Tag Archives: literature

Arithmetic of missing out

This article is riffing on some ideas in found in this 2011 article that is very much worth the read.

There are 8 billion or so people going about their business. Suppose 1 hour of consumable content is produced per 1000 people per day (whether it be books, shows, poetry, video, etc.). Then, suppose that 0.1% of that is truly good content (whatever “good” means to you).

Under these assumptions, 8000 hours of good content is produced per day, and there’s 8 million hours of content that you need to sift through in order to find that good content.

With far less than 24 hours per day to spend on content consumption, that’s a lot of stuff that is simply impossible for you to consume.

We can tweak the numbers and assumptions and things don’t improve much. We can reduce 8 billion to 400 million if we’re only interested in English works by native English speakers (I doubt this is particularly accurate of anyone). That’s still 400 hours of good content per day.

0.1% might be generous when it comes to how much is good. But there’s still 4 hours per day for 0.001%, or 1 in 10,000 hours of content being good. And no matter how strict you make this percentage, the amount of media you have to sift through to find the good stuff doesn’t change. Reducing this percentage doesn’t reduce your chances of missing out on something good, it just means you waste far more energy trying to find the good stuff in the first place.

In any case, there’s a lot of good stuff out there. Which we won’t experience. And this doesn’t even factor how much good has already been created. Jules Verne, Dostoyevsky, Confucius–an endless list.

And that’s a good thing. I’m glad humanity is more complex, more creative, than I or any single person can comprehend. If all of humanity, all of its creations, could fit in a single mortal mind, that’d be an infinite shame.

But there’s no such infinite shame. Instead we have an infinite, human text. There is always much, much more to discover. To hear, feel, think.

xenoblade and what lies beyond the morally grey

i like xenoblade 2 cuz it’s a world where ppl *are* fighting for each other but failing. and how our fragility and mortality kinda guarantee that. (we’re too small and ignorant for it to be otherwise.) and what you do after you realize that.

for the most part, you know who the good guys and bad guys are. not only is that refreshing, but it allows the narrative to deal with harder moral questions (questions that are actually complex, not the typical morally “grey” junk that hobbles so much literature).

the real world is full of wonderful people, miracles, divine intervention, beauty, nature, peace, healing, the gamut. and we’re *still* a mess. and that’d be true even if the intentionally cruel ppl weren’t with us (it’d be less severe tho).

and i think it’s precisely this space where the most healing, the most wise, the most creative, and the most valuable writing occurs.

the space im talking about: the discussions about goodness that can only come *after* we’ve fully committed to doing good, and only with ppl who trust us to *choose* good and whom we trust back.

and trust is so important because we need to handle stuff that hurts us and scares us and terrifies us and we need to be challenged in our beliefs, but for all that we really, really need someone we can trust.

[originally formatted for twitter, so please excuse the choppiness]

xenoblade and les mis and clannad and ssss.gridman

xenoblade 2 & 3, les miserables, clannad, and ssss.gridman are the stories that just made me genuinely and powerfully happier. there’s not a lot of fiction that does that. ive enjoyed a lot of stories. But this is something far deeper than being compelling, truthful, or profound.

and maybe to drive the point home, i have a minor and half a master’s in spanish literature, and i’ve read in a lot of different movements and traditions. i’ve been looking for these stories like my life depends on it lol.

i love truth (as i can distinguish it), i love thought-provoking stuff, i love to be moved. i’ve written trying to figure out the magic, but i hate to write about these texts themselves because i just want ppl to experience them; anything i say points towards that because i cant capture what’s so important myself.

“Truth, it seems to me, is known only to the person who is affected by it; and if he chooses to communicate it to others, he automatically becomes a liar. Whatever is communicated can only be falsehood and falsification; hence it is only falsehoods and falsifications that are communicated … What matters is whether we want to lie or to tell and write the truth, even though it never can be the truth and never is the truth.” (Thomas Bernhard) It’s stuff where i can tell they’re fighting to get the truth through with all they’ve got.

“purify to the eyes of the impure”

“It is one of us women who must speak (now that men have not) of the sacredness of this painful and divine state. If the mission of art is to beautify all, with immense mercy, shall we not purify, to the eyes of the impure, this?” – Gabriela Mistral on pregnancy

she wrote a series of poems after witnessing the harassment of a heavily pregnant woman while traveling. she was criticized for these poems, which spurred her to write this note (of which i can only include the beginning) to defend her work.

Gabriela Mistral herself never had the chance to marry or have children.

I think it’s appropriate to say we’re doing worse at this even than when she wrote. Children and mothers and fathers. It’s what matters. If we cannot do right by them, we have failed beyond recovery.

work is a scam, at least half of ideology is a distraction, all that matters is doing right by families

This is not about Xenoblade 3, but Xenoblade 3 got me thinking about this

On Edelgard: Moral Complexity vs Moral Greyness

I would like to discourage applying “moral greyness” to Edelgard (by discouraging using “moral greyness” in literary analysis generally). Most of this is going to be theory about literary theory, not a discussion of Edelgard, because the facts about Edelgard are largely known and settled. I don’t think it’s productive to rehash one more time the arguments about whether act X or act Y of Edelgard’s is justified. What’s at issue is not her, it’s the theories of interpretation that are applied to her.

Morally Grey vs Morally Complex

So, let’s get to it. There is a difference between moral greyness and moral complexity. There are several models for moral greyness and moral complexity, and I can’t account for all of them.

At least for me, when a character is described as morally grey, it means that the character has mixed intents. They respond to both good and evil motivations in a meaningful fashion, beyond a hero’s ability to fail or misjudge or a villain’s ability to have good traits. E.g., a villain is not morally grey just because he likes dogs or defends his family. When he burns down an orphanage, he’s just evil: any good intentions or tendencies don’t really weigh against concrete, evil actions. What makes a character morally grey is how they “halt … between two opinions” or “serve two masters.” They willfully and knowingly do the right thing and the wrong thing. When they do the wrong thing, they are not trying to do the right thing but failing; they are doing exactly what they intend. And viceversa when they do the right thing. Moral greyness, then, tends to be impermanent in most characters.

Moral complexity, on the other hand, is what you have for difficult moral questions. A good person in a morally complex situation may not achieve good outcomes, despite good intentions. Less often considered is how an evil person, in a morally complex situation, may not be able to achieve the evil they desire. The litmus test I apply is this: a situation is morally complex if reasonable people could disagree about the right option.[1]

To better understand moral complexity, consider the law: executing the law is morally complex, no matter how wise or clever or studied you are. Most judges over criminal trials try to exercise lenience and harshness when each is appropriate. They try to recognize when a defendant is capable of or willing to reform and when they are not. Over the course of their career, they will all be lenient and harsh to some people who don’t deserve it. Or, to complicate it further, they will be lenient to someone who genuinely does deserve leniency, but that person will later abuse that leniency of their own free choice and seriously hurt someone. On top of all that, there’s a feedback loop: a judge may be tempted to be overly lenient or overly harsh if they’ve found success in leniency or harshness, or they may underuse one approach after seeing it fail. Which it should be reemphasized, both approaches fail regularly, because people are messy and deserve second chances, but it’s also not fair to victims to give people a chance to hurt people again, and there’s no perfect way to reconcile these two things without omniscience.

I believe that calling the law morally grey is inaccurate for one, but more importantly, it devalues the efforts, intents, and study of judges (a definition of moral greyness that includes this sort of thing is immediately overbroad in my eyes). The vast majority of judges in developed nations are trying to get the right results. The problem is that the right result is a matter on which reasonable people will disagree. Especially in the moment, before the consequences are known and knowledge is perfected.[2]

It’s worth mentioning here that moral complexity is not moral relativity: there are better and worse answers, and clearly wrong answers, and maybe even clearly ok answers, in morally complex questions. The complexity may be fact-specific, where it’s unclear how moral principles will apply to the specific people and circumstances involved, or it might be that the whole situation is gnarly and hard to resolve. But moral complexity presumes there are better and worse outcomes; it’s not just a wash between all the different options.

Now, just to be clear, moral greyness has its place in analysis. But it is a narrow one, limited. Moral greyness is overapplied and overused. Issues like politics, lawmaking, judicial decisions, and the like are morally complex and have resisted solutions for millennia—and will likely do so for millennia more. They are not, however, morally grey.

Edelgard Time

Edelgard is not a person of mixed intents. She intends to do what’s right. She largely rejects evil motivations like vengeance, even when they could technically coexist with her real motivations of reform and defense of the weak.

It is her lot that her choices predominantly lie in areas of moral complexity. She is a warmonger and a lawmaker: neither war nor law admit easy answers to its moral questions.[3] But the questions that law and war pose need to be answered; we cannot delay, as we can with science, until we have a “right” answer. There is an urgency to human suffering that requires us to act. There are also fundamental flaws in our ability to research and recognize right answers: it’s not clear that we could find the right answer even with an infinite delay. Most often, we simply must act, and it is only in the action itself that the answer becomes clear (if that; in these fields many questions will never be answered by mortal means).

The discourse around Edelgard’s actions is proof itself that she is in a morally complex situation, not a morally grey one. The debate is almost never whether she has good or ill intent, it’s about whether her actions were justified. And, I think the past years have made it abundantly clear, reasonable people can differ on that for pretty much everything Edelgard did. Edelgard is capable of misjudging and you may feel free to disagree with any given action of hers. What is incorrect is attaching evil intention to any misjudgment you decide she has made.

Anyways, I am content to call Edelgard a hero and to say she did nothing wrong. Not because she “objectively” did the right thing in every circumstance, but because she always sought to do the right thing and took steps to do so. And, not only did she try to do the right thing, she tried to be the kind of person who can recognize the right thing even in complex situations, by studying law, history, and philosophy.[4] She repeatedly asks the player to be a person “swayed by [her] words and deeds,” because that is where the proof is.[5] Not in framings, not in perspectives, not in outcomes, and certainly not in “Red Emperor” tropes and comparisons within Fire Emblem, but in what she has sought out to do; what she has envisioned and intended, as proven by words and deeds.

A hero isn’t someone I agree with on every issue; they’re someone I trust to fight for the truth. And that’s what Edelgard does and that’s what she’s about.

Further Theory That Isn’t Required But At The Very Least Is Something I Believe And Find Useful

Mixing is the problem: good and evil don’t mix quite like lights and darks do in painting. Moral greyness is like the worst of videogame choice design. In most “light vs dark” games that leave the choice to the character, like Star Wars: Knights of the Old Republic or Mass Effect, good actions weigh directly against bad ones. But we all know it’s ridiculous to say someone who commits genocide and then saves an orphanage is morally neutral.

Yet, this is the idea that moral greyness tends to propagate: weighing good against evil. And, while it’s true that people do both good and evil, good actions and evil actions are incommensurable, incomparable. You cannot add triangles to the number five. You cannot mix good actions and evil actions.

To illustrate, I turn to the genre noir, a genre which happens to suffer greatly from being described as morally grey. Noir protagonists tend to start out with mixed intents. Much of what’s good in the genre is that it’s willing to depict goodness in people who do bad things. So that would make them morally grey. But the point of noir is the darkness: it needs its protagonists to love the dark more and to end in the darkness. Noir is not a genre of moral relativity or ultimate greyness: if it were so, it would lose its impact and force. Noir needs the darks to be darks and its lights to be lights, because its meaning is created by contrasting the two, not by confusing them.

