Tag Archives: law

Some notes on the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints’ finances

Since there are some odd claims about the finances of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints going around, I thought I’d just mention a few things:

1. I honestly like paying tithing and making other donations. It’s chill, I like not worshipping money, it’s lovely how it tempers materialism, and God watches over us better than money does anyway.

2. The monetary reserves the Church holds (about $100 billion), in the highest amounts I’ve seen alleged, are comparable to the combined endowments of Yale (~$40b) and Harvard (~$50b). The 3 BYUs (Church-owned universities) serve about the same number of students as those two universities, but the Church is a much, much bigger org than Yale and Harvard (and even just discussing the BYUs, they’re operated at a massive loss with the lowest nonmilitary tuition in the US, a far cry from Yale and Harvard). The Church’s worldwide operations include welfare programs active basically everywhere the Church is present, humanitarian operations, facilities, budgets for local congregations, even educational services etc. The numbers in modern finance are dazzling, but that’s because the world is crazy. $100b in the modern economy is ~not~ large at all for a global institution.

3. The Church is tax-exempt. Its investment arm (Ensign Peak), however, is a related but distinct entity and is ~not~ tax exempt. It receives extensive IRS oversight, as does any org handling large amounts of money.*

4. Church investments are largely consistent with the Church’s purpose. One of the biggest sectors of investment is agriculture, which is necessary to sustain the Church Welfare system’s food distribution. The oddball projects are usually offshoots or offspring of various community development projects that the Church has contributed to. (Consider how the Church in Utah was in charge of developing almost everything necessary to build a life in the beginning; it has taken on similar projects in other countries as well.)

5. The Church does report what it spends donations on. Building maintenance, humanitarian needs, welfare, missionary funds, temple funds, etc. It doesn’t specify what percentages go to which, but 1) i’m satisfied as to the legitimacy of each fund, 2) detailed reporting is v expensive, and 3) i don’t really care about the details, anyway.**

*I found this kind of funny, it’s an aside about tax law, but I saw a claim that the Church wasn’t following the spirit of the law in its tax operations in some unspecified way. I just wanted to take a brief moment to note that the Tax Code is the most byzantine, absurd, torturous area of law in the US. There is no “spirit of the law” when it comes to our tax system. (It isn’t even fully consistent with the spirit of raising revenue lol.)

**The trend to demand detailed budget reporting in the name of government transparency is a similar and sometimes vexatious issue. The more detail you demand, the more checks you add in, the more expensive it gets (and it gets expensive fast when you apply it across an institution as extensive and varied as the government). It’s really easy to spend so much on “improving” finance reporting that you burn any savings you’d gain from catching errors.

Re: The AP article on the sexual abuse hotline for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints

The AP article, at least with respect to the legal portion, appears to be flagrant misinfo. This whole situation is distressing, but I write this up because that article actively damages chances of reform and amounts to little more than a distraction.

The AZ law in question states: “A clergyman or priest, without consent of the person making the confession, as to any confession made to the clergyman or priest in his professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the clergyman or priest belongs.” A.R.S. § 13-4062(2). The statute even explicitly forbids reporting of sexual abuse admitted in court-ordered/correctional sex offender treatment in A.R.S. § 13-4066, and only makes an exception if, during the course of the treatment, there is a new offense. The statute provides no explicit exceptions for the penitent-clergyman privilege. Now, future or ongoing violent offenses are not covered by these privileges (per judicial interpretation), but that’s why the fact that the article mentions there was no actual knowledge of future or ongoing offenses is legally significant.

Unfortunately, the AP article provides 0 citations for the quotations of law it claims to provide, so I can’t determine why it claims what it does. It just throws phrases in quotation marks out there without explanation or sourcing.

In short, any report made without the permission of the confessor would be illegal. Only the confessor could allow the information to be divulged; the bishop had no discretion and indeed would be under a legal duty to say nothing. This case does not reveal some nefarious pattern in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints’ conduct; it is a pattern in US law. Every single state and federal law grant some degree of clergy-penitent privilege.

The helpline exists because it is entirely unreasonable to expect bishops or anyone besides lawyers to know how to handle these cases, esp. since law can change at any time. There is genuine legal complexity and significant regional variation. Leaving bishops to handle things by intuition, or or based on a rulebook, or whatever, would produce radically worse outcomes.

