 years, but the probability of making a serious moral lapse across centuries is much greater. And any traumatic failure or unresolved sin, instead of weighing Rhea down for 50, 80, years, does so for 800 years, which is a terrifying thought. Rhea has been without companionship and moral/emotional support for centuries. I cannot fathom how terrible a situation that is. And as if this were not enough, she may well have tried to do things better before (find a sense of belonging, try to find someone she could trust with her (racial + other) secrets, cooperate with humans, be forgiving), and been burned enough in the attempts that she gave up somewhere along the line.

In particular, Rhea, even in 1180 I believe, could set things right, but the conditions that induced her tyranny remain unchanged [Note 3]. Perhaps Seteth and Flayn could have moderated her, given more time, but things were already at a boiling point on the human side and, unfortunately, they both lack the force of character to undo a millennium of dysfunction.

We really do not know what Rhea was like in her youth. She may have been an orchid child, but she may well have not; her circumstances are sufficient to break many a psyche. She does not seem to be an empath now, but she could have been one once. She has had a lot of time to change and, given a millennium, I doubt any part of her personality would be immune to change.

Because we don’t know her starting point, we do not know whether her contemporary tyranny is more a consequence of suffering or an expression of choice. Or rather, how much each factor is responsible, because they both are. We do not know who Edelgard would be if her experience were closer to Rhea’s.

I did not write this to say that Rhea and Edelgard have no comparison. Rather, I want to delimit exactly what the issues with comparison are. Rhea and Edelgard share a lot and I believe that must be appreciated. But these confounding factors also must limit any conclusion we make regarding their relationship. I’ve focused largely on the ethical implications of these factors, but I don’t doubt that other significant implications exist.

Further, I do not write this to justify who Rhea has become, but because she represents a threat we each face: given the right circumstances, the necessary duress, I doubt any of us would not become monsters. I contemplate how gangs take kidnapped youths and subject them to mixes of drugs and torture, then force the victim themselves to torture or murder in order to break the spirit. How child soldiers are often forced to kill their own families. And the El and Rhea comparison reminds me of how perilous the escape from torture and trauma is. I want Rhea to be happy, but without some gratuitous time travel, it’s pretty hard to reach her. And that’s not necessarily her fault. And, given a thousand years, it’s hard to say Edelgard wouldn’t have ended up similarly miserable, similarly cruel. Not that Rhea’s cruelty should be viewed as a sole consequence of her circumstances. Rather, we need someone outside of ourselves to ground us, to support us, to raise us up, to keep us true to ourselves. Because, of ourselves, I doubt any of us have the strength to truly endure the hurricane of time forever.

Notes

[Note 1] I received some light pushback on the claim that the Zanado massacre was race-driven. Before getting into the justification, I would like to note that I am worried by some comments I’ve seen suggesting that the Agarthan’s actions here are reasonable, or that Nemesis was genuinely heroic. For the reasons that follow, it was racial. But even if it was political, the slaughter of children is unforgivable. Beyond that, the very precept is wrong. The Agarthan justification, mirrored in comments, is disturbingly similar to the anti-Semitic conspiracy, which I refuse to describe on account of its odious nature (and, if my memory does not fail me, one commenter even invoked this similarity while justifying Nemesis’ actions). I do not mean to characterize anyone as an anti-Semite, but the nature itself of this argument has left me unsettled. Yes, Nabateans had a great deal of power over human society. Yes, benevolence does not justify a program of racial supremacy. But we do not know that such a program existed, let alone that Nabateans were active participants in human society. Fidel Castro would blame imperialism for literally anything and, while the US truly has a disturbing role in Cuban history, he would use the same scapegoat to cover his own failures and evils. (Without diving too much into the political, I would point to the widespread scapegoating of immigrants and refugees as a modern and historic example, a practice which I am avidly opposed to and disgusted by.) The point is, cultural, political, and racial scapegoating is a common political ploy, regardless of whether there is any factual basis. And even where culpability does exist, it is exaggerated. And even then, it does not ever justify genocide. Nemesis and TWSITD display the tyrannical dispositions of strongmen. I believe we are wiser to assume they used the tactics of strongmen than give them the benefit of the doubt here.

Now, to the facts.