It is not even clear that you can “add” good to good or evil to evil. People are not permanently good or evil in any way. Good people can abandon their past, as can evil people. A good person can remain good in an evil system, even when that evil system forces them to do evil. And viceversa. The same tragic backstories can equally justify a heroic tale of overcoming and a villainous tale of succumbing. We try to create good and evil identities, but identity is an ephemeral thing. Not just for characters, but for ourselves and all humanity. We can seek to preserve good and evil intents, but we cannot reach a point where our good and evil are unchangeable.[6]

Anyways, and in conclusion, please take care, stay safe, and may your intentions be pure.


Footnotes

[1] Now, you can still do evil in a morally complex situation by choosing a harmful option that reasonable people would not choose. If you want a good reputation coming out of moral complexity, you need to choose one of the options that could be reasonably motivated by goodness. But that’s not the scenario we’re dealing with.

[2] I will note that some people use moral complexity to disguise evil intents. They will intentionally seek evil outcomes but use the complexity of the matter to claim that their intents were good and abuse the theories of well-motivated people to justify their actions and minimize the harms. But this is still morally evil, rather than morally grey. And, it must be emphasized, an evil person abusing a good person’s theory to achieve evil doesn’t mean the theory is wrong either. The theory may still be a good one, because an evil person will not execute it properly and will only imitate the appearance of the theory, rather than the substance. In short, the substance may still be quite good. Rejecting the theory because it was exploited may well cut you off from a sizable portion of truth.

That being said, I do believe that you can usually distinguish between genuine people and fakers if you are close enough to them. Not 100% of the time, since we all misjudge, but I would not say that moral complexity makes good and evil indistinguishable.

[3] Note that I use warmonger in a literal sense and not the normal pejorative one here.

[4] This is what sets Edelgard apart from the rest of the cast for me. Every character tries to do the right thing at least sometimes. However, Edelgard more than anyone else studies morality to increase how often she makes the right call. Especially in governance, it is not enough to desire the right thing: you must refine your understanding as well as your intentions. As Christ said: “Be ye therefore wise as serpents and harmless as doves.”

[5] Edelgard’s focus on words and deeds evokes these passages for me: number one and number two. Much of what I have written here, not just the one section, is motivated by these passages, too.

[6] I’d recommend reading these two criticisms of identity: one by the Argentine author Borges and another by the transcendental Ralph Waldo Emerson.

Unusual Umwelten of Fodlan: Nabateans, Crest Beasts, and Edelgard

general, light spoilers for FETH, nothing to do with Three Hopes tho

Outline

I. Intro

II. Dragons

III. Crest Beast

IV. Hegemon Husk

V. Closing Thoughts

I. Introduction and Framework: Umwelten

For a long time, I’ve wanted to write about one of my special interests[1] as it applies to Fire Emblem Three Houses: umwelten. It’ll take a moment to set up since there’s some specialized vocabulary and some background concepts necessary to understand the whole situation, but, at least to me, the groundwork is beyond fascinating.

An umwelt is a term coined by biologist Jakob von Uexküll.[2] It’s a curious little concept lying underneath much more famous theories from people like semioticians like Heidegger and Bakhtin. Strictly translated, it means “environment,” but what it really refers to is the world that an organism creates by interpreting the stimuli received by sensory organs.

It is important to understand umwelten because physically speaking, before your or my personality/mind/voluntary will can begin to act, physical factors limit what we perceive and alter how we interpret. We can only act on data if we perceive it. A bat can act on all sorts of data we cannot thanks to its sonar; a tick cannot see and cannot build its worldview on sight (but it can build an umwelt using heat signals based on a sensitivity far more delicate than ours). There could be any number of senses that humans are incapable of, with data we’ll never be able to perceive (think about all the things you physically sense, through sight and hearing and taste and touch and smell, that a plant, or a jellyfish, living beings all, have no concept of, and indeed, can never contemplate). And, of course, our senses are imperfect: vision’s fuzzy, finite, imprecise, sometimes we missee things, confuse one thing for something else, etc. And a lot of those errors we never detect (because, most of the time, they don’t matter). Just like we never realize when we are correctly filling in the gaps in our perception, because most of that happens before the data is even presented to our conscious perception.

Not only do our bodies determine what raw data we possess, but they also influence how we interpret that data. Chemical signals can dramatically alter how we interpret things, like how McDonalds never tastes better than when you’re hungry, how adrenaline allows you to perceive some things with incredible accuracy but fail to perceive other things entirely, and how trauma can increase sensitivity or awareness to negative stimuli. The sophistication of our brains allows us to do things like detect lines, perform physical predictions, and distinguish rhythms and colors when many species can’t do any of these things, even when they are perceiving the light or sound or other stimuli that contains the lines, music, and the like. (I am deeply saddened by this truth because my dog will never understand why wrapping his leash around a pole limits his movement.) To say nothing of how memory and past experience also affect your interpretive framework.

So your umwelt is the world as you construct it, based on all your sensory abilities, limitations, filters, biases, etc. Your umwelt changes whenever you interact with anything, as you add new information and forget old data. Parts of your umwelt include your innenwelt, that is, how you construct yourself within your umwelt. Because, while we do have special access to information about ourselves, we are still perceiving most parts of ourselves in some fashion. Whenever we engage in self-reflection as is necessary to create concepts like “Identity” or “Self-Image”, we do so purely by using perception on ourselves. And not just our own perception, but we necessarily rely a lot on our perception of others and how we perceive others perceive us. This brings us to the final bits of vocabulary (which I probably won’t use but it’s good to have :>). When you perceive someone else’s umwelt, that’s an umgebung (it deserves a different name because you aren’t accessing their umwelt, the umgebung is just the parts of their umwelt that you manage to perceive imperfectly). Then, a sociosphere is created by the interaction of two umwelten. A sociosphere requires communication via signs to bridge the umwelten (these signs being everything from raw sensory data to spoken language to tone to body movements, each full of their own impreciseness, imperfection, and ambiguity, for good and ill). The signing process, that is, all communications of meaning, is semiosis.

As a final example, take a moment to consider the soles of your feet, the walls around you, or the palms of your hand. Your feet are touching something, possibly fabric or grass or carpet or wood or tile. There’s a whole lot of sensory data of softness, texture, shape, temperature. When you think about walls, most of the time I just imagine them as flat, but that’s not true at all. When I see a brick wall, I know it’s made of bricks, but I don’t observe the individual bricks at all. And despite the phrase “know it like the back of your hand”, how much do you actually know or perceive of your hands? The little platelike structures that compose your skin, the creases on the joints, the veins under the surface, the pores, the precise contours and shapes of your hands?

If you choose to focus on one of these things, you’re suddenly filled with new data and your world, your umwelt, is enriched and detailed. When you’re not focusing on them, they simply do not exist at all within your umwelt, because you are not perceiving them. They exist within the welt, the physical, unperceived world, but they don’t exist in your umwelt. Attention is important to prevent us from being overwhelmed by the sheer amount of data our senses provide, like the typically useless awareness of the taste of the inside of our mouth or the sensation of clothing against skin.

Between differences in sensory organs, chemical compositions, wills, and experiences, our perceptions are fundamentally different, not just from species to species but from individual to individual. You and I can never know what it’s like to be inside someone else’s head, not really, anyway. Empathy is somewhere between reasoned guesswork and outright projection.[3] The gulf between a person and a bat is not so severe as the distance between two people, but we never really know how close or how far we are experientially, linguistically, or physically. (This doesn’t mean empathy isn’t important or valuable, but it’s limited. See [1] for places where I talk about that in detail, but a discussion of the frailty of empathy and a subsequent reconstruction of empathetic action is well beyond the scope of this article.)

With the groundwork out of the way, let’s talk about three umwelten: that of dragons, that of crest beasts, and that of the Hegemon Husk. Note that this is speculative rather than concrete because this stuff is specific enough that you’d need authorial confirmation for it to have any authority. So, more questions and possibilities are raised than conclusions reached, but they’re fun questions and possibilities and you could do a lot exploring them in fanfiction and the like. (See [4] for stories that explicitly address stuff like this; it’s awesome.)

II. The Immaculate One and other Draconic Shapeshifters/Nabateans

A single creature with a composite umwelt, because it has two separate sets of sensory devices, united by a single mind interpreting the senses, but the inability to use both sets simultaneously. We can assume that dragons in human form have a sensory suite similar to humans in most respects.

Biologically, a dragon body takes much more energy than a human one, meaning it just doesn’t make sense to use unless it’s necessary. So what is it necessary for? I doubt dragon forms are dexterous enough for construction work, so that leaves hunting and fighting. This is reflected in Rhea’s nutty combat skills, from Hoarfrost to Miracle to Defiant Strength to Ancient Dragonskin. Draconic bodies are for fighting; human forms are for communication, living, crafting, i.e., all else. Social life.

This narrow purpose means that dragon bodies are likely to focus on certain types of sensory data, like hunger (because of how much energy a dragon body needs to maintain) and aggression (the body needs the mind to be on board with fighting when it is using this form). Dragons are probably more territorial or even conquering because they would need to be so in order to survive. Of course, they’re more than intelligent enough to resist these impulses, but it might be harder for them to resist these impulses in dragon form. A dragon form is probably better able to handle the peculiar cognitive burdens of combat, like intense stench, fear, loathing (both loathing others or the dreadful sensation of being loathed).

Note, though, that the Immaculate One’s mechanics suggest social cooperation might be physically built into the dragon form: the fact that Hoarfrost and Aurora Breath don’t damage allies and Sacred Power buffs allies means that the dragon form’s abilities are modified under the assumption that allies in combat are likely to be present. But these social components specifically may reflect Rhea’s own training, rather than innate physical qualities. While the dragon form likely elevates survival instincts, which are often antisocial, these social aspects repudiate the possibility that the dragon form is purely animal. (Crossing the streams, I note also that Nowi and Tiki can benefit from pair up while transformed too.)

In summary, a dragon’s umwelt may include much more threat information than a human one, with more stimuli being perceived as threatening. Survival information will also be elevated to sustain the body’s higher energy needs. Information irrelevant to the purpose of the dragon form is less likely to be incorporated into a dragon’s worldview as long as they are in dragon form.

How much that carries over to the human form is unclear. The mere existence of a dragon form might affect the human form’s senses as well, e.g., Rhea might get hungrier faster. There are probably ways for the body to communicate to the mind the need to shapeshift, attached to the processes of aggression (it could operate somewhat like adrenaline).

Other plausible differences between human and dragon forms include:

  • better sight (the Immaculate One has a range of 5, for instance) (but perhaps they use magic as a sensory organ; the Immaculate One has white, round pupils, which wouldn’t work well at all).
  • windsense: greater awareness of wind/wind currents thanks to wings.
  • physical insensitivity: scales and scale-the scales may not have the same level of detailed touch information as skin, and the scale of draconic bodies means that they have to filter out more sensory information to not be overwhelmed.

Plausible differences between humans and dragons (regardless of form):

  • cognitive capacity: this might differ between human and dragon forms, but also between human forms and genuine humans. Perhaps dragons have better pattern recognition or something.
  • lots of instinctual interpretive filters. Dragons probably have different microbiomes, gut systems, and all that changing what they can eat, what they like to eat, etc. And from there, that changes what smells they like, what chemicals or flavors are associated with “good” and “bad”, etc. E.g., maybe fish are really good for dragons and Flayn’s fishxation is more than sentimental.
  • Stamina & other physical abilities. Crests are innate to dragons. The fact that their human forms are combat-capable (and they don’t totally rely on dragon form for combat) means that even their human forms probably require more energy than humans and that combat in human form wasn’t uncommon. Otherwise, dragons would probably be quite physically frail.
  • Age and perception of time: there’s naturally a lot of debate over how “fast” different people or species might perceive time and it’s a subject quite resistant to empirical study. But I’d say it’s pretty reasonable to say dragons, especially long-lived ones,
  • Hibernation. Dragons can hibernate, but don’t have to. That makes you wonder what triggers hibernation, how they choose to do so, etc. Perhaps a dragon can just start overeating and that tells the body they’re about to hibernate.