Even if the bishop illegally reported, courts would be legally required to ignore any evidence produced by the bishop. And, if the police managed to somehow get enough info anyway to establish probable cause (an uncertain proposition already) to issue a warrant to find admissible evidence, warrants typically don’t produce anything because sexual abuse is hard to get evidence for (this is an ongoing crisis, terribly intelligent people are trying to improve that, prosecutors really want to catch sexual abuse, but it’s a very difficult thing to fix and a quagmire well beyond the scope of this discussion). And forcing a criminal trial without adequate evidence would make things worse; it would almost inevitably grant the defendant immunity under double jeopardy.

That is the state of the law. If we want to prevent this kind of thing from happening/hold victimizers accountable, it doesn’t matter how much you speak to Church members or leaders. They cannot do anything; they are obligated to act within the law. The only people who have the power to change this are the AZ and other state legislatures. This is the takeaway. Hold legislators accountable; only they can change the rules we’re required to live by.

(I would support and I think most would support mandatory reporting for sexual abuse cases within the statute of limitations. I mention the statute of limitations as a threshold because, well, it’s useless to report anything beyond it. But I also note that, if the law were changed, most of these confessions would simply not happen and we’d end up in much the same place as we are now.)

(While this is not the most important issue at hand, I must also confess that the article is unprofessional and reeks of bigotry otherwise. For example, the article violates the AP’s own style guide on referring to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints by massively overusing the pejorative/dismissive term “Mormon.” If you are a Latter-day Saint, you know defamation, bigotry, and attacks are common, but in this case, I comment on it mostly because of the serious legal issues in the reporting.)

Addendum: Mandatory Reporting Statutes

A.R.S. § 13-3620, Arizona’s mandatory reporting law, does not abrogate the penitent’s privilege, nor does it confer the privilege, ability to waive, or actual discretion on the clergy member. If a clergy member does not report, it is based on the penitent’s privilege:

“This section [13-3620] does not create a statutory clergyman’s privilege independent of the penitent’s privilege under § 12-2233; rather, they reinstate in child-related litigation a clergyman’s ability to withhold consent on the penitent’s behalf to examination of the clergyman concerning his penitent’s confidential communication.” Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Superior Court of the State of Arizona, 159 Ariz. 24 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).

In that case, testimony was allowed solely because the penitent waived the privilege by telling police about the contents of his confession. AP alleges no facts that suggest a waiver by the confessor. And even should such facts come to light, what does and does not constitute a waiver is highly fact-dependent, and may rely on information neither the bishop nor the hotline would have possessed at the time.

The second section mentioned in that quote, A.R.S. § 12-2233, is another iteration of the clergy-penitent privilege: “In a civil action a clergyman or priest shall not, without the consent of the person making a confession, be examined as to any confession made to him in his character as clergyman or priest in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which he belongs.”

The court of appeals reinforced the clergy-penitent privilege because, if interpreted as AP suggests, § 13-3620 and § 12-2233 would create contrary legal duties that could not both be observed. Arizona courts have continued to reaffirm this interpretation, the most recent published decision being in 2018.

(And to explain more of the lack of professionalism on AP’s part, I would point to how they brag about obtaining access to this trove of documents, but they do not produce a single quotation or image about their contents. With that much information, if there were a pattern of problematic conduct, one would think they’d be able to report several cases across a Church with millions of members, or at least point to some document or actual policy that is causing the problem. Instead, all they do with all that information is say that, per their reading, again unexplained, the hotline could be used to divert sexual abuse cases from authorities, not that it is used. Here I note that the Church has also been sued for reporting too much in alleged violations of the privilege and that, as a matter of course, even where the privilege applies and a report is not possible, it is universal policy in the Church to push confessors of serious crimes to turn themselves in.)

Addendum 2: Further Details on Court Interpretation, esp. re: Mandatory Reporting, and Operation of Legal Privileges

You may not tell *anyone* privileged information.[1] Not the police, not a judge, not your spouse. Not in court, nor out of court. The clergy-penitent privilege operates very similarly to attorney-client and other privileged relationships.[2] Imagine an attorney telling anyone outside their office about their client’s confessions to them. Imagine if attorneys were allowed to report their clients. The privilege would immediately fail its purpose and the client would not be able to trust their own counsel. If AZ statute doesn’t explicitly spell that out, then it’s derived from common law, the body of law that corresponds to judicial decisions over history. It’s simply how privileges function (that’s why I don’t bother looking it up).

The clergy member has no privilege to not testify: he or she is compelled not to testify by the privilege of the penitent. The penitent is the exclusive possessor of the privilege in AZ law (most states grant the right to the penitent, not the clergy, as well). If the clergy member speaks without permission of the penitent, the penitent has the legal right to force the clergy member’s silence and obtain damages. And, of course, how many accused are not going to enforce such a thing? Even when it is referred to as the clergy member’s right, what it really means is that the clergy member exercises the penitent’s right on their behalf. So no, the clergy member may *not* testify of his or her own volition.