It is a racial dispute because the Nabateans were slaughtered as a race. There was no consideration of innocence, no sparing of children, no ideology that would make Zanado anything but race-based killing. The Agarthans hate dragons regardless of whether the dragon is personally responsible for the conditions they complained of. The process of slaughter was extreme and disgusting, demonstrated by a quote from the Dream Interview:

They granted humans the technology to make powerful weapons from the corpses of the citizens of Nabatea, or so was their plan that they enacted, to which they went forward with this plan using the human, Nemesis. As a result, what would happen to humans who gained power… they would want even more power, and find a dragon much stronger to beat in order to collect materials forcefully, in order to make even more powerful weapons… and so that was the cycle that was born. And that was the birth of Fodlan’s Ten Elites.

The slaughter specifically moved from the weak to the strong, for the sake of technology, not any political reason.

And regardless of whether anti-Nabatean sentiment was fair based on political circumstances of which we know little, and that from deeply biased individuals, that’s not going to mean very much to a firsthand witness of the slaughter of her entire race and civilization, innocent and guilty alike. Whenever genocide occurs, whatever political considerations may exist simultaneously are barely relevant in defining the quality of genocide. And, for all Rhea did, she never attempted to eradicate humans like the Agarthans tried to do to her.

[Note 2] We know that Rhea conferred the Crest of Seiros to Wilhelm for some reason. They had a wide-ranging alliance. While this gift may be nothing but the sort of thing that happened with Jeralt, it is a remarkable and rare event. Alas, we are left with pure speculation as to the true nature of Wilhelm and Rhea’s relationship.

[Note 3] I love stories about people realizing how awful they’ve become and fighting themselves and the world to atone so Rhea facing humans as equals and telling the public the truth because she chose to, not because she needed to, is my dream story. This would, I believe, have been the key to a golden route. I don’t think a golden route has to be a perfect, everyone-is-maximally-happy ending. We could have made meaningful choices about what the world should look like in the end, who we trusted to rule Fodlan more, or how specific issues should be handled. Heck, we coulda just had to sacrifice one of the lords if we wanna do it the easy way. But yeah, it could have been beautiful… q-q

[Final Note] I am posting at 4:10 am my time, so I apologize for any mistakes I make and will attempt to address them after some proper sleep. My hope is that such errors are minimal since around 80% of this is copypasted. I hope this reading has been worthwhile for you and may you have a wonderful, blessed day.

[Originally for r/edelgard]

Bernadetta & Edelgard

Bernadetta is a sweetheart, but there is something special between her and Edelgard. This post is mostly observational, rather than analytical, but I want to draw attention to these two good children.

Two components of that special relationship. 1. Crimson Flower is the only route where Bernadetta leaves her room on the regular during war phase. 2. She is one of two female Black Eagles with a shared ending with Edelgard (alongside Dorothea).

Observations on 1) The most significant implication of this is that Byleth is not the person who helps Bernadetta flower during the war phase. This stands in stark contrast to most students; Byleth is an effective, nurturing authority figure that allows many students to grow. But Byleth alone doesn’t do it for Bernie. It takes Edelgard and Byleth for Bernadetta to develop the ability to safely leave her room. (I would postulate that it is Edelgard alone or that Byleth is, at most, a catalyst while Edelgard is the main reactant. This is pretty speculative, but I note that Byleth is actually less supportive of Bernadetta than most others: other writers have observed how Byleth is the only character to willfully make light of Bernie’s suffering, in their A-support of all places.)

Observations on 2) Bernadetta sticks out among the women who have endings with Edelgard. Dorothea and Manuela are connected with El through the Opera, their political interests, and personalities. Lysithea and El share a drive and twin crests. The lovely and genius lady of Nuvelle are both meritocratic, ambitious, and driven. Bernadetta lacks each and every one of these qualities.

3) As a final note, Bernadetta and Edelgard are victims of similar abuses: grooming. Their grooming runs in opposite directions. Those Who Slither needed Edelgard to be a powerful, efficacious leader and warrior. Count Varley sought to make Bernadetta a doll. But both Edelgard and Bernadetta were intended to be puppets under the control of men. Additionally, both had absent but benevolent mothers (Patricia’s case being well-known, while Bernadetta’s mother was apparently employed in Enbarr, away from home).