The last note is dragon madness present throughout Fire Emblem lore. It wasn’t clear that dragon madness applies to the dragons of Fodlan until recently, when FEH had its forging bonds event that framed Fallen Rhea’s experience squarely within the domain of dragon madness. I actually started writing this before the Forging Bonds came out and I probably found the revelation a bit more exciting (in an academic sense) than most. What I’ve written here provides a purely biological explanation for dragon madness (as opposed to an ephemeral “dragons go crazy because old” that dragon madness has often been reduced to).[5]

As stated, it seems reasonable that the dragon form increases aggression, territorialness, decreases distress in combat, etc. The shift between this state and human state requires significant neuroplasticity, that is, the capacity for a brain to modify itself to adapt to different needs and circumstances. Neuroplasticity naturally decreases in humans with age and under high stress, i.e., the exact conditions that aggravate dragon madness. So, what dragon madness may represent is the gradual loss of the ability to revert and regulate the useful and productive cognitive qualities of dragon form. So dragons lose the ability to stop thinking and feeling as if they were constantly in combat and possibly in danger. In other words, the body approaches a state where it can’t exit its emergency mode.

Emergency mode, fight or flight, adrenaline-pumping, however you frame it, is incredibly taxing on mind and body. Focus and attention don’t work normally, there is a constant search for threats which involves a very specific type of detail-oriented perception (at the exclusion of other forms of perception and thinking), the heart, muscles, and the like work overtime, certain hormones and neurological subnetworks go wild, and so on. All very taxing, very tiring, very stressful. Plus, resources are devoted to survival-focused tasks at the expense of other functions, making it harder to perform normal, low-intensity tasks. That’s why it’s only used when necessary.[6] But without relief, the damage builds up from overworking the mind and body. As damage accumulates, the body and mind become less capable, and need to exert even more energy to function normally. And the victim is typically conscious of this decay, watching their capacities decline and losing their sense of control over their lives and actions. And, unless something interrupts the decay, it not only continues but accelerates. This is bad under any circumstances, but what is important about dragon madness is how it develops even in the absence of stress or trauma. Dragons are expected to experience this, no matter what they do, and despite their (assumedly) unlimited lifespans. Now, even in dragon madness, they are still people, but their umwelt is increasingly warped: they’re going to miss information that suggests things may be nonthreatening, they’ll miss details on all kinds of tasks, and they’ll be easier to provoke. The sort of information being missed also happens to be the sort that is often most helpful in mitigating stress and maintaining healthy worldviews and relationships. And, since this process does not seem to be strongly reversible,

III. Crest Beasts

The cognitive and perceptive state of crest beasts is probably quite similar to severe dragon madness, with some aggravating factors. First off, crest beasts are an imitation of dragons, what with how crests are ultimately draconic power. Crest beasts seem to undergo the same mental alterations as dragon shapeshifters, but where the negative effects are amplified. Humans are not meant to become crest beasts (meaningful insight, that one), and the dramatic shift in perception, emotional systems, and the like means that the human system is unprepared to experience the same things dragons experience during shapeshifting. For dragons, it’s built into them; for humans, it’s a radical, forceful, unnatural reconstruction of their being.

Some things to make it worse: First, the transformation itself is painful and intense pain is quite effective at blocking our perception of most stimuli. Recall how failing to perceive neutral or beneficial stimuli is one of the primary harms of dragon madness. Adding additional factors limiting perception means those harms will manifest more severely. Second, the human mind is not going to be ready to process information as it is presented to them by a crest beast’s body. Everything will look, smell, feel, taste, sound different. Some things will be too intense, other things will be conspicuously absent. This probably isn’t as severe or stressful or disorienting as, say, a person blind from birth receiving treatment to restore their sight as an adult, but that’s the sort of distress this is. Third, the process probably just causes straight brain damage. Nothing about it seems healthy. Fourth, crest beasts don’t have any of the moderating influences of natural selection or biology to make sure anything about them works properly.

So, crest beasts experience the worst parts of being a dragon, but all at once, with no biological safeguards or ameliorating factors. Checks out why they’d completely lose their sensibility in most cases or retain very little sense in the case of the most robust, like Maurice.

IV. Hegemon Husk

We know very little about the hegemon[7] husk, but it seems to be a recreation of nabateans using human material. I would put, biologically, the husk as a sort of midway point between crest beasts and nabateans. The blood reconstruction surgery Edelgard underwent with the double crest allowed her to become a shapeshifter and retain herself while transformed, much like a nabatean and quite unlike a crest beast. She is also able to reverse the transformation. I’ll also note that Fallen Edelgard, as depicted in FEH, is still very much in control of her faculties. She’s not mad, as the fallen characters often are.

The term husk does imply something is lost in the transformation.[8] If I had to guess at it, a lot of that applies to the physical level. Like the crest beast, the husk lacks all biological function and constraints. It is a purely artificial form, so questions like natural selection, adaptation, and fitness are off the table. I would assume the entire process is incredibly strenuous, if not ruinous, for Edelgard’s body. We can imagine that, as in the crest beast, the mental shifts are severe: as a human, Edelgard’s brain on the physical level is not naturally prepared for the change and subsequent increases in aggression. But as mentioned, she bears this well.

Indeed, the husk seems to exhibit everything about crest powers/shapeshifting more intensely than even nabateans. Consider the crest of flames weapon, with a whopping 27 range, as well as the ability to act twice. 27 range, even with a low hit-rate, implies a powerful perceptive ability (probably magical rather than purely physical, especially since her black irises and red pupils wouldn’t function very well as eyes).

This extremity of power, perhaps, is the best way to interpret the term hegemon as applied to the husk (even reading it as a husk of a hegemon is inaccurate, since Edelgard did not achieve hegemony in AM. Perhaps husk of a potential hegemon). Because, in the typical, political meaning of the hegemon, Edelgard isn’t a hegemon of anything at this point in AM. She does, however, represent the peak of physical might. The husk is at least on par with a nabatean, but also possesses twin crests. One last, but unevidenced possibility, is that Edelgard is manifesting only as a husk of her real power in that form. This type of highly specific, choice-and-context of language interpretation isn’t normally my speed, but given the lack of information about the husk, it at least gives us a bit more to talk about. Whatever the case, it’s odd that the only time the word hegemon is used in FETH is to describe Edelgard in husk form and in the much more context-appropriate title for Byleth in their Edelgard paired ending.

V. Closing Thoughts

Thanks for making it through. I hope at least part of the discussion was enjoyable. I’ll note that, while I haven’t relied too much on the vocabulary developed in the introduction, I think that discussion is still useful for foundational reasons, because it motivated this entire study, and it was underlying everything I wrote here. I did this for fun and hope it was fun for yall too.

An important limitation on the whole discussion: the study of umwelten and how our bodies and experiences color, limit, and define what we experience and how we construct the world is valuable. Both to better understand ourselves and others. It is not, however, grounds for vilifying or dehumanizing people by culture, experience, personality, or physical qualities. People and cultures have flaws, but in intelligent beings, our choices weigh much more than our physical differences (and I would say this would be just as true when comparing human and nonhuman characters). This is especially true when we intentionally observe, study, and accommodate these flaws in ourselves.[8]

Quickly, I want to discuss the nonphysical implications of the term husk. The other thing lost is that this is the only time that Edelgard genuinely accepts TWSITD’s influence over her body. It’s the culmination of the blood-reconstruction and the destruction of her family. It’s a last-ditch effort, after all her friends have been slain in previous battles and Edelgard is last person who can carry her vision forward. Edelgard’s final struggle in AM is a husk of what it was: even if she were victorious, TWSITD has expanded its control over her and the people she chose to fight alongside are gone. To drive it home, note how the hegemon husk has a skill called a Wilted Flower.[9]

This note is perhaps obvious, but if I were publishing this, there’s some stuff I’d fix up (like making sure to properly couch each statement as a potential interpretation rather than a how it is interpretation, but I’m not doing that much editing for free LOL). Took being unable to sleep as a good sign to finally finish this project/I’ve been sitting on this long enough that it just feels like it’s better to finish than keep holding onto it.

And most importantly, stay safe and take care yall. World’s crazy, but there’s a lot of good people out there and a lot of good you can do.

Footnotes

[1] If umwelten are something that interests you, I’ve written about it several times before but my favorite would be this: A Description of La Vida total. Pretty much anything on my site with the tag La Vida total is concerned with understanding others’ perception (and how, although it’s ultimately impossible, it’s a sacred and essential process).

[2] I think it’s tragic that there’s so much talk of semiotics, often without hitting on this core concept at the foundation of it all. Semiotics is essential for much of the good parts of postmodernism and especially understanding why modernist, enlightenment, and romantic thought were all kinda falling apart, i.e., why postmodernism became necessary. Alongside Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems and non-Euclidean geometry messing with mathematics, an understanding of umwelten makes some amount of postmodernism essential. And knowing this stuff helps navigate a lot of current issues and debates a little better because it inoculates you against some common intellectual traps.

[3] This didn’t fit in anywhere, but for your consideration: Sonder. As much as I love tangents, I don’t want to overdo it.

[4] If you like applying science and biology to fantastic species, I’d recommend Heterogenea Linguistica, Delicious in Dungeon, and, to a lesser extent, Land of the Lustrous. Heterogenea Linguistica focuses on how language would vary based on the physical capacities of fantasy races, while Delicious in Dungeon focuses on all kinds of ecosystems, interactions, sustainability, and all that. I’ve been loving them both. And Land of the Lustrous focuses a lot on the mind-body relationship in the context of gem-body people and how differences in body affect concepts like memory. Oh, and the anime Flip Flappers actually introduced me to the concept. Due to some development issues, like the loss of their head writer halfway through the run, the second half of the show is pretty shaky. But the first half especially is very clearly playing with and trying to understand the issues of umwelten.

[5] The explanation I favored most before (and it applies to any long-lived species) is that a longer life also means more opportunities for life-shattering trauma. This, of course, was an inadequate explanation for dragon madness, because people can and do recover from life-shattering trauma and dragon madness seems inevitable (although, who knows, maybe it’s not; there are so few dragons that humans are basing their understanding of dragon madness off of a handful of individuals, individuals they have a bad tendency of starting wars and genocides with).

[6] Several human mental conditions, like PTSD (and cPTSD even more), anxiety, and paranoia are possibly, a deregulation of the same process, that is, these diseases arise when the body feels like it is in danger constantly. My experience of cPTSD squares with this description of the condition, but as someone who is more an “involuntary expert” than an actual expert on the subject, I think it’s appropriate to emphasize that I don’t know that this is the precise mechanism for these diseases. It’s a plausible explanation and one I believe, but I am unaware of how rigorously the explanation has been assessed at the scientific level.