To summarize, the penitent-clergy privilege is a right that the penitent has *against* the clergy member, conditioned on the clergy-member’s respect of the privilege. Not a right of the clergy member.

That was the court’s decision in Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Superior Court of the State of Arizona, 159 Ariz. 24 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). While the statutory language of § 13-3620, read alone, would seem to confer the right on the clergy member, the courts do not interpret it so, because such an interpretation would be incompatible with prior law that § 13-3620 was not intended to replace (per the court’s own examination of legislative history and statutory text). The published decision goes into a discussion of the whys and wherefores if you so wish.

How it works out is that the clergy member may not divulge the privileged information, unless some waiver occurs by the penitent and the penitent alone. If the penitent waives their privilege, then the clergy member would actually fall under the mandatory reporting statute and be required to report (this is problematic because the clergy member doesn’t necessarily know whether the penitent has waived their privilege, esp. in cases of implied waiver).

[1]Unless one of the specific exceptions apply, like the report concerns future violent harm or, say, you’re an attorney discussing the case with co-counsel or a paralegal (and then, cocounsel or the paralegal would be bound by the privilege).

[2] Arizona court decisions have made attorney-client privilege the strongest of the privileges in Arizona, with penitent-clergy being just a tick below attorney-client. Other privileges,

What Is Actually In Abortion Trigger Laws/Bans?

There is a lot of disinformation going around. In particular, a lot of people have made it out that these laws do not contain exceptions for medical emergencies, something that seemed incredibly unlikely to me. So, I read every relevant statute I could find and figured out what exceptions apply under each law.

Summary

20 states would have an abortion ban applying to any time or almost any time during the pregnancy. More states would ban after a a set period of time. 14 states have trigger laws, 5 have laws predating Roe still on the books, and 1 recently passed a law prohibiting abortion. 1 more included here merely has a proposed trigger law, but local media seems to suggest its passage is very likely.

Every one of these states would allow abortion for medical emergencies. Even statutes from the 1800s provide exceptions for medical emergencies (Wisconsin’s, for instance).

7 states (35%) have rape or incest exceptions. Only Mississippi exempts rape but not incest. No state exempts incest but not rape.

Of states enacting bans, Utah has the most comprehensive exceptions.

Since I’m just one person, there may be slight errors, but I believe this is mostly accurate. If you are concerned about your particular state, investigate it thoroughly and do not rely on this information, whose purpose is merely to survey and summarize.

Chart of Exemptions to Abortion Bans

StateCodeCategoryMedical Emergencies Affecting the MotherEctopic Pregnancies
(explicit)
Lethal Anomaly Affecting the ChildRape or Sexual AssaultIncestThreshold
AlabamaHB314Pre-RoeXXX
Arizona13-3603Pre-RoeXPossibly (included in related statutes)
ArkansasSB149TriggerXX
GeorgiaHB41RecentXXUp to 20 weeksUp to 20 Weeksheartbeat
IdahoS18-622TriggerXXX
KentuckyHB148TriggerX
Louisiana5.1061TriggerX
Michigan750.14Pre-RoeX
MississippiSB2391TriggerXX
MissouriHB126TriggerX
North DakotaHB1466TriggerXXX
OhioHB598Proposed TriggerX
OklahomaSB918TriggerXheartbeat
South CarolinaTITLE44 CH1 ART 6TriggerXXFewer than 20 weeksFewer than 20 weeksheartbeat
South DakotaSL 2005, ch 187, § 6TriggerX
TennesseeSB1257TriggerX
TexasHB1280TriggerX
UtahSB174TriggerXXXXX
West Virginia61 6-2-8Pre-RoeX
Wisconsin940.04Pre-RoeX
WyomingHB92TriggerXXX

Code is the citation with a link to the text itself. Some are links to the text as codified, others to the enrolled bills pre-codification.

The categories differentiate between laws passed before Roe was decided and laws passed with a provision that they will only go into effect if Roe is overturned or states otherwise gain the ability to restrict abortion as if Roe were overturned (such as if a constitutional amendment were passed).