Unpacking all this:

Bernadetta and Edelgard engage in a peculiar, mutually beneficial relationship. From their C-support, Bernadetta reveals she looks to Edelgard as a model of fearlessness. Edelgard also displays unusual openness with Bernie (confessing her fear of the sea). In B-support, Edelgard proves very understanding of Bernadetta’s condition, helping her feel more grounded and being patient with Bernadetta’s rapid regresses to panic (I love the lines: Bernie: Then, may I please scream now? Edie: By all means. But please try to make it a fairly quiet one). By A-support, Edelgard is able to calmly navigate Bernadetta’s distress episodes and soothe her.

Edelgard understands (at least in abstract) the difficulty Bernadetta faces. Before Edelgard understands how to handle the conversations, she focuses on understanding exactly what Bernadetta is trying to communicate and reinforce what she herself intends to communicate. Edelgard addresses the barrier in communication directly and seeks to understand the barrier itself, rather than focusing on the outbursts or confusion the barrier produces. By taking Bernadetta as she is and working through their communication problems, Edelgard shows implicit respect and value for Bernadetta that other characters do not. Bernadetta values authority figures that make her feel safe, as evidenced by her relationships with Seteth, Alois, and her deceased uncle. Edelgard comfortably acts as an authority figure that Bernadetta naturally cares for and respects, even trusts (to the degree that she can with her persecution complex; she may still panic, but she trusts Edelgard more than her fears when Edelgard asks her to reevaluate things).

Conversely, Bernadetta is able to teach Edelgard a lot in terms of down-to-earth emotion. I’ve written before about how Edelgard is an empath, but it must be understood that being an empath does not mean you actually understand others’ emotions. An empath mirrors the emotions they believe the other is experiencing, not what the other is experiencing in truth. The empath may rely on assumptions about and exaggerations of others’ feelings. Bernadetta forces Edelgard to slow down her emotional processing and rely on communication more than practice. Edelgard specifically mentions that her experience with Bernie has helped her manage her anger in their A-support. But their shared ending suggests that this goes deeper:

“[Edelgard] demanded that Bernadetta counsel her in governing Fódlan. It is said that the emperor made this choice to keep herself from being too detached, and that Bernadetta was all too happy to provide a more emotional perspective now and again. “

Edelgard grounds Bernadetta during attacks from her mental illness, but Bernadetta also grounds Edelgard in terms of emotions. Bernadetta is very caring, something Count Varley didn’t snuff out of her. Bernadetta’s graveside manner exemplifies this. Pre-timeskip, Bernadetta leaves her room precisely once: to comfort Byleth after Jeralt’s death. She also invites Alois to visit her uncle’s grave, because Alois reminds her of him and to show Alois her trust and affection. This interaction also shows how Bernadetta has completed her mourning process for her uncle and has a healthy understanding of the loss. Contrast with Edelgard’s difficulty handling mourning with Byleth at Jeralt’s death (we’ve discussed on this sub how Edelgard’s handling of Byleth’s grief is not cruel, but they are indubitably hard to understand). Edelgard doesn’t address the past very much and, for her, mourning will not end until her fight is done. That perspective is important, but not infallible. It chills her emotions, even as it propels her fight. Bernadetta is perhaps the only person besides Byleth that directly counteracts the chilling effect of Edelgard’s trauma on her emotions. Byleth, like Bernadetta, has communication issues and emotional difficulty, but is caring and genuinely wants to help others. Bernadetta does for Edelgard in a subordinate position what Byleth does for Edelgard in a superior position. This is something of incredible value for Edelgard. Edelgard understands a lot about Bernadetta, but Bernadetta also understands Edelgard.

Bernadetta is, in short, a complement to Edelgard. Their grooming allows them to cover each other’s weaknesses but also appreciate how the other struggles with their weaknesses. I would describe them as symmetric: symmetric halves are different from each other in all the ways that matter and, at the same time, they are the same in all the ways that matter. Their A-support ends with them both contemplating a flower soon-to-bloom, waiting for that moment when its true colors show. In truth, Edelgard is not the only crimson flower, chasing the sun no matter where it goes.

[Originally for r/edelgard]