[7] Clearing up a misconception I’ve seen in the wild about the term hegemon, that it’s pejorative or negative or some such. Hegemony is a descriptive term, not a pejorative. Hegemony is often criticized because it’s dangerous, but hegemony of some form is typical (and possibly necessary) in any given societal arrangement. A functional government is always hegemon within its territory, for instance. Modern governance limits the danger of hegemony by breaking it up between competing groups, but these groups possess the hegemony of the state between them. There may exist other powers that compete or limit a hegemon, but a hegemon is dramatically more powerful than rivals. Rhea was hegemon: the dominant power in Fodlan, a single figure who stands at the top of Fodlan’s hierarchies (albeit a power in decline by all accounts, evidenced by the incomplete loss of influence in Adrestia and the weakened ability to invoke Fodlan’s armies for the Church’s purposes). Byleth inherits that title in most routes. Edelgard can be emphasized as a hegemon in Fodlan only insofar as she represents a new hegemonic structure, i.e., a hegemon besides the head of the Church of Seiros.

[8] I feel the need to mention this because people have used semiotics and observations about biology for several noxious philosophies. Racism, for one, especially since the theory was first developed in the middle of scientific racism’s peak. Or the argument that infants don’t deserve protection because they supposedly can’t express preferences (from Peter Singer, but also an idiotic claim on the facts).

[9] If anyone recalls what I wrote about Edelgard as an empath, part of that was that she seems a lot like what is described as an orchid child, i.e., a child who blooms with support but wilts without it (as opposed to more resilient children who have less extreme outcomes). Wilted flower checks out.

sayaka miki is good and deserves the world and her story is very sad and ppl often kinda miss what’s going on so im gonna talk about how much was hurting her :(

[MADOKA SPOILERS]

ppl sometimes miss all of what sayaka miki was goin through that turned her into a witch and it’s not just boy stuff so here’s a list cuz she’s brilliant:

the train scene:

it’s a way bigger deal than it might seem; there’s a reason she becomes a witch right after

  • predation on innocence; the scene is about predation on people like her (sincere, good-willed, loyal, etc)
  • loss of innocence
  • violent disruption of her justice-oriented worldview
  • moral distress b/c she can’t fix the situation (neither force nor appeal to morality)
  • even getting rid of the dudes doesn’t heal the victims or mean they weren’t taken advantage of
  • sexual exploitation/womanizing is genuinely horrible and shocking
  • the callousness
  • ppl using peace+safety to hurt others when she’s fighting hard to create that peace+safety
  • ideological dysphoria: the shock to your own identity when you suddenly arent motivated by or faithful to your core values, often due to feeling dead inside/intense pain.

[aside: i had a “train scene” of my own. it remains one of the most painful experiences ive ever had.see my essay on moral distress: http://octagonsun.com/moral-distress-a-systemic-issue-in-l2-teaching/… moral distress is serious: trauma symptoms arising when a person cant act according to their moral beliefs, esp when they witness profound hurt and cant help. really common in helper jobs like teaching&nursing. ruins lives]

other big events:

  • ptsd from witnessing mami’s murder
  • being intentionally misled to believe she could be strong enough to make the world better and then being particularly weak as a meguca – body dysphoria due to “zombification” (separation of soul from body)
  • kyubey intentionally manipulating her emotions & exposing her to toxic experiences b/c that’s its intent from the beginning – traumatic physical pain&injury, including kyoko fights and witch fights (even if it physically heals, the memory of intense pain doesnt just disappear)
  • and of course, the boy problems. she doesn’t feel worthy to stand up for herself b/c of zombification, doesn’t believe she’s capable of love (deeply disturbing), tension between wanting to let hitomi pursue happiness at her expense & stand up for herself (honestly hitomi isn’t a v good friend here, but it’d be normal middle school drama if not for the rest)
  • kyubey tries to separate her from emotional support

all this happens over a short period. every one of these is hard to absorb emotionally+possibly shattering. but we don’t have an adult here; it’s a kid dealing with all this, with little guidance or nurture. sayaka miki is full of strength and good. she’s a wonderful child. but that breaks under intense, intentional duress and it’s totally unfair to hold that against her.

[Originally written for twitter]

A Historical Perspective on Edelgard and Political Nonviolence

Edelgard’s declaration of war is often criticized by appeals for using nonviolent methods of change. This criticism most often looks like the argument that Edelgard should’ve just talked it out with Rhea and/or Dimitri. It may also manifest as the claim that Edelgard’s cause is not urgent enough to justify violence, so only nonviolent means are permissible. Now, before we get into this, I should note that I am a prima facie pacifist for the sake of disclosure.[1]

Historical Significance of Political Nonviolence

I’m not going to say it would have been impossible for nonviolent strategies to work. Everything that follows refers to probabilities, viability, and limitations, not unconditional truths. However, the nonviolent argument is ahistorical. While the philosophy of personal nonviolence is old, the philosophy of political nonviolence is modern. Here, I refer to political nonviolence as the belief that nonviolence is an effective means to effect political change. Political nonviolence could not exist until human rights, rule of law, and (to a lesser extent) democracy had become reality. It is only because these conditions are common that we can contemplate nonviolence as a political option. As George Orwell observed:

It is difficult to see how Gandhi’s methods could be applied in a country where opponents of the regime disappear in the middle of the night and are never heard of again. Without a free press and the right of assembly, it is impossible not merely to appeal to outside opinion, but to bring a mass movement into being, or even to make your intentions known to your adversary.[2]

Freedom of speech, press, and assembly are prerequisite to the formation of a nonviolent movement. Rule of law is necessary so that violent opponents of nonviolent protesters cannot act with impunity – paramilitary groups, members of the government, and lone actors must all be held responsible or expected to be held responsible for attacks on nonviolent protesters. Democracy aids nonviolence since nonviolence relies on popular support, but is neither essential nor sufficient (after all, Socrates was democratically executed). Before these conditions existed, nonviolence was a philosophy of individual conduct – it was not considered a method to effect political change. Striking, protesting, and the like are not effective against someone who is willing to kill innocents in the name of preserving their power. (Just as Peasant Revolts were wildly unsuccessful, a Peasant Picket Line is a laughable concept.) It just is not possible to develop a serious philosophy of political nonviolence in the medieval political environment.

On the subject of monarchy, violence is nearly the only form of regime change. Since the monarch controls policy, policy change can only come by changing the monarch’s beliefs (usually only possible as an adviser) or by changing the monarch (assassination, coup, invasion, kidnapping, etc). For an outsider to change the monarch’s beliefs, the outsider must do more than convince the monarch. The outsider must overcome the (probably hostile) influence of the monarchy’s staff. The staff may be advisers, guards, bureaucrats, or messengers. Whatever their station, officials are unlikely to aid anti-establishment causes and are likely to resort to censorship or false reporting. Monarchs are powerful forces for the establishment, but are generally less effective vehicles of reform.

As a corollary, even if the monarch is sympathetic to an anti-establishment message, the monarch must change the moods of all their enforcers. That is an enormous challenge logistically, legally, and politically, even for a monarch. Monarchy is not prone to dramatic ideological change unless the people themselves are readied to make the same change.[3] The renaissances and ideological revolutions of the medieval era were organic. A monarch, or an aspiring agitator, could not have willed them into existence.

Nonviolence in Fodlan’s Political Environment

Now, let’s look at Edelgard’s options for peaceful change. First off, diplomacy with Rhea is a nonoption. Rhea is dogmatic, totalitarian, and does not recognize freedom of discourse. Rhea is the only single figure that could bring about change across Fodlan, but she is not in a position where she is willing to listen to a political opposition. Centuries of hegemony warp the mind and it is no wonder that she has a hard time taking any vision but hers seriously, for all other ideologues die without damaging her position. The other lords aren’t particularly promising either. Dimitri is highly unstable, even pre-timeskip, prone to blinding emotion during disagreements, and pro-establishment (though not radically so). His refusal to recognize that it is impossible for Edelgard to be behind the tragedy of Duscur is demonstrative. As for Claude, there is no particular advantage to diplomacy. Edelgard considers Rhea her adversary and Dimitri considers Edelgard her enemy. Claude being on Edelgard’s side would not move us closer to a Golden Route. Further, his own desire to conquer Fodlan, coupled with his manipulative and secretive nature make him a poor partner for Edelgard. In short, the personalities of Edelgard’s counterparts leave me with little trust in the diplomatic process.

It is also reasonable to suppose that Edelgard would be a nonparty to the political scene without a war. Edelgard’s rise to power was likely contingent on starting a war. Her main benefactors are House Hevring and House Bergliez, both of which benefit from a war. House Hevring’s main source of revenue is mining and its main duty is administration. Thus, their best method for accruing power is land, the primary form of wealth prior to industrialization. More land -> more mines/exploitable resources and more land -> more need for Hevring’s administrative role. Wartime also increases demand for mining (stone and ore for armor, weapons, and fortifications) and heightens their influence over domestic policy as competitors shift focus to external affairs. As for House Bergliez, they command the army. They have more power during wartime. They stand to benefit from the boost to attention and prestige. Even if they aren’t warhawks in particular, they are unlikely to oppose war on ideological grounds. We do not know Count Bergliez or Count Hevring to be idealistic in any sense (Count Hevring participated in the Insurrection of the Seven, after all). Since they do not care for Edelgard’s vision, the war remains as the biggest factor distinguishing her and PM Aegir. For his part, PM Aegir has shown no hawkish inclinations over the course of his rule. Therefore, if Hevring and Bergliez want a war, Edelgard is their only option.

Without the title of Emperor, Edelgard would have little political influence, especially in foreign affairs. Even with the title, nonviolence is especially impotent on the international scale: “Applied to foreign politics, pacifism either stops being pacifist or becomes appeasement.”[2] As a puppet or figurehead, Edelgard would have no leverage and no means beyond her own charisma. Rhea and Dimitri, her primary adversaries, are violently unstable – “the assumption, which served Gandhi so well in dealing with individuals, that all human beings are more or less approachable and will respond to a generous gesture, needs to be seriously questioned. It is not necessarily true, for example, when you are dealing with lunatics.”[2] Even without the violence, they are still dogmatic and closed off to Edelgard’s influence. This all combines to make diplomacy unviable.

Summary

Political nonviolence would be an anachronism in FETH.[4] Even in theory, it is out of place. Considering the particulars of Fodlan, the case for nonviolence gets even worse. The promise of a war was probably necessary for Edelgard to retake power in the Empire.

I’ve written this because <3 Edelgard, but also because it really is important to understand the history, limits, and nature of our ideals. This is a bit personal, but I’ve been troubled by the rise of ideologues throughout modern society and how they call dogma “idealism” or “faith to their principles.” And I think it’s something to watch out for/keep in mind.

[1] Prima facie pacifism “presumes that war is wrong but allows for exceptions [and] places the burden of proof upon the proponent of war: it is up to the proponent of war to prove, in a given circumstance, that war is in fact morally necessary” (Standord Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Pacifism).

[2] Reflections on Gandhi, George Orwell, 1949

[3] The Adrestian people seem readier to accept ideological change than the others. For one part, Adrestia seems to suffer from more extreme examples of the abuses that exist throughout Fodlan. For another, the Adrestian people have no common ideology that shores up these abuses. By contrast, Faerghus seems the least ready for change. Even though Faerghus’ culture is full of severe abuse, the Faerghus culture shores up these abuses. A normal participant of Faerghus culture (esp. the knightly ideal) is discouraged from criticizing the aristocracy, the religious ideologues, and the dogmatic cultural norms. Faerghus culture is self-preserving and shifts attention from itself: every character from Faerghus (excluding Felix and Jeralt to some degree) criticizes those around them or themselves for their suffering, not the systems, laws, and beliefs that cause suffering. This being the case, Faerghus may well resent many of Edelgard’s reforms in Crimson Flower, but reform is more likely to come by conquest than from within. Funnily enough, there is a real-life novel that would be perfect for the people of Faerghus, especially literary folk like Ingrid and Ashe: Don Quixote, or my preferred title, El Ingenioso Hidalgo Don Quijote de la Mancha (The Ingenious Gentleman Don Quixote of La Mancha). Don Quixote was written specifically as a criticism of the chivalric ideal and as a parody of chivalric novels, the same ideal that plagues Faerghus. Miguel de Cervantes’ genius would probably strike a chord with many Faerghus readers.