Medical emergency is usually defined with reference to a medical professional’s good faith or reasonable evaluation that there is a serious health risk to the mother. The exact definition of serious health risk will vary, but broadly speaking it includes serious bodily harm, impairment of body functions, etc. May include some mental health emergencies, depending on the state, the exact nature of the emergency, and how well verified the emergency is (e.g., Alabama allows only mental emergencies verified by certain psychiatrists if the mental illness will cause suicide or the murder of the unborn child). Most states, when they contemplate the issue explicitly, exclude suicidality and self-harm as excuses for abortion. Many states’ statutory definitions of medical emergency are general enough that lethal anomaly could be included under their definition of medical emergency. The differences in statutory language reveal uncertainty about how to handle mental health, due to the tension between genuine mental health issues and appropriation of mental health issues by bad faith actors (just like the insanity defense has been severely harmed by the numbers of people who claim insanity because they think, contrary to fact, that insanity’s an easy way to get off).

Ectopic pregnancies is marked if there is an explicit allowance for abortions of ectopic pregnancies. The lack of a mark does not mean they would be prohibited, especially given medical emergency and lethal anomaly exceptions.

Lethal anomaly exemptions allow abortions where the unborn child will die at birth, be stillborn, or die shortly thereafter. E.g., Alabama’s definition: “A condition from which an unborn child would die after birth or shortly thereafter or be stillborn.” Language varies; sometimes it’s framed in terms of medical futility, lack of viability, etc. Might also be included under medical emergency when the definition does not limit itself to risks to the mother or when no definition for medical emergency is provided.

Rape and Incest exceptions often explicitly require a police report to have been filed prior to seeking an abortion. South Carolina would require the physician performing the abortion to report the allegation instead after informing the patient.

An entry in the threshold section means the ban only applies if a heartbeat is detected in the unborn (alongside a requirement that doctors perform reasonable checks when there is no medical emergency). Generally, the physician need only take reasonable steps to identify a heartbeat; if none is found after a reasonable test, there is no liability. Several states have looser, time-based thresholds. Heartbeat thresholds are included because they apply so early in a pregnancy.

Based on my review of the statutory texts, miscarriages, abortions that increase the probability of a live birth, unintentional injury/death, or accidents to the unborn (including during medical interventions by medical professionals) are frequent, explicit exceptions. Where not explicit, I would highly doubt that they are not implicit-the statutes that don’t explicitly mention this are usually brief.

Many, but not all, statutes explicitly disallow the prosecution of the abortion patient.

Many of these bills also explicitly target or condemn abortions of unborn children for reasons of sex, gender, or nonlethal disability (especially Down Syndrome).

Notes on inclusions: I focused on states included in these two lists: 1 (specifically states listed as banning), 2. I excluded some states when I could not find any texts supporting what the article said, e.g., (1) lists North Carolina as banning abortion, but local news reports suggest no such thing. States listed as restricting I left out since, generally speaking, a ban is more extreme than a restriction and so the restrictions can be expected to be looser than the bans. Obviously, I can’t catch everything, but I’m not aware of having missed anything and anything I would’ve missed will probably be similar to one of the statutes included in the chart. It’s hard to imagine any statute, for instance, not including the medical exemption. Some states also had a pre-Roe statute and a trigger law. For simplicity, I limited my study to the trigger laws.

Brief Note on Roe

Roe set itself up for repeal. Even for the pro-abortion position, Roe was bad law, because of how it fueled the culture war and left so little room for discretion.

  1. The Supreme Court did not have the authority to issue the decision in Roe. I am not a textualist by any means, but the Court has to base its decisions on its Constitutional authority of interpretation. Roe did not interpret anything. The main text referenced is the 14th Amendment, but the connection to the 14th Amendment is tangential at best. The Court does not have authority to make such decisions, regardless of how good or bad they are, because these decisions are not interpretations. Interpretation is precisely the limit that prevents Justices from being kings.
  2. Roe violated the interpretive limit, but reversing Roe probably does not since the reversal is itself based on interpretation. Undoing an abuse of discretion is not itself an abuse of discretion.
  3. Roe set onerous obstacles on legislatures regulating abortion no matter how reasonable that regulation was, and it has left the US with radical abortion laws untempered by science or morality. Roe didn’t just block abortion bans; it made all sorts of regulation impossible. A Supreme Court decision like Roe is a sledgehammer: it does not allow for refinement, caution, compromise, or (ultimately) good governance.
  4. Because of these flaws in Roe, discourse around abortion has been extremist and conflictive. Roe deserves blame for fueling the culture war in ways which statutes, legitimately enacted by legislatures, do not.
  5. In a post-Roe v. Wade world, there will be more states restricting, not just banning, abortion. But abortion in many-maybe even most-states will be exactly the same as it was under Roe.
  6. State legislatures certainly have the power to legislate for and against abortion in a post-Roe world, so long as their state’s constitution grants them that power. I don’t particularly think that Congress has that power, though. Federal legislation has to be based on some vested power to Congress, of which only 2 might be relevant. I don’t think banning or preempting state legislation really falls under either the Commerce Power or the 14th Amendment Powers.