[4] Another anachronistic idea that I see a lot is new players’ preference for the Leicester Alliance. They see Adrestia and Faerghus and, based on the fact that monarchy is bad, decide that the Alliance is preferable. Some may even mistake the Leicester Alliance as being close-ish to democracy, which, as moderns, we are supposed to prefer in all circumstances. However, the Alliance is an aristocratic oligarchy, which is one of the worst forms of government. In fact, Plato’s Republic goes out and calls it the absolute worst form of government, out of all forms it considers. It inherits almost all the foibles of monarchy and the weaknesses of democracy: indecision, corruption, excessive concentration of power, an elite class formed by blood, etc.

[Originally written 04 May 2021 for r/Edelgard]

Con amor, el noir: Una teoría de empatía literaria

El noir es un género emocional. Por tanta preocupación que los personajes noir tienen con la lógica, tanto ellos como los lectores reconocen el espacio que existe más allá de la lógica—el mismo espacio que sirve para darle al noir su identidad, aparte de la novela policiaca y la novela detectivesca (véase Copjec 178-183). Dentro del hueco dejado por la lógica, surge una disposición emocional en particular: la empatía. Es de la empatía que el noir saca la mayoría de su valor literaria. La empatía es una de las motivaciones principales de la filosofía noir, igual que un factor esencial de sus resultados. La empatía también asegura que el género no degenere en su propia vileza. El rol clave de la empatía se debe al ambiente de emoción negativa que crea el noir, el cual ambiente ha recibido recientemente el nombre de noir affect. Sin la empatía, el afecto noir quedaría tóxico y no recibiría lectura fuera del contexto nihilista.

Este estudio discutirá los temas mencionados de esta manera: se establecerá la base del afecto noir, la empatía será identificada como elemento sine qua non de este afecto. Como el afecto es un fenómeno con elementos fuertes de subjetividad, el punto de referencia afectiva tendrá que ser el del autor, en este caso, en relación con la novela Montevideo noir, por Hugo Burel. Habrá referencias ocasionales a las experiencias afectivas de otros autores que las han descrito e interacción con otros textos, cuando es relevante. Sugiero que un estudio fuertemente empático puede hacerse con cualquier texto noir, sin sugerir que todos los autores desearían o anticiparían tal lectura. El noir tiene su componente empático en sí, donde la empatía esté ausente, el texto carecerá del afecto noir.

1. El afecto noir

Empezamos con el afecto noir. Existe mucho desacuerdo en cuanto a la definición, la ontología, la causalidad, la posición, etc., del afecto dentro de las disciplinas diversas que se han valido del concepto. Aquellas discusiones quedan fuera de este estudio: nos conformamos con considerar el afecto noir. Para los propósitos del afecto general, adopto la definición de Carroll y Russell: “genuine subjective feelings and moods (as when someone says, ‘I’m feeling sad’), rather than thoughts about specific objects or events (as when someone calmly says, ‘The crusades were a sad chapter in human history’). Affect can be assessed at any given moment, rather than only in times of great emotion” (3-4). El afecto noir, entonces, es formado por los sentimientos que corresponden al noir, tanto los sentimientos efémeros y reactivos de una lectura como el humor que el lector asociará con el libro después de haberlo terminado.

Breu y Hatmaker han propuesto que la presencia del afecto noir sea la definición total del noir. No proveen una definición exacta, pero quizá con la razón de que el noir tiene cierta hostilidad con las definiciones libres de ambigüedad. Proveen las palabras siguientes para bosquejar el concepto:

In trying to define noir, we encounter the same forms of negativity that characterize the work of the form itself. Noir itself foregrounds fractiousness, divisiveness, conflict, and dissension. Moreover, it is preoccupied with belatedness, retrospection, fatality, inadequacy, and intransigence. It also marks the elusiveness of subjects to definition and even to self-knowledge. (3)

De este bosquejo, se nota que el afecto noir está vinculado en todo a la filosofía noir. Si la filosofía noir se trata del nihilismo, la incertidumbre, la posmodernidad y la fatalidad, el afecto noir es la crisis existencial que estos asuntos filosóficos suelen traer consigo. En general, el afecto es dividido entre el afecto positivo y el afecto negativo. El afecto positivo corresponde a conceptos como el amor, la felicidad y la seguridad, mientras que el afecto negativo se relaciona con sentimientos como el enojo, la tristeza y el temor. En base de estas filosofías, el afecto noir es de la clase negativa: “an understanding of noir as characterized by negative affect is the central premise” (Breu y Hatmaker 3).

En el caso de Montevideo noir, yo describiría el afecto de la primera porción de la novela como una ansiedad nauseabunda. El protagonista, Gabriel Keller, se ha fascinado con la estética del asesinato perfecto a través de la lectura de una novela noir llamada Asesino a sueldo, esta novela protagonizada por un Murray Sullivan. A la vez, Keller sufre de la soledad y la pérdida de su familia (su esposa perdida a la muerte y su hijo a la mudanza remota) y descubre un amor tentativo para una vecina, Beatriz, y un odio convencido hacia su novio, Javier Brentano.

La ansiedad mencionada tiene varios elementos. Primero, hay el miedo que Keller imite la trama de Asesino a sueldo. A este miedo, se suma un miedo específico: Murray Sullivan mató a la mujer a quien él había tratado de salvar. Mientras se deshace la división entre la realidad (ficticia) de Keller y la trama de Asesino a sueldo (una ficción dentro de una ficción), se produjo en mí una preocupación intensa de que Keller mate a Beatriz. La severidad de este peligro es atestiguada por las palabras que Keller se asevera débilmente cuando comprende las razones que Murray Sullivan teñía cuando mató a la mujer: “Finalmente se dijo que era solo una novela y que la realidad suele ser muy diferente” (41). Este segundo miedo se distingue del primero por afectos. Que Keller mate a Brentano, por ejemplo, es grave, pero es menos grave gracias al afecto negativo del caso: Keller puede inculcar en el lector parte del odio que Keller siente. El lector no tiene que depender totalmente de Keller para este afecto negativo, cuando aprende que Brentano es un adicto del azar, es abusivo en su relación con Beatriz y tiene otra novia aparte (aunque solamente la adicción es revelada antes de que Keller mata a Brentano). Por otra parte, el riesgo de que muera Beatriz produce un afecto nauseabundo porque Beatriz produce afecto positivo, ya que es retratada como abnegada, optimista e inocente. En ambos casos, hay un afecto fuertemente negativo asociado con la posibilidad de que Keller mate (una posibilidad que se realiza), pero este afecto es agravado por el afecto positivo hacia Beatriz y aliviado por el afecto negativo hacia Brentano.

Además de estos afectos principales, hay varios afectos auxiliares dentro de la primera porción de Montevideo noir. Por ejemplo, mientras crece el entendimiento de la vileza de Brentano, crece el miedo de que Brentano siga causando daño a Beatriz y a su familia sin sufrir repercusiones, ya que la sociedad no promete ningún castigo para él. Hay también el afecto de la disforia, demostrado cuando Keller se despide de su jefe anterior: “Keller lo miró y de pronto le pareció estar ante un desconocido, alguien que no podía comprenderlo ni saber siquiera remotamente cómo se sentía” (48). La angustia mental y emocional suele producir este sentimiento de aislamiento entre conocidos y, aunque Keller no describe ninguna enfermedad mental específica ni expresa necesariamente una experiencia duradera del trauma, Keller invoca los afectos del trauma en los lectores que conocen trauma por sí mismos a través de este lenguaje.

El afecto noir existe de una manera más limitada después del asesinato de Brentano. Con la muerte de Brentano realizada, la ansiedad y la ambigüedad se han acabado en gran parte. La segunda parte de la novela retrata las acciones de Keller mientras él procura encubrir el crimen y mata a otro en el proceso, es decir, más de lo mismo. La filosofía ha cumplido su propósito y la trama se confirma en lugar de proponer nuevas amenazas existenciales. La trama se enfoca más en hechos y menos en posibilidades.

El afecto noir sufre esta reducción de severidad en gran parte porque hay menos miedo mortal. El peligro que Keller presenta hacia Beatriz se disminuye lentamente. El peligro no es recalcado y pasa de la memoria. Las amenazas que Keller enfrenta no producen un afecto fuertemente malo. Es un caso del reproche que normalmente corresponde al asesinato. Si Keller es capturado y castigado por la ley, es triste, pero es una tristeza cotidiana y fácil de soportar porque se entiende por qué el matador es castigado. La convergencia de la realidad de Keller y de Asesino a sueldo para de una manera asintótica, o sea, son historias paralelas, no historias convergentes.

En base de las diferencias entre el afecto en las dos partes de la novela, el afecto noir no puede ser solamente el afecto negativo, sustenido a lo largo de un texto. A la segunda parte de la novela no le falta de afecto negativo: Keller sigue con odio y hay mucho temor de ser descubierto, arrestado o chantajeado (en fin, Keller sufre un chantaje que le obliga a cometer más asesinatos). Sin embargo, este afecto negativo no produce un afecto fuertemente noir. La fortaleza del afecto noir que rodea Beatriz en la primera parte de la novela viene del afecto positivo que se asocia con ella.

Regresando a la perspectiva de Breu y Hatmaker, un afecto puramente negativo no puede producir “divisiveness,” “retrospection” o “inadequacy” (3) a solas. ¿Quién podrá luchar divisively sin ideología o pasión positivas? ¿Para qué considerará uno el pasado de una manera retrospectiva si no había una posibilidad de un pasado y un presente mejor? ¿Quién se creerá inadecuado si no es adecuado para nada? Copjec también observa la necesidad de un afecto positivo (que ella llama desire) para crear el afecto noir y el gap dentro del cual el noir existe: “Desire is not an impurity that threatens the ‘objectivity’ of the detective but the quasi-transcendental principle that guarantees it. … Desire does not impose a bias but supposes a gap: the detective reads the evidence by positing an empty beyond” (178-179). Copjec invoca el deseo como el medio para contemplar el espacio noir porque la lógica no basta fuera del mundo conocido: la lógica y la filosofía noir tiene que ceder el paso al afecto noir.

Gracias a afectos como el deseo, el afecto noir es tanto un afecto positivo como un afecto negativo. Consistente con la complejidad del noir, hasta el deseo puede convertirse en un afecto negativo: el lector del noir sabrá bien que el deseo puede volverse cáustico. Para entender el afecto noir, hay que “consider the possibility that in many cases one and one does not equal two, at least when it comes to comparing positive and negative affective states. Instead, … most of the time, positive and negative feeling states are independent of one another: a person can be both happy and sad, or even unhappy and not sad” (Potter et al. 75-76). El afecto noir es un conjunto complejo de afectos negativos, positivos e irresueltos que coinciden sin cancelarse.

El afecto noir es el afecto que surge al navegar el espacio noir entre la positividad, la negatividad y la ambigüedad. Sin importar dónde uno se coloca en tal esfuerzo, la diversidad de influencias afectivas del noir garantiza que parte de la jornada pase por espacios desconocidos, el gap de Copjec. En breve, el noir es un encuentro afectivo con el Otro (afectivo porque el encuentro es una experiencia afectiva que solamente es posible gracias también al afecto). Debido al afecto negativo que permea el noir, Copjec concluye que el Otro (“the existence of other people”) es lo más horrible que hay (195). Keller tiene miedo de muchas personas, por cierto, pero, aunque existe tanto desacuerdo, aislamiento y confusión entre él y su sociedad, todavía Keller desea llegar hasta el Otro representado en su hijo lejano y Beatriz. En base de las observancias anteriores en cuanto al rol del afecto positivo, sugiero que el afecto noir no termina con el miedo del Otro, porque la empatía noir representa una búsqueda para algo mejor: hacer las paces con el Otro.

Todo el afecto noir culmina en la necesidad de la empatía en el noir. La empatía es la herramienta precisa para vivir dentro del espacio noir de una manera ventajosa, capaz de procesar los afectos positivos y negativos.

2. Sine qua non: la empatía

La fascinación con el afecto negativo en el noir ha hecho que la empatía pase desapercibida. Este resultado sorprende poco, ya que la oscuridad del noir sobrepasa la que se halla en la literatura general, hasta el punto de que el género recibió su nombre basado en la falta de luz. Sin embargo, es natural que el género se base en la empatía. La empatía, desde el principio, ha sido un fenómeno noir, una contradicción: una expresión de amor y bondad que invita el dolor y la miseria ajenos.

Describo la empatía como una disposición emocional ya que la empatía no es una emoción en sí, sino un conducto por el cual los sentimientos y las disposiciones de otras personas pueden ser transmitidas a otras personas, las personas que ejercen la empatía. Ya que la empatía transmite el afecto en diversas formas, la empatía puede describirse como una atmosfera afectiva: los afectos que uno absorbe del ambiente.

El noir crea una atmosfera empática desde el principio: suele escoger antihéroes y villanos como protagonistas. El protagonismo es una estructura empática, diseñado para ayudar a que el lector comparta los sentimientos del personaje principal, con el fin de que se regocijen y lloren juntamente. En otros géneros, el regocijo y el llanto no son fijados a personas que se regocijan del asesinato o que lloran por la posibilidad de que uno haya matado emocionalmente y no imparcialmente, como hace Keller. La autora Claudia Piñeira explica el proceso empático para personajes de una moralidad tan inadecuada:

¿Quién no puesto en el lugar de unos de los personajes haría el mismo que ellos? Esa cosa de ver a alguien hacer algo que primero decir que no, jamás haría eso y después, si reflexionás, puedes llegar a pensar, bueno, habría que ver yo no estoy en ese lugar. A lo mejor si estuviera en ese lugar podría hacerlo creo que tiene que ver con la empatía, con lograr tener con estos personajes, algunos que se van del límite, puede haber crímenes, puede haber un cuento de terror, distintas circunstancias de las cuales de verdad uno sabe que no estaría allí.”

Este proceso empático es esencial para entender preguntas importantes como por qué existe la violencia y por qué hay personas que están dispuestas a causarle daño al Otro. Hay que considerar el afecto negativo que otras personas experimentan para reconciliarse con ellas. Estos afectos se vuelven todavía más negativos con el entendimiento que cada uno de nosotros somos el Otro de otro. Esta empatía es también importante en el desarrollo de la empatía dirigida de uno a uno mismo: somos todos capaces de volvernos un monstruo en la vista de otras personas y en nuestra propia vista. Si odiamos los monstruos ajenos, más odiaremos la monstruosidad dentro de nosotros.

Keller mismo ejerce la empatía en base de este modelo. Siente una empatía demasiado directa con Murray Sullivan, el protagonista de Asesino a sueldo. Antes de decirse que “era solo una novela y que la realidad suele ser muy diferente,” siente que Murray Sullivan “había actuado como un monstruo. Y sin embargo… [él], como lector no podía condenarlo por completo. El autor había sido capaz de meter una duda en su moralidad” (41).

Otro ejemplo del proceso se halla en Ornstein, un rabino y académico legal, quien pasó en medio de las posiciones de Keller y Piñeira, con deseos de empatía y fuertes desafíos a su capacidad de ejercerla. De joven, el noir le inculcó la filosofía de empatía hacia los desamparados. Las palabras de Bogart en Knock on Any Door le impactaron: “Until we do away with the type of neighborhood that produced this boy, ten will spring up to take his place, a hundred, a thousand. Until we wipe out the slums and rebuild them, knock on any door and you may find Nick Romano” (citado en Ornstein 7). Después, Ornstein

learned what victims of crimes come to understand the hard way: A crime is a brazen, traumatizing act of cruelty and an abuse of power, no matter who commits it or the circumstances of that person’s life that led that person to become a criminal. It took me time and maturity to recognize that justice against criminals for their crimes must constantly be balanced against mercy for the sometimes terrible circumstances that contributed to their actions. (8)

El afecto noir no es aditiva. Lo malo es malo y lo bueno es bueno, sin que el bueno impida lo malo y viceversa. La empatía noir, por lo tanto, no puede negligir ni lo bueno ni lo malo para lograr la empatía que Piñeira y yo tanto deseamos. Una cantidad de oscuridad y una cantidad igual de luz no son cero en suma porque son cantidades independientes. El malo debe ser reconocido, pero también la humanidad de la gente que comete maldades merece reconocimiento. Tratar de añadir y comparar lo bueno y lo malo, como si fuesen números compatibles, sería disminuirlos. Si la suma del bien y el mal en un texto favoreciera a lo bueno, tendría que faltarle respeto a la humanidad de los que han obrado mal y, por lo tanto, lo bueno y la empatía se hallarían frustrados. Por otra parte, el favorecer a lo malo sería burlarse de las víctimas—inaceptable para la misma filosofía noir, que reconoce a los victimarios como víctimas, lo cual es la base de la empatía dirigida a las personas dentro del mal. Para expresar fielmente la empatía, hay que tomar el bien y el mal aparte, de modo simultaneo e igual, sin mezclarlos.

Con este modelo de empatía en mente y con deseos de evitar la empatía disfuncional de Keller, la empatía cumple varias funciones para el noir y protege el género de la degeneración en dogmas y vilezas. Sin embargo, los ejemplos anteriores demuestran que la empatía dentro del noir crea riesgos. Lo que describe Piñeira es importante para entender al Otro pacíficamente, pero lo que ocurre en Keller es el caso menos ideal para tal cosa, ya que Keller llega a matar a parte del Otro en base de su empatía para otra parte. El afecto noir, como debe esperarse, siempre conlleva riesgos. La realidad no suele ser muy diferente de lo que ocurre con Keller: la empatía parcial se halla en la violencia tribal y el terrorismo (Hartevelt Kobrin 108; Putilin 359-361). La empatía es el vencimiento del afecto positivo y la reconciliación con el Otro, mientras que la vida de Keller representa una fe demasiada en el afecto negativo y una empatía parcial. La tarea del afecto noir necesita ser una empatía universal, o tiene riesgo de destruirse y convertirse en odio del Otro y de uno mismo (tal como el afecto noir ha sido entendido por tanto tiempo por autores como Copjec y Conard).

Esta tarea es difícil. El afecto negativo dentro del afecto noir puede dañar al lector de varias maneras, no solamente convertirlo al tribalismo o a la violencia. Por ejemplo, el afecto negativo puede causar el enfoque excesivo en uno mismo y, consigo, ansiedad social, ansiedad general y depresión (Mor y Winquist 638). El retrato de la criminalidad crea un riesgo de la angustia moral (del inglés moral distress), o sea, angustia relacionada con no cumplir con la conciencia de uno al ver la victimización de uno mismo o de otra persona. Los textos noir pueden recordarle al lector de diversos problemas sociales en los cuales el lector no puede actuar conforme a su conciencia. La angustia moral será más intensa entre más cercano está el lector a las dificultades invocadas en el noir y puede causar una pérdida de moralidad y trastornos físicos y mentales (Devos Barlem y Souza Ramos 612). Además, aunque apenas necesita ser mencionado, si el noir solo causara dolor en el lector sin algún producto positivo (y más que un poco de afecto positivo dentro de la mezcla), ¿quién lo leería?

Recalco que el afecto negativo es una parte esencial del afecto noir y, sin ello, la empatía podría ser extendida hacia el Otro. Entonces, con consideración a estos riesgos y con esfuerzos para no dificultarle la vida al lector sin buenas razones, el afecto noir puede tomar dentro de sí los afectos negativos y positivos. Un afecto altamente negativo, temperado inteligentemente con afectos positivos y contextualizado dentro de una empatía universal puede profundizar los sentimientos del lector y alcanzar un modo de empatía más avanzada. Este estado avanzado se define por poder llegar al Otro después de tomar en cuenta todo el afecto negativo dentro del noir, con todo el miedo del Otro, la inseguridad del ambiente y la inhabilidad de confiar en el bien humano. Que yo pueda desear el bien de Keller y de Brentano, aunque el uno mata al otro y ambos necesitan mejorar su pensamiento moral, es la finalidad de la empatía noir. Deseo el bien, no de ellos (ya que no existen), pero de todas las personas reales que han sufrido, se han confundido y se han perdido como ellos, igual que deseo que las personas como Beatriz puedan librarse de novios abusadores y acosadores. Que la empatía se extienda a Brentano y Keller, no solamente a la inocente Beatriz, importa mucho: la ayuda dirigida a los victimarios ayuda a que las Beatrices del mundo no tengan más novios abusadores y acosadores. Además, esta empatía respeta la inocencia que Brentano y Keller antes tenían y la que quizá no tuvieran culpa en perder.

De esta manera, ni la moralidad ni la empatía dentro del noir apoyan un relativismo verdadero (no es la muerte de Dios, sino una revisión). El impedimento al relativismo se debe a que, tras reconocer las causas de las acciones, no deja de calificarlas como buenas, malas o ambiguas. Si fuese relativista, el noir no sería el género negro, sino el gris. “In many cases one and one does not equal two, at least when it comes to comparing positive and negative affective states” (Potter et al. 75), pero el gris es la resulta de precisamente esto: sumar falazmente el bien y el mal, lo positivo y lo negativo. El noir es negro y blanco. Extiende la empatía sin dejar de reconocer la injusticia de los hechos. Las víctimas merecen este reconocimiento, mientras que los victimarios merecen la empatía.

Un noir sin empatía, un noir verdaderamente gris, que no reprocha la victimización y tiene simpatía para la víctima, perdería su sentido rápidamente y se quedaría como melodrama: “scenes of violence within [melodrama] take on an even darker cast than the shadowy corners and wailing sirens that make us shudder with pleasure and fear in noir. Melodrama may be noir’s bad seed” (Rabinowitz 265). Un noir que se concediese al schadenfreude podría ser melodrama, podría ser horror, pero no sería noir. Los afectos negativos tienen que quedarse negativos: la filosofía noir surge del dolor ajeno y propio, la lástima por la vileza del humano y el conocimiento que las personas pueden comportarse mejor. Es clave que el noir no deje de retratar la crueldad tal como es: cruel, vil, asqueroso. El afecto negativo, asociado con tales eventos, es necesario para interpretar los eventos correctamente y las acciones resultantes, es decir, las tramas noir. Si un texto noir llega a negligir el sufrimiento de las víctimas y negarles empatía, no importa cualquier empatía extendida hacia los victimarios, o sea, sería una hipocresía total. Igualmente, el noir es más rico mientras retrata fielmente la bondad en la humanidad y en la naturaleza. El afecto noir se beneficia del contraste, no solamente de la contradicción.

3. Conclusión

La reconciliación del afecto negativo y positivo dentro del afecto noir, si se puede llamar una reconciliación, es sencillamente el retrato simultáneo. La empatía solamente puede existir si ambos elementos son respetados. Si fuese de otra manera, repito la declaración: no sería un género negro, sino un género gris. La oscuridad existe, pero no se puede entender sin la luz.