Personal note

This information has been prepared to be as neutral as possible, even if my personal feelings are very much nonneutral. I write this, not to invite debate (I have little doubt you or I would be convinced by anything either of us write), but because disclosure and openness about the biases I write under are important.

I approve of Utah’s approach, because I can only see abortion as justifiable where there exists a serious intervening cause. The life-status of the unborn invokes so many unsolvable questions of epistemology and semiotics that it’s impossible to show the unborn are not humans. I certainly consider the murder of a pregnant woman to be a double homicide, as well as a nonconsensual abortion to be murder. I don’t think miscarriage and abortions are distinguished by mere sentimentality. If we can’t be reasonably certain abortion isn’t homicide, if that question remains in a zone of ambiguity, I don’t think action is justified. And, even if abortion absolutely weren’t murder, I don’t know that it’d be different enough to be tolerable.

I also note how often the consent for abortion is nominal or uninformed. Legal access to abortion makes it much easier to pressure, manipulate, coerce, and abuse women into acting contrary to their will. On the question of choice, I find abortion just as, if not more disturbing, when men, partners, or family make the decision. Abortion also has nasty and enduring connections to eugenics, racism, sexism, classism, and ableism (enough so that Ginsburg may or may not have been caught up in that, enough that it may have at least influenced Roe).

Additionally, I note how urgent healthcare reform, orphanage/foster care reform, mental health reform, education reform, child rights reform, and parental rights reforms (like parental leave) are. As well as things like drug, alcohol, labor, and economic reform because of how much issues in those areas hurt people and their children. Abortion is one of the most serious forms of dehumanization of children, but it’s far from the only one.

Finally, I’m horrified when I reflect on how 1/3 of pregnancies were terminated the year I was born in my home state. A lot of us live lonely lives, and it is certainly lonelier, more painful, knowing that 1/3 of the kids who would’ve been my peers never drew breath.

FETH: Abyss & the State of Exception

I see people wonder why the Church of Seiros would tolerate Abyss, especially the presence of criminals and religious dissidents. The answer to this one is relatively simple: Abyss is what is called a State of Exception.

A state of exception exists when a government deliberately creates an area of lawlessness, or more exactly, a place where the law is not applied in the same way as it has been historically/elsewhere. The people living within a state of exception live within exceptions to the law. Governments may have any number of motives to establish a state of exception. Bad motives include how a state of exception allows the government to violate its own laws/use more violence than normal. Lawlessness can also be useful if members of the government have black market or other unethical interests (one of Aelfric’s motivations). Better reasons for a state of exception may be to respond to a crisis (states of emergency are sometimes states of exception) or to establish a refuge for people who cannot exist in normal society (Aelfric’s initial motivation and a reason to allow Abyss to survive post-Aelfric).

The theory of states of exception is largely developed by Giorgio Agamben. He points to Nazi Germany and Guantanamo Bay as real-life examples. I was exposed to the concept by Jason de León’s book The Land of Open Graves, where he argues that the US-Mexico border is a state of exception.

The key to a state of exception is that the condition of lawlessness is a deliberate creation of the state itself. This makes it different from a region where the law is absent or has lost control (as often occurs in border regions, colonies, and the like). Looking at Abyss, the specific principles in suspense are: the supremacy of the aristocracy, the supremacy of the church, and general penal law. The aristocracy and church do not assert their power over the Abyssians (the aristocracy cannot assert its power, while the church can assert its power if it so desires, but generally does not).

Other examples in Fire Emblem include the various nations seized by cults (Nohr under Iago, Plegia, Rigel under the Duma cult). Nonexamples include western and southwestern Zofia (overrun by pirates and bandits, not government-created), the Ylisse side of the Ylisse-Plegia border before the Shepherds stabilize the region (the instability is created by an enemy state, not the state itself), and Ylisse in Lucina’s timeline (assuming Grima did not somehow become the head of state and legally enforce his destruction). Valla strikes me more as a failed state rather than a state of exception (it definitely has some state of exception kind of stuff going on, but we don’t really see if Vallan law has survived in any way past whatever Anankos orders in the moment).

[Originally for r/fireemblem]