Esta simultaneidad es lo que hace que el noir sea un género de tanto significado. El noir se basa en la declaración radical que toda la humanidad, hasta el bellaco, el miserable y el desamparado, debe ser respetada. Mucha literatura declara algo parecido, pero el noir es uno de aquellos lugares excepcionales donde la creencia se pone en práctica. La mayoría de la literatura no alcanza esta fidelidad positiva a la causa humana. Será porque la tarea es difícil y, como se ha propuesto, requiere una contemplación directa y más completa de lo malo, o sea, la mayoría de la literatura no acepta el costo del afecto negativo que se cobra para llegar a la empatía poderosa y positiva que posee el noir. Siempre es difícil hacer que las personas contemplen lo negativo, pero la empatía es una manera de hacerlo y salir con ventajas.

En resumen, el noir es un microcosmos donde se hace una meditación difícil y verdadera: la contemplación simultánea de la hermosura profunda, silvestre, eterna y vital del universo, con la tragedia, la destrucción, el caos, la futilidad y la muerte. Aquí, el bien no borra el mal, ni puede el mal borrar el bien. Sin poder añadir la luz y la oscuridad, el puente que queda para unirlas es la empatía.

Obras citadas

Arias Mariana y Claudia Piñeira. “Entrevista a Claudia Piñeiro – Conversaciones.” YouTube, subido por LA NACION, 7 nov 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8uCcw0LytZs.

Breu, Christopher y Elizabeth Hatmaker, editores. Noir Affect. Fordham UP, 2020.

Breu, Christopher y Elizabeth Hatmaker. “Introduction: Dark Passages.” Breu y Hatmaker, pp. 1-27.

Burel, Hugo. Montevideo noir. Alfaguara, 2016.

Carroll, James y James Russell. “On the Bipolarity of Positive and Negative Affect.” Psychological Bulletin, vol. 125, no. 1, 1999, pp. 3-30.

Conard, Mark. “Nietzsche and the Meaning and Definition of Noir.” The Philosophy of Film Noir, UP of Kentucky, 2005, pp. 7-22.

Copjec, Joan. “The Phenomenal/Nonphenomenal: Private Space in Film Noir.” Shades of Noir: A Reader, Verso, 1993, pp. 167-197.

Devos Barlem, Edison y Flávia Souza Ramos. “Constructing a theoretical model of moral distress.” Nursing Ethics, vol. 22, no. 5, 2015, pp. 608-615.

Hartevelt Kobrin, Nancy. “Nobody Born a Terrorist, but Early Childhood Matters: Explaining the Jihadis’ Lack of Empathy.” Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 10, no. 5, 2016, pp. 108-111.

Mor, Nilly y Jennifer Winquist. “Self-Focused Attention and Negative Affect: A Meta-Analysis.” Psychological Bulletin, vol. 128, no. 4, 2002, pp. 638-662.

Ornstein, Dan. “Balancing Justice and Mercy.” Cain v. Abel: A Jewish Courtroom Drama, U of Nebraska P, 2020, pp. 7-12.

Potter, Phillip, et al. “The Independence of Affects is Context-Dependent: An Integrative Model of the Relationship Between Positive and Negative Affect.” Annual Review of Gerontology & Geriatrics, vol. 17, no. 1, 1997, pp. 75-103.

Putilin, Dimitri. “Tribalism and Universalism: Reflections and Scientific Evidence.” The Oneness Hypothesis, editado por Philip Ivanhoe, et al., Colombia UP, 2018, pp. 351-370.

Rabinowitz, Paula. “Afterword: Melodrama, Noir’s Kid Sister, or Crying in Trump’s America.” Breu y Hatmaker, pp. 261-273.

La locura sana y la violencia enfermiza: Don Quijote como hombre más violento que loco

El nombre Quijote es sinónimo de la locura y lo ha sido por mucho tiempo y en varios idiomas. A pesar de esto, deseo sugerir que esta perspectiva hace hincapié en la cosa equivocada. La locura de Quijote no está en sus ideas o moralidad, sino en la violencia que mutuamente se efectúa entre él y su comunidad. En sí, la palabra locura es poco apta para lo que ocurre con él. Quijote, y los que lo rodean, no son locos, sino violentos. Quijote es la víctima de un proceso de radicalización violenta, mientras la enfermedad mental ha sido el chivo expiatorio por sus disparates. Gracias a la dominancia de la ideología en la mente moderna, combinada con el ajuste de cuentas sobre el maltrato y la falsa representación de las personas con enfermedades mentales, la reforma de la imagen del Quijote tiene un valor cultural aumentado. Para esta discusión, se estudiarán primero los problemas con la asociación entre las hazañas de Quijote y sus errores de percepción, o sea, su enfermedad mental. Este componente tiene como propósito principal desvincular el legado de Quijote con la enfermedad mental. Después, se desarrollará la tesis alternativa que asociará la identidad de Quijote con la ideología violenta, la cual es, en este caso, la misma ideología caballeresca.

1. La tesis de la insania

Para demostrar unos problemas en la alegación que Don Quijote es quién es por su locura, podemos tomar el mismísimo ejemplo de las molinas del viento. Famosamente, Quijote percibe las molinas como si fuesen un grupo de aproximadamente treinta gigantes con múltiples brazos de unos diez kilómetros. La abundancia de brazos es sugerida por el desafío levantado por el caballero: “Pues aunque mováis más brazos que los del gigante Briareo, me lo habéis de pagar” (76). Quijote, como ya se conoce, decide que tal grupo ha de ser combatido, ya que “es gran servicio de Dios quitar tan mala simiente de sobre la faz de la tierra” (75).

La interpretación típica de esta escena hace hincapié en el desacuerdo alarmante entre gigantes y molinas de viento. Aunque, por cierto, esto es un problema llamativo, hay un problema de pensamiento más sutil en este episodio. ¿Por qué merecerían la muerte los gigantes por el mero hecho de existir?

No hay nada intrínseca en la idea misma del gigante que justificaría esta reacción. La clasificación de los gigantes como mala simiente va más allá de la definición de un ser con apariencia humana y una altura desmedida. A menos que el tamaño mismo sea tomado como una señal de la virtud, tendría que haber otro indicio para justificar el ataque de Don Quijote. El relato es escaso, tal de que, si existen otras justificaciones, tendrán que ser extratextuales.

El prejuicio que Quijote expresa hacia estos gigantes se vuelve aún menos si se considera el retrato de otros gigantes dentro del texto. Malambruno, en el episodio de la condesa Trifaldi, por ejemplo, es capaz de razonar y, “aunque es encantador, es cristiano y hace sus encantamentos con mucha sagacidad y con mucho tiento, sin meterse con nadie,” además de haber servido una familia real con distinción (856). Si Malambruno, como miembro de la especia de los gigantes, es capaz de fidelidad religiosa, servicio gubernamental y la sabiduría para obrar con encantamientos y magia, la especie obviamente es capaz de una vida altamente moral y filosófica, igual que cualquier humano. Como miembros de la misma especie (a menos que exista una taxonomía desconocida de gigantes), los gigantes molina han de ser capaces de la misma nobleza e inteligencia de Malambruno y Don Quijote mismo.

Por cierto, la descripción de Malambruno viene del artificio de los duques y no de la mente de Quijote. El otro gigante principal en la historia, el que atemoriza a la princesa Micomicona y su nación, tampoco es de la invención de Quijote. Esto limita la aplicación de sus casos al caso de las molinas, aunque no deja de establecer que la idea de gigantes pacíficos, cristianos o inteligentes es compatible con el entendimiento que tiene Quijote del mundo.

Para resolver esta ambigüedad, pensemos en las diferentes maneras por las cuales una molina de viento puede volverse un gigante. Por ejemplo, quizá los gigantes tuviesen un parecer espantoso, o el grupo, el parecer de unos invasores, y, gracias a la valentía de Quijote, él poseía la capacidad de enfrentarse a ellos para defender el país. Los artistas han interpretado a los gigantes de varias maneras, generalmente con varios brazos, rostros enojados y a veces con espadas (las espadas sirven también como una transformación de las aspas de las molinas) (véase “The Giants (Don Quijote)” para varios ejemplos). La manera consistente de retratar a los gigantes con disposiciones violentas será garantizada porque Quijote mismo los describe como violentos.

La dificultad que surge en la narración de Quijote es que la percepción errónea de gigantes, en sí, no tiene mucha razón de proporcionarles un aspecto violento. Es posible que sí, Quijote los percibe de esta manera independiente de todos los demás factores como la ideología. Aunque existe esta posibilidad, no existe razón para pensar que la tergiversación de la vista sea ponderada para preferir imágenes violentas. Es decir, la tergiversación debe ser un proceso más o menos neutro y aleatorio. Entonces, si los gigantes violentos tienen un parecer violento solamente en consecuencia de la percepción y no de otra cosa, este resultado tendría que corresponder puramente al azar. Si llamamos el proceso de tergiversación T, con la entrada de la imagen original y la salida de las imágenes potenciales que podría ver Quijote, entonces T(molina de viento) = {cualquier gigante} + {otros objetos aparte de gigantes}. Tomemos por sentado que la percepción nos mostrará gigantes y no otra cosa para descartar el conjunto de objetos aparte de gigantes, como torres, castillos, montañas y espíritus. Aunque limitemos así T(molina de viento) a {cualquier gigante}, el conjunto de cualquier gigante incluye gigantes violentos, gigantes pacíficos, gigantes neutros, gigantes que le causan un dialogo para cambiar su perspectiva sobre los gigantes. La figura 1 ilustra la poca diferencia entre un gigante que agita los brazos y un gigante que labra la tierra con azadas, desde el punto de vista de T. Los estímulos visuales, como el contorno de una imagen y la relación de los componentes, permiten muchas interpretaciones tergiversadoras. En breves palabras, el resultado no es único. La apariencia violenta no deja de ser posible, pero es lejos de inevitable o garantizada.

Figura 1.

Por consiguiente, el error de percepción asociado con la enfermedad mental (bajo el nombre tradicional de locura) difícilmente justifica a solas el episodio con las molinas del viento. Además, la atribución de la violencia de Don Quijote a la enfermedad mental se basa en un prejuicio no científico que falazmente sugiere las personas que sufren la enfermedad mental son más violentas que las personas sin tales enfermedades. Hasta las enfermedades mentales más asociadas con la violencia, como la esquizofrenia y el trastorno bipolar, no producen una taza de violencia mucho más alta que la taza de violencia en la población general. Aproximadamente 4% de toda la violencia societal parece ser el resultado de la enfermedad mental (Fazel et al.; Harvard Mental Health Letter). La enfermedad mental que sí se asocia con violencia elevada es el trastorno del uso de substancias, el cual no se halla presente en ninguna manera en Don Quijote. La violencia que ocurre en las personas con enfermedad mental es parecida a la que ocurre en cualquier persona: “[it] stems from multiple overlapping factors interacting in complex ways. These include family history, personal stressors (such as divorce or bereavement), and socioeconomic factors (such as poverty and homelessness)” (Harvard Mental Health Letter).

Ya que los elementos que generalmente instan la violencia están ausentes en Don Quijote, quien lleva una vida ociosa y cómoda, la tesis de locura, o en palabras más adecuadas, la tesis de enfermedad mental, es menos confiable o estable que generalmente se considera. Por cierto, Don Quijote sufre de alguna tergiversación desconocida de su percepción, pero no son los errores de percepción lo que le inculcó un deseo de matar gigantes y salir en tres aventuras para vencer y luchar.

En la sociedad actual, la enfermedad mental ha llegado a ser un chivo expiatorio para explicar todo tipo de violencia masiva: “Media accounts of mass shootings by disturbed individuals galvanize public attention and reinforce popular belief that mental illness often results in violence. Epidemiologic studies show that the large majority of people with serious mental illnesses are never violent” (Fazel et al.). El autor de este ensayo conoce personalmente los prejuicios asociados con la violencia masiva: de joven, cada vez que hubo un tiroteo masivo, como yo era callado, los compañeros de la escuela me dirigían el cliché vil: siempre son los callados. Esta persecución de personas con enfermedad mental no es justificada, especialmente con el conocimiento de que la persona que es más amenazada por la enfermedad mental es el mismo que sufre: la enfermedad mental sí se asocia con el suicidio (Frazer et al.).

Hay una necesidad urgente para cambiar la perspectiva alrededor de la violencia societal y la enfermedad mental, tanto para apoyar y proteger a los que sufren de la enfermedad mental como para combatir la violencia societal y ayudar a que las personas no lleguen a expresar impulsos violentos. La enfermedad mental no puede seguir siendo un chivo expiatorio por la violencia.

2. La tesis ideológica

El modelo alternativo que propongo para la locura quijotesca es la de la ideología. Don Quijote es víctima de la radicalización. Igual que en los casos del terrorismo, no es culpa de la enfermedad mental, sino de la fe basada en una ideología violenta. Quijote comete violencia masiva y dirigida repetidamente a lo largo de la historia. Una brevísima selección incluye los episodios siguientes: las molinas del viento, la lucha con el vizcaíno y su caravana, el robo del barbero, la lucha con los galeotes y los leones (estos episodios son mucho más frecuentes en la primera novela, conforme al humor distinto de la segunda novela). Por suerte, la tergiversación de perspectiva y la ausencia de enemigos auténticos u oficiales (como lo fueron los moros) aseguran que, en la mayoría de los casos, los ataques de Quijote son sin víctimas, pero no cambia la naturaleza del hecho. Que él no sea homicida resulta del cuidado de los con quienes se encuentra, no por virtud de él.

La pregunta fundamental de esta sección es por qué Don Quijote está tan predispuesto a usar la violencia en sus encuentros. Tal como Cervantes podría haber señalado, es culpa de la ideología caballeresca. Esta ideología es homicida en sí. Quijote mismo dijo: “¿y dónde has visto tú o leído jamás que caballero andante haya sido puesto ante la justicia, por más homicidios que hubiese cometido?” (91). El caballero tiene muchísima confianza en la capacidad y la justicia de cometer violencia libremente. Mientras Quijote vive bajo esta ideología, busca aventuras, donde la aventura requiere violencia. Por consiguiente, Quijote eleva la probabilidad de violencia en todo encuentro en que se halla. Él busca la violencia y, por lo tanto, necesita que los extranjeros sean violentos para justificar su violencia.

La ideología caballeresca tiene por lo menos dos axiomas. Primero, el caballero ejerce su oficio a través de la violencia. Segundo, la violencia caballeresca es justificada. Las circunstancias y el carácter de los demás tienen que conformar con esta verdad. Estos dos axiomas, por ejemplo, permiten que la violencia entre dos caballeros, por tan inútil y frívolo que sea, sea normalizada.

De regreso a los gigantes de las molinas, dentro de la ideología, caben muchas justificaciones para matar a cualquier gigante. La justificación más fácil será el racismo, el cual se halla fuertemente en la filosofía medieval y en los libros de caballería (aunque el racismo de la época de Cervantes es menos sistematizado como en la actualidad, o sea, la filosofía alrededor del concepto era menos formal, relacionada, cohesiva y desarrollada. De este modo, muchos elementos de la obra de Cervantes critica instantes del racismo sin llegar a una condenación sistemática del racismo). La ideología también se vale de conexiones superficiales con la religión, por lo que, dentro de la caballería, los pecados de Goliat bastarán para la condenación de la especie. Otra posibilidad es que los gigantes presentan en sí un riesgo a la seguridad popular, debido a su capacidad intrínseca militar, pero esto no es muy distinto al caso racista. Es difícil, en fin, que la tergiversación visual justifique la violencia quijotesca, pero la ideología provee muchas maneras fáciles para hacer lo mismo. Se dijo anteriormente que la tergiversación no tiene una probabilidad muy alta de crear una imagen de gigantes violentos sin algo que añada un sesgo al proceso. La ideología es precisamente aquel sesgo.

Hay espacio para decir que existen méritos parciales de la ideología del Quijote; validez que sería mayor si no fuese por la violencia. Por ejemplo, la historia está llena de personas que, de veras, tienen necesidad de ayuda extrajudicial para ayudarles donde las estructuras oficiales les han fallado. Esto incluye a Andrés, Dorotea, Cardenio, Lucinda, Doña Rodríguez, su hija, Ricote, Ana Félix y Roque Guinart. La mayoría es ayudada por la buena suerte o la intervención divina, mientras que Roque Guinart se hace la ayuda extrajudicial que necesita. En sí, de todos los personajes, Guinart es el que quizá más vive el credo caballeresco, pero se vuelve ladrón por organizarse con otros (el modelo del caballero andante a solas es reemplazado por la sistematización formal en un grupo de rebeldes, ya que el sistema les permite combatir con enemigos organizados a pesar de los avances de tecnología que tanto amenazan al caballero anacrónico). El punto decisivo se halla precisamente en que Quijote es demasiado violento y no lo usa medidamente. Así que, por tanta necesidad que la España de Cervantes tenía para un sabio armado viajero y fuera de la ley, la violencia acaba creando tantos problemas como resuelve (con referencia a la tortura de Andrés, la libertad de los galeotes y la autoflagelación de Sancho).

Que la ideología caballeresca sea condenada por el libro de Cervantes y que sea demasiado violenta no son conclusiones tan sorprendentes en sí. Más bien, este estudio sugiere que la violencia ideológica es el problema esencial de la novela, no la locura. Debemos clasificar a Don Quijote como radicalizado, en lugar de disparatado. De hecho, un estudio de la literatura caballeresca sugiere que la radicalización violenta no es tan accidental: el género es un género de modelos, enseñanzas, hechos e ideales que imitar, tanto dentro de las crónicas como las ficciones caballerescas. Bellis y Leitch documentan este fenómeno:

Chivalric literature was practical, not just in that it instructed knights in their métier … but in that it reflected to medieval society the image of its proper order. It was both inspirational and corrective, as Hoccleve’s advice to the Lollard Sir John Oldcastle made clear: ‘Clymbe no more in holy writ so hie!’ but ‘Rede the storie of Lancelot de lake,/ Or Vegece of the aart of Chiualrie,/ The seege of Troie or Thebes’. … Chivalric literature reinforced patterns of conduct and the proper structure of society: restraint and obeisance, exercising and recognising authority, muscularity moral and literal, when to stand and when to bend. (242)

A esto, se añade la declaración del cronista medieval Froissart: “In order that the honourable enterprises, noble adventures and deeds of arms which took place during the wars waged by France and England should be fittingly related and preserved for posterity, so that brave men should be inspired thereby to follow such examples, I wish to place on record these matters of great renown” (citado en 243). Esta literatura tiene elementos de enseñanza loable—“chivalry signified knights, fighting, and the ideas that encouraged them to be more than trained thugs”—pero no podemos escapar del hecho de que la literatura caballeresca fue diseñada para un mundo violento y que aumenta la violencia en personas como Quijote (251-252).

Figura 2.

Quijote no fue el último radicalizado por la literatura caballeresca, ya que la estética de los cruzados y los caballeros ha sido adoptada por extremistas derechistas. Esta adoptación llega hasta el odio del islam, un eco nefasto y aterrador de las campañas españolas contra los moros. Koch documenta, por ejemplo, un meme de una página (ya removida) de Facebook de la Liga de Defensa Española que combina dentro de contextos modernos la imagen caballeresca con la ecuación prejuiciado entre el islam y el terrorismo (17) (véase fig. 2). Koch resume la relación entre lo caballeresco y el derecho extremo en la modernidad:

For the extreme right wing (either the CJM or neo-Nazis and fascists) circles, Christianity is under a religious and demographic threat, posed by Muslims in general and by Jihadis in particular. … Right wing individuals, groups, movements, parties and organizations in Europe and North America use the same militant-religious symbols and rhetoric, … to provide an appropriate response to what they see as a threat posed by Muslims. Furthermore, it is being used not only as a motivational source … but also for recruitment, mobilization and propaganda. (20)

Entre la apropiación de la caballerosidad, el prejuicio anti-islam y el prejuicio anti-enfermidad mental, la distinción entre un Quijote disparatado y un Quijote radicalizado llega a tener más que un significado literario y filosófico.

3. Conclusión

Ya que Quijote es radicalizado y no disparatado, su declaración “Yo sé quién soy” resulta más verídico (58). Él puede formar su propia identidad, su quién soy, independiente de los esfuerzos de su familia y sus amigos de desradicalizarlo. La identidad de un radicalizado es consciente y, aunque puede ser irracional, no es sin su lógica. Reconocer la identidad de Quijote, tal como él la construyó, nos ayudará a entender mejor su vida y el deseo de Alonso Quijano de ser llamado “El Bueno.” El pensamiento cuidadoso en cuanto a la radicalización, el esfuerzo por la desradicalización y la liberación de la enfermedad mental de las asociaciones falsas con la violencia son proyectos urgentes en la sociedad moderna.

El ejemplo de Don Quijote radicalizado (y el Alonso Quijano desradicalizado) sirve para aviso. El mundo moderno está inundado por las ideologías—quizá la razón porque muchos académicos se ven en Quijote no es la locura, sino la abundancia de ideología que Quijote comparte con la modernidad. Toda ideología con rasgos o elementos violentos, igual que la caballeresca, merece mucha desconfianza. Aunque no participemos de una ideología violenta, el aviso queda para que tengamos más cuidado al poner fe en cualquier ideología, ya que esta nos puede consumir, hasta que salgamos en tres aventuras y muramos arrepentidos. Es decir, evitemos ser un nuevo Quijote. Alonso Quijano, el Bueno, dejó un ejemplo mejor.

Obras citadas

Bellis, Joann y Megan Leitch. “Chivalric Literature.” A Companion to Chivalry, editado por Robert Jones y Peter Coss, Boydell & Brewer, 2019, pp. 241-262.

Cervantes, Miguel de. Don Quijote de la Mancha. 2ª ed. Conmemorativa del IV Centenario Cervantes, editado por RAE, Penguin, 2015.

Fazel, Seena, et al. “Mental illness and reduction of gun violence and suicide: bringing epidemiologic research to policy.” Annals of Epidemiology, vol. 25, no. 5, 2015, pp. 366-376. PubMed Central,doi: 10.1016/j.annepidem.2014.03.004. Accedido 20 abril 2021.

Harvard Mental Health Letter. “Mental illness and violence.” Harvard Health Publishing, enero 2011, https://www.health.harvard.edu/newsletter_article/mental-illness-and-violence. Accedido 20 abril 2021.

Koch, Ariel. “The New Crusaders: Contemporary Extreme Right Symbolism and Rhetoric.” Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 11, no. 5, 2017, pp. 13-24.

“The Giants (Don Quijote).” Villains Wiki, https://villains.fandom.com/wiki/The_Giants_(Don_Quixote)#Gallery. Accedido 20 abril 2021.